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Abstract
While the literature on democracy and its relationship to trust provides little consen-
sus regarding the role of trust, researchers have emphasized the importance of generalized
trust over particularized in relation to democracy. This research marks a departure from
this consensus, and exposes the neglected role of personal relationships in fostering suc-
cessful democracy.
One of the key measurements of democracy in a country is social trust. There are three
forms of trust: generalized, particularized and institutional. Previously, the measurement
of social trust focused on the importance of generalized trust, that is, trust in those we
do not know (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995, et. al). Generalized trust is marked as
having the greatest benefits for democracy. Those who are generalized trusters have the
will to bridge across ethnicities and join civic groups in larger numbers. Institutional
trust is society’s trust in its institutions. Countries ranking high on institutional trust
are also believed to have positive democratic outcomes. By contrast, particularized trust
is often dismissed because it is seen as highly atomizing and, therefore, incapable of
making bridges to ethnic others resulting in a bankruptcy of democratic values. Thus, the
combination of institutional and generalized trust has been the main crux of measurement
and understanding in relation to a country’s ability to democratize.
The problem with this approach is two fold: first, it assumes the unidimensionality
of trust and ultimately resigns a country of trusters to one category or the other with
often negative impacts. The reality is, we are not solely one truster or the other: we are
a combination of each form of trust. Secondly, this approach is Western in focus and
does not account for the differentiation within cultures and is therefore unable to truly
account for trust in a society. Nor does it account for new forms of trust and civil society
in the new digital age. Recently, some questions about the legitimacy of this approach
have surfaced and new methods have been employed to ascertain the true nature of social
trust, however these methods have also fallen short (Gibson 2001; Bhary, et. al. 2005).
x
Because trust is one measure used to determine the amount of democracy in a nation or
the ability for it, accurate description is vital.
Here, the author will take a new approach and focus on the importance of the often
overlooked particularized trust, as well as control for the importance of institutionalized
trust. Using Khodyakov’s (2007) research on trust and the Soviet case as the launching
pad, the author will empirically examine trust in the former Soviet Union today. Using
the most recent World Values Survey data, a new trust variable will be constructed
that will be better able to capture the true, dynamic nature of trust. Placing this new
trust variable in a Bayesian hierarchical linear model which will control for country level
variables, it will be revealed that particularized trust can and does have positive impacts
on support for democracy, debunking current notions to the contrary.
xi
Chapter 1:
Examining the Problem of Social Trust.
Introduction.
The primary goal of this research is to create a new multidimensional trust variable
that will account for the nature of social trust and trust relationships. Social trust can be
generally understood to be "the expectation that arises within a community of regular,
honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other
members of that community."1 There are three accepted forms of trust: generalized,
particularized and institutional. Generalized trust is a form of social trust in which one
trusts the people they do not know. Particularized trust is form of social trust in which
one trusts only the people they do know such as family or friends. Institutionalized trust
is a society’s trust in government institutions. Previously, the measurement of social
trust focused on the importance of generalized trust as being paramount in creating and
fostering a civic culture that values democracy. Social trust is the basis of social capital,
as described by Putnam as being "features of social organization such as networks, norms,
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit."2 While
debate exists about the importance of social capital itself,3 social trust is widely seen as
one of the hallmarks of a vibrant civil society in liberal democracies.
1Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 26.
2Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tra-
ditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), 67.
3Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change
in 43 Societies. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 188.
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As a result, social trust captured the attention of those who study democratization.
Liberal democracy, specifically, is seen by many as being the standard of governmental
systems.4 Liberal democracies not only feature a free press, independent judiciaries, a
rule of law, and effective institutions, but also an active civil society with vast trust
networks and a strong civic culture.5
Our trust relationships with one another and the state have changed over the course
of human history. Though the concept of democracy was first given to us by the ancient
Greek philosophers, it was an idea that had lost favor. After the fall of the Roman Empire
the world6 was largely governed through a series of conquests by feudal lords. Though
feudalism gave way to absolutism, personal trust relationships based on kin remained
largely unchanged and political loyalty and ’trust’ merely shifted from lords to kings.
People were seen as ’subjects’ of the crown whose only purpose was to serve their King,
promoting the stability of the system. Personal family ties, or the "Tyranny of the
Cousins",7 as well as the Church, tightly governed one’s daily life and helped maintain
the political and social order of society. Anyone "beyond the walls" was seen as suspect
and not to be trusted.8 Individualism was treated as dangerous and punished severely.
This state of affairs morphed overtime through the Protestant Reformation and the
subsequent Enlightenment; individualism was no longer feared but rather revered. The
Modern State was coming into its own.9 Democratic principles of life, liberty, and prop-
erty, as well as political accountability, were touted as the Natural Rights of men.10 This
ushered in a wave of revolutionary liberalism that took hold in the English Colonies in
America. Thus began the democratic experiment in earnest. Democracy spread back
4Francis Fukuyama, "The Future of History," Foreign Affairs, September 30, 2013 , accessed April
13, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-01-01/future-history.
5Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 11.; 2002;Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 9-11.
6Referring to the Western world, in particular, though feudalism existed via the Golden Horde, China,
and Japan, for example. Fukuyama 2011
7Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (New York: Penguin Books,
1996).
8Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 18; 108.
9Max Weber, Peter Lassman, and Ronald Speirs, Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 310; 368.
10J. LOCKE and Johnathan Bennett, Second Treatise on Government, comp. Peter Millican and
Amyas Merivale (1956), , March 2008, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf.
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across the water to Europe and was then spread to the far reaches of the Earth via
colonialism11. This ideological shift from the collective based on strong family ties in
pre-modernity to the individual ultimately changed the relationship between "citizens"
-now imbued with rights- and the state. Individuals expected recognition from the state
and from one another. Personal relationships were also transformed; no longer were one’s
relations based solely on family considerations and/ or duties but rather personal choices
and preferences.12 Trust was extended to unknown others through the shrinkages of time
and space attributed to advances in travel and technology. By the end of World War II
and after the defeat of fascism, the promotion of liberal democracy was the paramount
concern of Western powers in an attempt to control the Red Wave or Communist expan-
sion.13 Thus began the global struggle for power between the Communist Soviet Union
and the Democratic West.
When the former Soviet Union collapsed, and with it the old Communist regime in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, liberal democracy was claimed as the new ideal; not
only among the former republics and satellites, but of the Motherland herself.14 This dra-
matic shift towards democracy was marked as the "End Of History", meaning democracy
had won the global struggle against authoritarianism signaling the end of global wars.15
Many wondered how these formerly authoritarian states would fare during this transition
in meeting each of the benchmarks of liberal democracy. Questions, specifically, were
circulated about the formation of civil society in Eastern Europe and Russia.16 Indeed,
Poland was well on its way towards a thriving democratic state already. The active in-
volvement of the Catholic Church, as well as the expansion of the transnational social
11Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Glob-
alization of Democracy (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 301-313.
12Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 4.
13Ernst Gellner, "The Civil and the Sacred" (lecture, Harvard University, Boston),
https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/documents/a− to− z/g/Gellner91.pdf.
14Vladimir Putin, First Person (London: Hutchinson, 2000), 183.; Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, Midnight
Diaries (London: Phoenix, 2001), 248.
15Fukuyama 1998 The "End of History" theory posits democracies do not war with one another. If
the world falls like dominos to democracy, there will be no more war, no more political progressing or
regime change.
16David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York: Random House,
1997), 27. ; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consol-
idating Russia?s Democratic Transition," Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, 2001,
doi:10.4324/9780203428092chapter5.
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movement Solidarity from the ground up both played a major role in that country’s road
to democratization -despite the totalitarian regime trying to push it down. Solidarity, in
particular, was seen as civil society at its best.17
However, when people turned their attention to Moscow, the future of trust and civil
society seemed less hopeful. After all, Russia had two factors working against her: First,
a long history of totalitarian regimes (much longer than other states of Eastern Europe).
Second, persistent low-levels of interpersonal trust, meaning the building blocks neces-
sary for civil society formation are in low supply.18 Some analysts argue that while it is
true there was some civil society in Russia prior to the fall that helped usher in a new
democratic regime, there is little hope for civil society to make a comeback and put down
deeper roots. Without a vibrant civil society, it is argued, all hopes for democratization
will be lost.19 Today, concerns about the future of democracy in the region have borne
fruit as a persistent pattern of backsliding away from democratic ideals has occurred in
some of the post-Communist and post-Soviet states rendering the "End of History" theory
void.20 Analysts see the lack of generalized trust and civil society stemming from "radical
individualism, social anomie and distrust" as well as greed that is prevalent in the govern-
ments of these former Soviet states, including Russia.21 It is because understanding the
cause and patterns of discontent or apathy will help researchers better predict outcomes
or recommend policy prescriptions, having a true understanding of how trust functions
in relation to civil society and the state is vital to the study of democratization.22
This work will explore trust in the context of post-Communist states of Eastern Eu-
rope and Russia in order to help understand how this region trusts in the face of perceived
corruption and government distrust. It will also tackle questions surrounding how long
17Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: an Answer to War? (Oxford: Wiley, 2003).
18James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating
Russia?s Democratic Transition," Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, 2001, ,
doi:10.4324/9780203428092chapter5.;Putnam, 1998; 1995; 1993
19Jeffery J. Mondak and Adam F. Gearing, "Civic Engagement in a Post?Communist State," Social
Capital and the Transition to Democracy : , doi:10.4324/9780203428092chapter9.
20Freedom House "Freedom in the World" 2017
21James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidat-
ing Russia?s Democratic Transition," Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, 2001 ,
doi:10.4324/9780203428092chapter5.
22Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tra-
ditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993).; Ibid.
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histories with authoritarianism has effected social trust and in turn a given society’s
prospect for democratic support. This chapter will proceed as follows: First, the author
will offer a statement of the problem existing in the current literature on social trust
and institutions. Next, the purpose of the study will be explored. This will be followed
by a summary of the questions not adequately explained by the literature, followed by
the hypotheses this project will seek to answer. The author will then provide a brief
discussion on how this work contributes to the discipline and to the body of knowledge.
Finally, the author will end with concluding thoughts and an outline of the chapters to
come.
Statement of the Problem.
While the literature on democracy and its relationship to trust provides little consen-
sus regarding the role of trust, researchers have emphasized the importance of generalized
trust over particularized. My research marks a departure from this consensus, and seeks
to ascertain the true nature of trust and exposes the neglected role of personal relation-
ships in fostering democracy.
There are two main schools of thought in the social trust literature: the culturalists
and the institutionalists. The debate between the two exists around which way the causal
arrow flows. Does trust begin via early associations with family, friends, and flow upwards
and out to others in society and to government institutions as the culturalists believe?23
Or are the institutionalists correct who posit trust considerations are formed later in life
and due to personal experience with institutions, and it is those experiences which flow
downward effecting trust at the individual level?24 The problem with the former is it
is too limiting, implies entrenched trust beliefs, and relies on largely pre-deterministic
outcomes. However, the later assumes some level of rationality; human beings do not
always act or trust rationally. Both do agree, however, social trust is vital for democracy.
Further, generalized trust, that is trust in people you do not know, is believed by both to
23 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in
Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177.
24Bo Rothstein, The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International
Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 145.
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be paramount in fostering trust among those in society, promoting individuals to become
active in social and political groups supporting democratic values. On the other hand
particularized trust, that is the trust in the people you do know such as family and
friends, is believed to be atomizing, blocking society off from those who are different from
them, creating echo chambers in which society cannot grow or learn new information.
A highly particularized society, it is said, is in danger of atomization where social trust
is utterly bankrupt.25 This atomization, the literature indicates, leads to apathy and
distrust in government further creating an environment for anti-democratic attitudes to
take hold. This is understood by both schools of thought to be detrimental to the survival
of democracy or the birthing of it.
Thriving democracies are comprised, in part, of citizens who are active in civic or-
ganizations, such as the Shriners, or the Key Club for example, where unknown others
come together around a common goal or goals of improving society in some specific way.
This exchange with those you do not know allows new information about government and
society to come into one’s world and permits individual and social growth.26 As such, a
reliance on generalized trust measures has become the lingua franca when discussing trust
and its relationship to democracy. However, this approach is problematic and perhaps
unrealistic in some societies who do not have similar forms of civil society and typical,
or Western, trust networks. This mode of thinking blocks from consideration other ways
societies who have a history of authoritarianism have come to understand and trust one
another, as well as their hopes for a different future.
The most common used measure has become the World Values Survey (WVS) gener-
alized trust question which asks "Generally speaking, would you say most people can be
trusted or you cannot be too careful?"27 This single, binary response question is intended
to capture a society’s capacity to trust and foster democracy. The question becomes,
can a unidimensional trust measure, which relies on only one form of how human beings
25Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tra-
ditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 89.
26Ibid., 90.
27Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
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trust, be adequate or reliable in order to predict democratic outcomes and civil soci-
ety? Is it fair to hold societies outside of the Western world to the same standard while
not recognizing other trust networks and relationships that may also benefit democratic
growth? The author of this research believes the answer to this question is a resounding
’no.’ Instead what is needed is a new measure that is flexible and multidimensional that
will more adequately mirror how individuals in society trust. We are not just one sort
of truster or another; rather, we are complex beings who rely on a varied set of trust
networks, both generalized and particularized and to different degrees. Social scientists
understand human beings are difficult to predict because of high variance.28 As such,
the measure must be able to capture the degrees to which individuals reflect different
levels of trust simultaneously. Given the high amounts of variance among human beings,
a dynamic trust measure trust may not fit neatly into the culturalist camp, nor into the
institutionalist camp.
Purpose of this study.
This study seeks to create a new measure for social trust that is more dynamic than
current measures. Because trust is used as part of a litmus test for a country’s ability to
democratize or to sustain it, accurate measurement is paramount. To this end, the author
will rely heavily on Khodyakov’s 29 research suggesting trust is a process of learning
and relearning based on both early socialization and experience. Further, he believes
particularized trust is not as atomizing as previously imagined. This is particularly the
case in post-Communist and post-Soviet countries, due to a history ineffective institutions
causing citizens to form a dualistic view of the state. Khodyakov (2007) calls this the
"Strong-Weak" sate model. The state was seen as both strong in it’s ability to provide
basics such as quality education and global security, however it was seen also as week and
ineffective in providing goods for survival, such as food, or to improve the quality of life
of their citizens. Where the state was unable or unwilling to provide, the state became a
28USA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Sciences Office, Human Social and Be-
havioral Variability: Scientific Challenges and Opportunities, by Adam Russell and Bill Regli..
29Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.
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sort of "non-entity"; society turned to one another to fill those gaps, creating vast social
networks that included intermediaries from different networks and even ethnicities.
The new social trust measure was created with Khodyakov’s (2007) theory of trust
in mind. The author takes his theory a step further, providing empirical testing that
has, thus far, been lacking. As such, it follows logically to first test the measure and
the "Strong-Weak" state model in the post-Communist and post-Soviet context. For a
closer examination of how the new trust variable operates, the case of Russia will isolated
from the region and contextually examined. This approach will have the benefit of also
potentially answering questions surrounding endogeneity or which way the trust causal
error flows.
The multidimensional trust variable was created by using the World Values Survey
(WVS) generalized trust question and particularized trust question and compressing them
into a single variable.30 The result is a 3-leveled trust variable consisting of generalized,
particularized, and a new other category. The author believes this variable will be a more
accurate reflection of how human beings and will have greater accuracy establishing the
relationship between trust and institutions, as well as democratic support.
Research Questions and Hypotheses.
The examination of the relevant literature exposes 3 main questions this research will
seek to answer: 1) Do country-level perceptions of corruption present towards institutions
have a credible impact on how society trusts one another at the individual level? 2) Is
there any credible difference between particularized trust and generalized trust in relation
to one’s support for democracy? 2) In thinking about atomized others, do they have a
credible negative impact on one’s attitudes towards democracy?
In order to answer these questions, three hypotheses have been formed which will be
the backbone of this research. These are:
Hypothesis 1 H1 Country level corruption will not create a credible negative effect on
individual trust outcomes in light of support for liberal democratic values.
30This will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5.
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This question should answer for us whether or not institutions have a direct impact
on social trust at the individual level when a respondent imagines the importance of
democracy. In order for us to accept this hypothesis, the data must demonstrate no
significant or credible interaction between country-level concerns over corruption and
trust at the individual level, as each person considers the importance of democracy in
their lives. Acceptance of the hypothesis will provide support for the "Strong-Weak" state
model, implying perhaps cultural considerations are at play. On the other hand, for us to
reject this hypothesis, the data must show countries that are perceived corrupt or have
low levels of government trust experience negative impacts on social trust, particularly
at the level of generalized trust, which will in turn net negative results for how society
sees the importance of democracy. Rejecting the hypothesis will result in support for the
institutionalist position. At both the region and individual country-level for Russia, this
hypothesis found support.
Hypothesis 2 H2 There is no credible difference between those who trust generally and
those who trust particularly in relation to support liberal democracy.
Accepting this hypothesis will mean the data have shown that particularized trusters
and generalized trusters are substantively the same when considering the importance
of democracy. This would contradict the current literature from both the culturalists
and the institutionalists who claim particularized trusters are atomizing and bad for
democracy. However, if we are to reject this hypothesis, it will be because the data have
indicated there is a credible difference between the two forms of trust and the impact
is negative when one considers the importance of democracy. This finding will support
the current literature. This hypothesis was accepted at the level of the region and found
mixed results when Russia was isolated.
Hypothesis 3 H3 Atomized others have a credible negative impact on democratic atti-
tudes.
Removing atomized trusters, or those who have little to no trust in anyone, should provide
a more accurate picture of how particularized trust operates. Further, it will reflect the
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true nature of how atomized others function when considering their likelihood to support
democracy. Acceptance of this hypothesis will mean the data have demonstrated atomized
others have a measurable negative support for democracy when compared to others forms
of trust. This hypothesis also was accepted at the level of the region and found mixed
results when Russia was isolated. The results for each hypothesis can be found in Chapter
6.
Procedures.
This project is quantitative in nature, though technically qualitative. Though the
author will be using survey statistics and statistical modeling, these tools will be deployed
only in a specific region, and further still down to a single country. Though the measure
itself was constructed for the purpose of generalizability, one should not take the results of
this study to make inferences to the larger body of knowledge across the globe. Testing
this measure in other regions or states is beyond the scope of this work, and will be
the task of future research. Here, the author will test the measure in the region of the
former Soviet Union and post-Communist sphere. The World Values Survey (WVS) data
for Waves 5 and 6 will be employed for the creation of the trust variable, as well the
dependent variable and relevant controls. For country-level institutional concerns in the
region, Transparency International’s "Corruption Perceptions Index" will be used. When
Russia has been isolated, the WVS’s "trust in government" question will be used. In
order to resolve concerns surrounding endogeneity, a Hierarchical Linear Model will be
utilized to help account for the nested nature of the data. Further, the author will use
Bayesian inference at the region level to help reduce bias and increase the reliability of the
results given the small M sample space of five countries at the region level. A standard
ordinary least squares model will suffice when Russia is isolated.
Contribution of this work.
This work provides a measure of trust that is more dynamic than current measures,
as is captures trust in multiple degrees and levels simultaneously. Previous literature has
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been unable or unwilling to grapple with the true nature of trust by focusing solely on one
form of trust: generalized trust. The literature claims that particularized trust can lead
to the atomization of society, which is detrimental to democracy. However, atomization is
the absence of trust in others. Particularized trust is based on trust in people you know.
Atomization is the mirror negative of trust. Therefore conceptualizing a bankruptcy of
trust with those who do trust does not follow, logically. With this in mind the author
has separated out those who re atomized from those who have trust. The creation of a
new "other" category for those who are not trusters is another unique contribution to
the discussion of trust measurement.
Since social trust is seen as the cornerstone to civil society 31 and, in turn, liberal
democracy32, it is important to have a true understanding of where countries stand on
this important measure. If one aspect of a measure is incorrect, then the final result
will be flawed. A new measure must be created accounting for particularized trust that
will be applicable across other countries making it generalizable.The author has taken
great care when creating the trust measure to ensure its application in a wide variety
of political and social contexts. If this can be accomplished, our previous held views of
countries as not being trusting will have to change, and with it, our attitudes towards
them and their prospects for democratization. This research is an important "first step"
in this process.
Conclusion and Chapter Layout.
The main goal of this research was to create a new measure that would more accurately
reflect the nature of how human being trust. Given the important role trust has been
given in the democratization literature, it is vital to be able to measure trust in a way
that more accurately reflects how human beings trust. How we trust has slowly changed
overtime, from a hyper-focus on kin relationships, to a focus on individualism. Debates
between philosophers over the Rights of Man and clashes between religious ideologies, as
31Francis Fukuyama, "The Future of History," Foreign Affairs, September 30, 2013, accessed April 13,
2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-01-01/future-history.
32Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan J. Linz, Democracy in Developing Countries
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988).
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well as improvements in technology shrinking of time and space, have morphed how we
relate to ourselves, one another, our governments, and our role within them. Nonetheless,
what has not changed is our need for recognition and affirmation related to our human
nature. We are inherently social creatures. On the whole, we cannot tolerate atomization.
When we have been pressed down upon from above, like water finding the path of least
resistance, we have made our way to one another, and when necessary joined forces to
topple authoritarian regimes. As Oscar Wilde once said: "Discontent is the first step
in the progress of a man or a nation." We saw evidence of how discontent can fuel a
movement in the so-called low trust societies of Eastern Europe and Russia as the Wall
came tumbling down. And while the "End of History" was not realized, there is current
evidence of similar discontent brewing in the region today. Now, perhaps more than in
recent memory, we need a trust variable that will help predict patters of civil discontent.
This work seeks to accomplish this task.
The rest of this work will unfold in the following manner: Chapter 2 will consist of
two parts. Part one will provide the reader with a theoretical and historical background
to the relationship between citizens and the state, form the so-called "State of Nature"
through to modernity. Part two will offer a review of the general literature on social trust
and institutions. Chapter 3 will also proceed in two parts: first, the reader will be pre-
sented with and extensive background into the post-Communist condition. Specifically,
the Russian case given it’s dominance over land, policy, and institutions in the region
over most of the past century or longer. Second, the author will review the literature on
the region, and Russia more specifically, as it relates to social trust relations and insti-
tutions. Chapter 4 will offer a theoretical framework for the construction of a new trust
variable that will better capture the nature of trust itself. This chapter will rely on an
interdisciplinary approach drawing on works from psychology and child development, so-
ciology, and political philosophy to make the case for a more dynamic understanding and
measurement of trust. Chapter 5 will lay the groundwork for the methodology employed
here and present the new trust variable. The author will be using survey research in the
region from the WVS, to measure trust in a quantitative nature. The Random Effects
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Hierarchical Linear Model (RE HLM) method provides us with the best opportunity to
capture concerns around endogeneity, especially when combined with Bayesian inference
with small M models. The ordinary least squares (OLS) linear model will be utilized to
examine the Russian case more closely. Chapter 6, will offer the results of this testing.
Finally, Chapter 7 will provide a discussion or the results as well as possible directions
for future research. It will end with concluding thoughts on this project.
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Chapter 2:
Background and Review of the General Literature.
Introduction.
The most pervasive variable in all of social, economic, and political life is trust; it
is the base from which all social interactions are launched in both political and non-
political spaces.33 That is, trust is the key to understanding the manner in which societies
and people within societies interact with one another, the state, and what is an ever
interconnected global society.34. ; Anthony Giddens. The Consequences of Modernity.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990 While the literature on democracy and
its relationship to trust provides little consensus regarding the role of trust, researchers
have emphasized the importance of generalized trust over particularized. My research
marks a departure from this consensus, and seeks to ascertain the true nature of trust
and exposes the neglected role of personal relationships in fostering democracy in an
effort to create an accurate empirical measure for trust.
There are three accepted forms of trust: generalized, particularized and institutional.
Previously, the measurement of social trust focused on the importance of generalized
trust, that is, trust in those we do not know.35 Generalized trust is marked as having
the greatest benefits for democracy. Those who are generalized trusters have the will to
bridge across ethnicities and join civic groups in larger numbers. Institutional trust is
society’s trust in its institutions. Countries ranking high on institutional trust are also
believed to have positive democratic outcomes. By contrast, particularized trust in those
33 Erikson, Erik H. Childhood and Society. 2d ed. New York: Norton, 1964.; Seligman, Adam B. The
Problem of Trust. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. 13
34Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 14
35Putnam, Robert D., and Robert Leonardi. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern
Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.
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you know is often dismissed; it is seen as highly atomizing and, therefore, incapable of
making bridges to ethnic "others" resulting in a bankruptcy of democratic values. How
did we come to this understanding of trust? This chapter will proceed in two parts: In
Part I, a theoretical history will be offered of how we have evolved over time through our
trust relationships with one another and the state; In Part II, I will discuss the accepted
literature on trust in general terms, as well as how trust is commonly measured. I will
conclude by covering gaps in the general literature.
Part I: Background.
Theoretical understandings of the state and its relationship to the people, as well as
to one another are important to establish before delving into the prevailing literature. It
helps to provide uncover the path from where previous understandings were launched and
propelled forward. Combined with more current historical understandings, we can shed
those parts which are inaccurate and take with us those truths that will help provide a
deeper understanding of the nature of trust itself. I will begin with a discussion of Trust
in the State of Nature, this will be followed a discussion on Trust and the State in Pre-
Modernity. The author will conclude this section with Trust and the State in Modernity.
What is uncovered here will help us have a better understanding of where the gaps in the
general literature are in Part II.
Trust and the State of Nature.
Classical political thought on trust begins with the period of time in which man
settled down from a hunter-gather existence and into communities. Of course, no one
was present to record how the first societies came to be. As such, this ’period’ was
outlined theoretically by the various Social Contracts of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.
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These were intended more to be ’thought experiments’ as to the possibilities rather
than any real attempt to get at a factual historical accounting. The state of nature, that
is the time before private property, society, and government, for these theorists consisted
of isolated individuals; group behavior was not natural.36 What those rights were and
how they came out of the state of nature depended upon the philosopher in question.
At the core of each of these considerations was the implied conflict of trust and distrust
in others, as well as related fear and instability and the attempt to gain control over
their environments. This was believed to have been done through the coming together
of rational individuals and the selection of a leader whom could provide protection and
stability.37
The Coming of the Leviathan.
For Hobbes, the state of nature was a virtual hellscape wrought with near constant
violent conflict, or the threat of it; where humans interact based on some combination of
jealousy and fear. Human nature was primal and humans were, at their core, evil. Man’s
life is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." Because man is individualistic and
does not share a moral community with other men, one can not claim any act in ’unjust’
because there is no moral authority. 38The threat of a violent death is most pressing;
therefore, it is the absolute right of nature that provides every man with the liberty to
preserve his own life even if it means stealing someone else’s labor or taking the life of
another.39 Man, in order to escape this constant state of war, fear, and violence agrees
to give up some of his liberty and natural rights to do as he wishes. In doing so, others
will give his right to life and liberty deference creating a shared moral community.
The Leviathan (the state) will ensure these boundaries between men are respected,
thereby securing peace, in exchange for the position of power over them. This gives
men the space to trust one another, or not, within the bounds of performance based on
36Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Glob-
alization of Democracy (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 29.
37Ibid.
38Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), xiii.13.
39Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Glob-
alization of Democracy (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 26.
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societal expectations in which the ruler is the arbiter. In other words, trust began by
putting trust first in the state, allowing the environment to be created where people in
a society could trust one another creating societal trust. For Hobbes, the Leviathan was
best exemplified in a monarchical system. Subjects of the Leviathan may not seek redress
for alleged offenses; once a covenant has been entered into subjects cannot breech it. He
stresses natural law does not provide any opportunity to criticize or revolt against laws
made by government.40
Natural Law and the Power of the People.
While Locke somewhat shared with Hobbes the belief of a power exchange for purposes
of security, he differed on the notion the state of nature was a terrifying hellscape. The
state of nature was not based on war, but focused on mixing labor with resources found
in nature, producing things they could exchange for stuff they might need. This mixing
of labor resulted in private property, which Locke felt was the main source of conflict
arising out of the state of nature.41 Locke’s understanding of natural law is based on
life, liberty, and property, which later also became the basis for the rights enshrined in
the U.S. Declaration of Independence.42 Locke also felt the best form of government was
characterized by leaders who were elected by citizens, though he was also accepting of a
monarchical system, so long as the citizens chose it. The state becomes a necessary arbiter
in the disputes between individuals, who are inherently good, though are still essentially
human bent towards err. Another key distinction is Locke understood the state could
become tyrannical and potentially use that power to restrict or deny the rights of man.
As such, he reserved the right of man, once trust has been breeched, and unjust acts have
been committed, to overthrow the tyrannical ruler and install a new one. Revolution, in
such circumstances, is a sort of ’civic duty’ to protect the rights of man and reestablish
40Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, Chapter xviii. https://www.ttu.ee/public/m/mart-
murdvee/EconPsy/6/HobbesThomas1660TheLeviathan.pdf
41Locke, Second Treatise, 192. J.; Locke and Johnathan Bennett, Second Trea-
tise on Government, comp. Peter Millican and Amyas Merivale (1956), March 2008,
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf.
42 Justice Joseph Story 1832 *
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trust in the state.43
Private Property as a Root of Distrust.
Rousseau also indicates man is not void of virtue and good, but in the state of nature
is more meek and timid and would flee sooner than engage in violent conflict. Though he
may not be inherently bad, he is hyper-individualistic; even the notion of family bonds
are not natural for Rousseau. Instead of seeing the coming of the state as a Good, he
sees it as an unfortunate event in which men gave of their liberty for what amounts
to bondage based on growing interdependence on others in society. Further, he traces
societal injustice to the advent of agricultural and private property: "this is mine and not
yours" fencing off land in an act of greed and distrust of others. Thus, creating castes or
classes of those with and without.44
The Classics Synthesized.
For these theorists, there are a few important take aways: as previously stated, their
intellectual musings were more heuristic in nature and less and attempt to uncover historic
truths. Given the time periods in which these men were writing, it is understandable to
conclude men were individualistic. As will be discussed in the sections to come, this was
the seminal idea amongst Enlightenment thinkers, offering a counterbalance to the the
ancien regime. Their aims were merely to parse out the nature of man. They wanted to
explore how much of what makes up man is based on nature or biology and how much is
the result of conditions created by societal development.45
While there are very few records of pre-modern times before people begun to settle
into communities, there are clues in the anthropological and archeological evidence.46 One
43J. Locke and Johnathan Bennett, Second Treatise on Government, comp. Peter Millican and Amyas
Merivale (1956), 194-196, March 2008, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf.
44Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Glob-
alization of Democracy (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 64.
45Ibid., 65
46Nicolas Naudinot, Jeremie Jacquier, "Socio-economic organization of Final Paleolithic societies: New
perspectives from an aggregation site in Western France", Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, Vol-
ume 35, September 2014, Pages 177-189, ISSN 0278-4165, http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaa.2014.05.004.
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thing we can be clear on: the pre-modern world was not based on roaming individuals as
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau would have you believe, but rather it was organizationally
based on small family bands and tribes with each member depending upon the other to
help the group survive. Trust was vital– each person in the band was expected to preform
some duties for the survival of the whole. Modern evidence provides needed clarity: we
are not individualistic by nature, but rather our instincts are social and communal. Even
as children today, we are taught there is ’safety in numbers’. The deep seeded notion
of human beings being individual rational actors seeking to preserve their individual
self-interest was learned over time and is not part of our innate human biology.47
We know now, empirically, human beings will act in an altruistic manner to those
whom they share kinship in proportion to the amount of genes they share.48 Trust in
the state of nature seemed to be based on particularized links between families and the
immediate community of those who looked like they did and shared the same values.
Communal organization was not the result of some rational choice for individual protec-
tion, because communal organization was already our natural state. In other words, the
state of nature was highly particularized, if not atomized from other groups or bands.
How it progressed and developed depended upon other external factors such as geography,
disease prevalence, and culture.49
Trust in Pre-modernity.
When theorists imagine the pre-modern period, they are typically thinking of feudal
European societies through the period of territorial consolidation that occurred under
absolutism, however it is necessary to consider what lead up to the absolutist period
in early pre-modernity, in order to see the process unfold. Further, it is worth noting
there is some debate surrounding where the first modern state arose. Weber believes the
47Ibid.
48Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Glob-
alization of Democracy (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 65.
49 Ola Olsson, Christopher Paik, "Long-run cultural divergence: Evidence from the Neolithic Revolu-
tion", Journal of Development Economics, Volume 122, September 2016, Pages 197-213, ISSN 0304-3878,
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.05.003. ; Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From
Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 30.
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first modern states arose out of Europe,50hristopher Pierson, The Modern State (London:
Routledge, 1996), 19. Fukuyama and others point towards China as having many features
of the modern state, save rule of law, beginning from the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE or the
Islamic.51 While the Western focus is, of course, reductionist, it is nonetheless important
to consider how this period is discussed; it is out of these understandings of institutions
and trust in feudal Europe, which gave way to absolutism, the modern state developed.52
Political Order in Pre-Modernity.
Society was highly stratified in feudal Europe with multiple layers within the power
structure. While lords ruled over a given set of people whose borders were often in flux
due to power struggles from competing lords. In this way, power was determined by
whom could consolidate resources through a strata of lesser-lords. In order to establish
their power base, lords would award large plots of land to vassals in exchange for loyalty
both militarily and politically. In turn, the vassals could then tax the peasants living on
the land known as a fief. The peasants had no rights and often became military fodder
for their lords in battle when called upon to do so. The peasant’s ultimate loyalties lay
with their lord; this loyalty was immutable. Serfdom was another feature of feudalism
and serfs, who were a step beneath peasants, were bound to the land at birth. Unlike
peasants, serfs could not own property but both were forced to produce agricultural and
50C
51Fukuyama argues the Qin Dynasty had all of the Weberian trappings of the modern state sans his
own understanding of the rule of law. He points to a lack of accountability at all levels of society and
government meaning the Emperor, in particular, was above the law. He refers to this as ’rule by law’ not
’rule of law’. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French
Revolution. Chapter 3, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Francis Fukuyama, Political
Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York
: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 24; 79
52Of course, this is with a focus on Western societies. The discussion of how trust in pre-modern
periods looked is important and also illuminates the development of trust and political institutions but
is beyond the scope of this particular work. Some work on this has already been completed. See:
Ernst Gellner (1994) Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals where he contrasts Islamic and
Soviet political and social development against the ideals of liberal democratic values, as well as Francis
Fukuyama’s (2011;2014) 2 volume set: Political Order and Political Decay in which he details his theories
at the apex of geographical positioning and political and social development.
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other goods for their lords.53
As such, pre-modern economies were highly agrarian. This, ironically, allowed for
some ’freedom’ from the King, particularly given in regions outside of the center, and
even their lords. The most advantageous positioning were those communities sub-divided
by mountains or other such terrain. Sub-communities were loosely governed by intermedi-
aries of the lords and vassals with little or no institutions present in these communities.54
This resulted in situations where the Medieval ’state’, due to a lack of governing bu-
reaucracy, was producing scant political goods for its people, leaving pensants in these
distant locales to be largely self-governing. At times, they would band together to make
demands such as reduction or avoidance of taxation (with varying degrees of success).55
Yet, at the same time the Catholic Church also played and increasinglyKings ruled over
some general region of land, intertwined role with the "state"; the Church’s role was to
essentially establish legitimacy of the King, and reinforce each economic group’s political
and social position in it.56
As feudalism was being shed as a result of the consolidation of territory via military
and political power and conquest of the Kings, political and social order shifted under-
standings of sovereignty, loyalty, and legitimacy away from a strata of local lords and
towards the King, exclusively. The swapping of a pluralistic and stratified society in fa-
vor of an absolutist ruler resulted in a King who became particularly correlated with the
idea of "the state."57 At around the same time, the position of the Catholic Church was
coming into question in some states as a result of the Protestant Reformation and the
break with England under Henry the VIII.58 However, the Protestant Reformation and
subsequent period of Enlightenment brought new ideas on the Rights of Man, resulting
53 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the
Globalization of Democracy (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 111.
54Ibid.
55The Peasant Revolt of 1381 in England is one such instance. Ernst Gellner. 1994. Conditions of
Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals. p. 7
56 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Glob-
alization of Democracy (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 111.; Ernst Gellner, "The Civil
and the Sacred" (lecture, Harvard University, Boston), https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/documents/a−
to− z/g/Gellner91.pdf.
57 Louis XIV "L’t c’est moi." I am the state.
58Herbert H. Rowen, ""L’Etat c’est a moi": Louis XIV and the State," French Historical Studies 2,
no. 1 (1961): , doi:DOI: 10.2307/286184.
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in a political order in jeopardy. Previous views of unwavering, forced loyalty and trust
were being challenged as absolute power increased concentrating corruption at the top,
and economies began to fail.59
Tyranny of the Cousins and Social Order.
The pre-modern area was marked by a distinctly different form of civil society from
how we understand it today. Much like in the state of nature, society at all levels
was centered entirely around familial and kinship bonds. Intertwining alliances through
marriage for the sake of peace with neighboring clans or, even, to expand empire, were
established. Time was bound with space and the notion of travel -which was expensive,
dangerous, and time consuming- and was reserved for the select few either engaged in
commerce or with the financial means to do so. Individuals within society often never
left the town in which they were born, or engaged in ties with outside others. The notion
of a stranger was understood to be someone from "beyond the walls", and it was those
people who were not to be trusted.60 Communities were tight knit and all social activities
were confined within.
Constraining rituals, rules, and traditions guiding everyday social life were controlled
by kin and community and helped to reinforce the social, and political order. For such an
order to exist it must be maintained through a series of strict rules, norms, and exacting
expectations. Any deviation from expected behavior could cause the breakdown of the
community.61 As such, each person is expected to act in accordance to the rules or be
punished. This creates an environment where everyone must place trust in each other for
the proper functioning of society. Because there are so many opportunities for individuals
to transgress unwittingly, each person must cultivate good will and reciprocity from others
in their community. In essence, society is, as Gellner says, shedding the tyranny of the
King for "tyranny of the cousins."62 Symbols are honored and tradition kept because
59 particularly in England and France.
60 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 102.
61Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. (New York: Penguin Books,
1996), 7.
62Ibid.
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it has been the experience of past generations such structures ’work’ for maintaining
social and political order. In other words, perceptions of trust and civil society were
socialized at the level of the family, reinforced through the Church and the pre-modern
state. This is not to imply pre-modernity saw no progression in relation to the state of
nature but rather the changes in social norms came about through a process of examining
previous traditions and norms and reinterpreting, clarifying, or updating them for present
circumstances.63
Early pre-modernity in Europe established placing a somewhat stratified pecking order
of elites (that was often in-flux) over the class structure; one that is near immutable for
all levels of society, especially peasants and serfs, and reinforced through the Church
and social order. Trust was mainly placed in those you know in your community, and
especially family members. This divine political and social order was under scrutiny
through the passage out of feudalism and into absolutism. The people were no longer
willing to accept man’s sole purpose was to serve God only as an agent of the "state" via
the class he was born into. The Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment created
a paradigm shift and the belief that man’s natural state was individualistic born with
natural rights, and the people longed for this part of the ’state of nature’ to return.64
Trust and Institutions in Modernity.
What we know as "modernity" did not arrive all at once, globally,65 as we believe
occurred with the transition from "the state of nature" to pre-modernity, it was a slow
process.66 Without a doubt, however, the Protestant Reformation and the subsequent
Enlightenment67 brought with it a focus on individualism, science, and reason which
63 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 79.
64Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. (New York: Penguin Books,
1996), 7.
65 Again, see Fukuyama (2011, 2015) and others on discussions related to China’s flirtations with the
Modern States in the Qin Dynasty.
66 ...with such events as issuing of The Magna Carta, first in 1217 acting as a check on the king, and
came to a head via the The Glorious Revolution in 1688.
67 Enlightenment thought can be credited, not just to the Protestant Reformation, but also (ironi-
cally, perhaps) to the Crusades, especially the so-called "Western Crusades" in Spain. The information
exchange that occurred through interaction with the Muslim world, who cultivated and protected the
works of ancient philosophers and scholars via the vast libraries of Alexandria and Baghdad, as well
as throughout their empire, allowed us to interface with Muslim philosophers influenced by the ancient
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stood in stark contrast with the absolutism, collectivism and mysticism that defined pre-
modernity. Though the latter ideas were initially formed in absolutism, they are credited
for ushering in what would become the modern state.68 Moreover, what has later been
called the Weberian model became the gold-standard of defining (modern) statehood and
citizenship.69 From the Marxist perspective, this lead to an environment where capitalism
lead to innovation and industrialization, bringing about rapid technological advances
bearing both positive and negative effects, including the exploitation of the working
class and subsequent threat to the political order of democratic societies. Resolution
of these struggles allowed for new opportunities to re-establish institutional trust in an
improved political order. Modernity steamed forward, taking up breakneck speeds at the
end of WWII ushering in a new sort of modernity where, according to constructivists,
technology increased global interconnectedness, ironically, allowing families to re-establish
bonds of trust lost in the wave of increasing mechanization. Globalization also lead to
our developing trust networks with unknown global others to engage politically, as well
as deepen our own personal social bonds of trust.
Trust and Institutions in Modernity.
In pre-modern times, geography, as well as time and space were often inhibitors to
control and interaction with ’distant’ locales increasing the need for ’self-governance’ and
decreasing the direct roll of the state in local affairs; an inverse relationship with between
the citizen and state occurred with the shrinkage of time and space. Citizenship within
the modern state was shaped around what Almond calls the "rationality-activist model."
This highlighted the importance of creating and sustaining democratic principles where
all citizens were actively engaged in the political process in a manner that was "informed,
Greeks, as well more direct access to philosophical texts long lost to history. See: Cloud, Randall R.
Aristotle’s Journey to Europe: A Synthetic History of the Role Played by the Islamic Empire in the
Transmission of Western Educational Philosophy Sources from the Fall of Rome through the Medieval
Period. Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2007 and Butterworth, Charles E., and Blake Andr Kessel.
The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into Europe. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994.
68 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the
Globalization of Democracy (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011)
69Ibid.
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analytical, and rational."70 The modern state had evolved from authoritarian monarchies
colluding with religious powers to maintain political, economic, and social order, into a
more secular state grounded in reason and subject to the rule of law; a state in which
its citizens play an active, and more equal, role in their own destinies in the political,
economic, and social realms.71
Further, the modern state became an increasingly tangible entity that citizens could
interact with on a variety of levels and visa versa. A hallmark of the Weberian modern
state, an effective bureaucracy, became indispensable to the state who sought legitimacy
and to citizens seeking security.72 Mercantilism gave way to capitalism and state insti-
tutions were formed or expanded to help provide a growing citizenry with the political
goods, such as public education, police protections, and clean water, needed to create and
foster real trust in the system and encourage greater political participation.73 Further,
deepening beliefs of political accountability and rule of law also helped engender feelings
of trust and good-will between the state and its citizenry. While initial attempts to pro-
vide political goods helped foster an overall sense of trust in the system were taking place
before 1800, advances in technology lead to rapid growth, and ultimately exploitation of
the working class. As the Industrial Revolution steamed forward in democratic societies,
a lack of intervention from the state stymied trust in the political order and institutions
overtime, calling into question the dynamic between the state and its citizens.74
70 Gabriel Abraham Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in The Civic
Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publ., 1980), 16.
71 This is an important distinction for Weber in the "Modern State"; a citizen has agency and subject,
in the Feudal sense, does not. A citizen has rights, a subject does not. A citizen can choose his rulers
via rational-legal means, and by contrast, a subject can only hope to reinforce the current social order
by knowing his place and not straying from it.
72 The idea of bureaucracy and institutions generating good-will through the effective distribution of
political goods is discussed in Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial
Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 55. Further
the first real modern bureaucracy took place in China some 1300 years earlier. He also points out some
Muslim states, as well as Israel also had functioning bureaucracies. Francis Fukuyama, 2015.
73Joyce Appleby, "Ideology and Theory: The Tension Between Political and Economic Liber-
alism in Seventeenth-Century England," The American Historical Review. 81, no. 3 (1976): ,
doi:10.1086/ahr/81.3.499.
74 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the
Globalization of Democracy (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 43.
25
Marx and the critique of the Modern Political Order and Capital-
ist Response to "Correct" the System.
Increasing industrialization and innovation across the globe, at the expense of cottage
industries and agriculture, created an economic and political environment which lead
to decreased political trust as ordinary citizens became increasingly aware of their poor
living and working conditions and increased poverty.75 Indeed, German philosopher Karl
Marx’s seminal critiques of the capitalist order, particularly in England, France, Germany,
and America, during the height of the Industrial Revolution highlighted capitalist failings
to provide needed protections from the greed corporations taking place at the expense of
workers. For the sake of this work, the American experience will be focused on briefly.
Technology and growing industry meant average self-employed artisans, farmers and
the like, could no longer afford to keep up with the rate and cost of production. This forced
people to leave agrarian centers or leave their own small shops and/ or move into urban
areas in search of work at factories as wage laborers. Mechanization reduced the need
for highly skilled workers, and as such, paid below sustenance wages; income inequality
ballooned out of control.76 This created an environment where workers felt alienated from
that which they produced. Previously, workers used their minds and specialized skills
to create goods. Now, according to Marx, they are but a cog in a machine, engaging in
mindless, menial, though back-breaking, and dangerous work; they are forced to sell their
labor working to produce wealth for the owners of the means of production in order to
survive.77
Historically, the political order of democratic capitalist societies largely took a laissez-
faire approach to business and industry creating a situation in which the populace felt a
deepening distrust of government in the face of growing exploitation.78 Political corrup-
75Ibid., 47
76 Karl Marx et al., The Communist Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Karl Marx
et al., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books in association with
New Left Review, 1990), Chapter 6; Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel
Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1994), 3; 234.
77Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 45.
78 Seymour Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton Company., 2001), 108.
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tion was rampant all levels of government. Aggravating working conditions, housing was
relatively expensive and dangerous. Sanitation in urban centers was virtually nonexistent
as well as hazardous.79 Overall, laws had the net effect of favoring business owners at the
expense of ordinary people.80 Surveying modern democratic bureaucracies, Marx postu-
lated capitalism had sown ’the seeds of its own destruction’ and its collapse ’inevitable’.81
Workers were at the whim of the bourgeoisie and could expect no help from the state to
intervene on their behalf, largely because politicians were in cahoots with the bourgeoisie
colluding to impede the rights of the working class.82 This resulted in capitalist states
who can not be trusted rationally as a direct response to state-sponsored violence via
exploitation.83
The philosophies of Marx and Engles were spread through immigration around Europe
and to America as the working class recognized their lived experiences in their writings.84
This inspired workers around the world to form unions and demand increased wages
and safe working conditions from their employers, better rents and living conditions
form their landlords, and political accountability from their elected officials, in some
instances violently. It became apparent capitalist states must act to save the system
or face the real threat of, what Marx described as, the inevitable bloody revolution of
the proletariat.85 The capitalist system partially outwitted Marx by adapting, curtailing
predatory business practices against workers and consumers via regulation, providing legal
protections and increased wages to labour and securing their right to unionize and bargain,
79 Roy Lubove, The Progressives and the Slums: Tenement House Reform in New York City 1890-1917
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), 124.
80 Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina
Press, 1994), 3
81 "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League." Letter from Karl Marx. March
1850. London.
82 There are many example to support this idea even beyond the death of Marx. Deeper exploration
is beyond the scope of this work. For examples, see: Dubofsky, Melvyn. The State Labor in Modern
America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994, 208. among others.
83 John Dunn "Trust and Political Agency", in Gambetta, Diego (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking
Cooperative Relations, electronic edition, Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2000, chapter
5, pp. 73-93, <http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/dunn73-93.pdf>
84 Seymour Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton Company., 2001), 34. Lipset and Marks note while the Socialist Labor
movement across Western Europe was strong, the American movement was second only to Russia in
terms of relative strength.
85 Karl Marx et al., The Communist Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
27
as well as improving building and sanitation codes urban centers largely squashing the
specter of communism and re-establishing greater political trust in the system.86 While
capitalism may have halted the global spread of communism, it became the paradigm for
modernization going forward, ushering in a sense of cosmopolitan awareness or a global
civil society.87
Giddens and Political Order in the Post-War Era.
As stated previously, institutions in modern democratic states exist to help maintain
political order; this is accomplished by providing needed political goods effectively. Con-
structivists have critiqued the political landscape that has resulted from speed in which
technology continued to transform the globe in the post-War era. The disruption that
occurred in the pre-War era surrounding a changing economic and political model, forcing
people to leave their families and communities in search of new opportunities began to
settle after the post-War era due, in part to advances in technology and strengthening in-
stitutions. Modernity ultimate has, as Anthony Giddens88 refers to as a "disembedding"
effect. In other words we are being pulled out of space and place through rapid changes
in technology, which shrink time and space, resulting in a time-space distanciation. This
pulling out of ’space’ results in our ’place’ (or physical locale) becoming blurred. The
disembedding nature of modernity has two features: symbolic tokens and expert systems.
We can think of symbolic tokens taking the form of money, particularly credit. In the pre-
modern era money took the form of coinage worth its face value and had physical mass.
Today, we often rely on credit or debit cards, which alone have no inherent value. Each
debit or credit card will have the same format and size but will carry digital information
86 In America, for example, this began with Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Era through his
5th cousin’s administration Franklin D. Roosevelt. Though we can also point to the hyper-radicalization
of the Marxist movement in America and its refusal to work more broadly with less radical labor unions as
a reason for quashing revolution in the US. A greater degree of political socialism was adapted in Europe
because of Socialist leaders willing to cooperate with labor on more pragmatic social goals building a
deeper political base, however it still did not result in a coup of the regime, as pointed out in greater
detail which is beyond the scope of this paper: Seymour Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here:
Why Socialism Failed in the United States (New York, NY: W. W. Norton Company., 2001).
87 Francis Fukuyama, 2015, 47.
88 Giddens tries not to separate the political from the social in a very clear way. As a constructivist,
for Giddens, What is political is also social. Here, I will pull out those aspects of his theory which apply
most directly to political order and institutional performance.
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representing monetary value in the owner’s account in some online space. One’s money
is both present and absent. Expert systems are also somewhat phantasmagoric. Expert
systems are "systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organize
large areas of the material and social environments in which we live today."89They can
take the form of private or state institutions which are ultimately intertwined.
These characteristics of modernity have a way of producing trust in the political and
social system overall. Hitherto, trust and interactions with others were seen to be based
in fortuna, or luck. However, modernity has caused a shift in our ideologies to trust based
on risk,90 or educated calculation of probabilities and degrees of certainty. For example,
I trust that when I use my debit card, the money in my account will be there for my
purchases anywhere in the world. If it is not, I trust that the bank will correct the error
or make me whole if my account has been compromised. I can rely on this because the
state guarantees the safety of my account. I trust when I bring my children to school
they are safe and the building will not collapse on them.
This is an example of placing trust in experts, unknown others to us, who possess
specific knowledge we do not. We trust this system of experts works, and those who make
up the system are competent. We trust unknown others to not harm us as we are walking
down the street. Of course, there is always risk of failure in the system, however, political
and institutional performance allows us to calculate the risk through experience. This
sort of trust is, according to Giddens, a direct result of the process of globalization. In
pre-modernity trust politically and socially was very much tied up with space and place.
In modernity we have shifted away from trust in those we know, to taking risks with
those we do not in order to regain control over our ever morphing environment. However,
this form of trust has become so routine, it is something we have internalized and taken
for granted.
Of course, our social experiences have also shifted dramatically as a result of the
disembedding nature of modernity. The social main focus in modernity is the individual;
we are no longer at the whim of the tyranny of the cousins. For example, at the most
89 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 27.
90 see also: Ulrich Beck, World-Risk Society 1996.
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personal level, bonds of intimacy were no longer based on strengthening bonds of civil
society and reinforcing some immutable political order, as was the case in pre-modernity;
rather, it became about finding another who reflects one’s need for self-determination.91
This betrays a significant change: we now find mates for our own ends rather than to
fulfill some societal goal. In turn, the disembedding nature of modernity has also affected
other social relationships and created new ways for trust in others to develop.
Giddens and the Role of Technology in Fostering Social Trust in
Modernity.
The rapid way in which technology and communication has impacted all societies,
whether directly or not, has caused some people to feel a lack of control over their local
environment and, as a result, turn inward, atomized, and away from society. As discussed
previously, it can also have the effect of re-embedding people back into their communities.
"Re-embedding" occurs, in this case, by repairing some personal disconnections resulting
from modernity. More specifically, "rembedding" is possible through the shrinkage of
spatio-temporal relationships due to globalization. Indeed, people are able to travel
farther in shorter periods of time and engage in new forms of communication at a rate
never seen before in history, allowing them to re-establish lost bonds and/ or create new
ones.92
Further, Internet applications, such as Skype and FaceTime, allow us to reconnect and
construct bonds which were previously much more difficult to build and maintain. New
social networks have emerged out of this this technology. Just as we have the ability to
strengthen our so-called "strong ties", that is, relations with the people we know, such as
family and friends, neighbors and co-workers, we are also able to build new trust networks
made of "weak-ties", that is, unknown "others" across town, or even the globe, via the
Internet. Sites such as Facebook, Twitter, LiveJournal, Reddit, and VKontakte (Russia)
are "spaces" of interaction which transcend state borders, effectively blurring them. As a
91 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
92Ibid.
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result, they have the ability to move out of the realm of personal and congenial relations93
and into the arena of global social trust and movements taking the form of a global civil
society.94
Early theoretical thought projects on trust and institutions in society born out of the
Enlightenment presented us with belief that, in the State of Nature, man was solitary
and individualistic. While Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau varied on the specifics within
their philosophies that unifying theme was present. However, modern anthropological
and archeological evidence has shown otherwise. We are social beings who wandered in
familial small bands relying on one another to preform some function for the survival of
the whole.
Surveying the historical context of democratic institutions and social trust we see a
dynamic political and social structure adapting to changes as technology advanced. Set-
tling down into communities and then forming the political structure of the state did not
break the familial bonds formed in the State of Nature; in some ways they strengthened
them, though not always in a positive direction. The tyranny of the cousins could in some
ways reinforce a lack of individual liberty. In others it reinforced societal trust amongst
the group for the ’optimal’ functioning of the whole. With the Protestant Reformation
and the ushering in of Enlightenment ideals of liberty and innovation, technology and
philosophy gave way to industrialization and modernization. It was at this point the
rights of the individual were championed above those of communal good.95 As individu-
als began to climb up or down social and economic ladders and moving across geographic
93This focus on the positive aspects of globalization in relation to the first world. However, this focus
favors the industrialized world and leaves out two-thirds of the global population who do not have access
to the technological spoils of globalization and rather than actively participate are often acted upon.
While Giddens does admit there are some who may suffer in the process of constructing modernity, this
is glossed over and one is reminded of the institutions which have come as a result of globalization to
address some of these ills. Inayatullah Blaney, as well as Rosenberg, take constructivists like Giddens
to task for their inability, or perhaps, refusal to address the underlying negative forces which set some of
these globalizing forces and events in motion, as well as their potentiality for negative consequences for
"others" on the global field. For them, this sort of omission is tantamount to the tacit approval of the
oppression and violence perpetuated by the modernizing forces of globalization. This "western focus"
will be addressed in Chapter 4.
94Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War? 111-13
95 Sascha O. Becker, Steven Pfaff, Jared Rubin, "Causes and consequences of the Protestant Ref-
ormation", Explorations in Economic History, Volume 62, October 2016, Pages 1-25, ISSN 0014-4983,
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.07.007.
31
space away from their familial centers, leading to social ennui, alienation, and depression.
Threats to the system emerged during the Industrial Revolution as Marxism took hold
among the working class across Europe and America, driving workers to form bonds and
unite against the state to demand change. The Capitalist system did adapt, largely ad-
verting catastrophe. Further, advancements in technology allowed society to form new
bonds of trust with the state, institutions, with family and friends, as well as meet new
people from all over the world and see themselves as potentially part of a global commu-
nity, blurring state boarders. They can take what they learned from global others and
re-embed themselves back into their local communities with new ideas they then share
with their local trust networks. This history shows us that human beings are inherently
social creatures. As such, even when faced with threats from the state, we will find solace
in one another and form new bonds to amend the existing political order. This is key to
understanding the nature of trust relationships discussed in Chapter 5.
Part II: Conceptualization of institutions of governance and trust
in the general literature.
There are two main thoughts on how to examine the effects of institutions on gov-
ernance, as well as the formation of social trust. First, there is the culturalist approach
that posits the prevailing culture present in a given society will impact how social trust
and institutions are formed. Second, there is the institutionalists who believe it is institu-
tions that impact how society is structured, and thereby how society trusts one another.
There have been significant attempts to bridge across most valid points of each theory;
the new-Instutionalists, have taken on this task.
The culturalist approach.
Culturalists believe institutions are created as a reflection of cultural norms and ex-
pectations established via early-life socialization.96 In short, what people have come to
96 William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?," Comparative Po-
litical Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.; Richard Rose, William
Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its alternatives: Understanding post-Communist Soci-
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expect politicians and their institutions are capable of and/ or are willing to perform. It
is a bottom-up theory of institutional formation. Macro-cultural theories focus on trust
formations are synthesized at the national level homogenizing norms and expectations,
which are largely fixed, establishing a dominant political culture. Societies with free-
markets and democratic institutions will be the result of a culture of individualism and
democratic spirit, while those societies that are focused on authoritarian values and norms
have low levels of interpersonal trust which in turn will produce authoritarian states and
institutions.97 Individual level micro-theories posit social trust is first formed in the fa-
milial unit and extended out towards society and then towards institutions, forming the
basis for how institutions are created. The focus is on the experience individuals within
the cultural setting which allows some individual variance of trust outcomes.98 Regard-
less of which specific theory of culturalism one presents, they agree that socialization and
networks of trust are ingrained from and early age, transmitted to political life as the
child grows into adulthood, and then transmitted again through the generations.99
This transmission occurs through a state’s political culture. A main feature of the
culturalist perspective, it is defined as "the pattern of cognitive, evaluative, and affective
orientations towards political objects."100 It is spread by individuals or groups through
a combination of socialization, and personal experience. It takes into consideration the
history within a state, both politically and culturally, that formed society and its in-
stitutions. As such, they believe that societal and institutional trajectories are ’path
dependent’ and difficult to change.101 Those societies which have a high civic culture
eties. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 116-117.
97 Ibid.; Gabriel Abraham Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in The
Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publ., 1980), 32.
98 Ibid.; Gabriel Abraham Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in The
Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publ., 1980), 32.
99 Ibid.; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1999).
100 Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of Inference," in The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston, MA: Little,
Brown, Company, 1980), 38.
101Samuel P. Huntington et al., The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate (New York, NY: Foreign Af-
fairs, 2010).; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democ-
racy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).; Robert D. Putnam, Robert
Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993).; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
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will more likely to demand political goods and hold their officials accountable, leading
to horizontal institutions who are more likely to be effective. When societies exhibit low
levels of civic engagement they will produce vertical institutions that are not effective
or accountable. Overall, culturalists focus on the quality of political culture present in
a society because their research seems to support the notion a society that exhibits a
politically active polity, combined with high levels of social trust, help create the con-
ditions in which democracies can be sustained. Indeed, culturalists often point towards
the United States and Great Britain when making their case. These countries both have
long histories of active civic societies with a political culture that reinforces democratic
principles.102
The trouble with this approach is the idea of "path dependency’" This leaves societies,
in the minds of those who follow this approach and potentially other world leaders, to
have little or no faith for positive change to come out of authoritarian systems or if it
does it will take generations to manifest. It is a prejudicial view that ignores or down-
plays the ground swells of revolutionary change throughout history that have resulted in
positive changes through regime or institutional change that came from the bottom-up.
It also ignores or downplays the legitimate efforts from elites to change the system from
the inside out. Further, this assumes a sort of rational and linear thought process in
trust formations. One of the main difficulties facing any empirical study in the social
sciences is the notoriously high variability of human beings. For example, not all who
’join’ necessarily project trust outwards towards political institutions. By the same to-
ken, not all who trust ’unknown others’ trust their government or institutions, or even
their own family members. Similarly, not all who have had negative early socialization
experiences grows to become atomized away from society, not do all who are atomized
distrust institutions. Further, there is evidence that institutional trust has little to do
with social trust to begin with. These combination of experiences vary across cultures,
as well.103
102Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999).
103 William Mishler and Richard Rose 2001; Kenneth Newton, "Social and Political Trust in established
Democracies," in Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford,
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The institutional approach.
This school of thought dominated concepts of the importance of institutions on society
up until the post-war era of World War II. Institutionalists believe that trust, or the lack
of it, in institutions is a direct result of rational choices based on personal experiences.
The main focus was on quality of design rather than performance. Performance matters,
however to what degree depends on the theorist. It was believed if an institution was
simply designed ’correctly’ everything else would fall into place along proper democratic
expectations.104 Overtime, the focus would then turn to performance: How effective is
the state at delivering stability and economic performance at the aggregate level of the
state, as well as political and economic goods to its citizens?105 Thus, proper design leads
to legitimacy and optimal performance which feeds back to increasing societal trust.
When examining social trust, institutionalist posit that it is adult leaning, rather than
early life socialization, that forms views of political institutions. As such, institutionalists
also recognize the importance of individual variance in experiences with the state and
institutions. It is believed examining an individual’s values, what they deem is most
important, can also predict individual experiences with institutional performance. In
short, lifetime of socialization and experience, if adult experiences demonstrate positive
interactions with institutions in providing political goods, then this will in turn feedback
into society creating greater generalized trust and a stronger civil society. A key feature
of the institutionalist approach is the belief that stability and trust is not locked on a
dependent path determined by culture or of past political experiences.
Again, the problem with this approach is the emphasis on generalized trust and tra-
ditional forms of civil society. Further, prevailing theories of institutional trust do not
account for situations where social trust may act independent of institutional perfor-
mance. For example, if social trust depends of high rates of institutional trust, how have
societies been able to bond with one another in social networks with unknown others to
UK: Oxford University Press, 1999).
104 Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 1993. p. 9
105 Jose Antonio Cheibub et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," Journal of Democracy 7,
no. 1 (1996): , doi:10.1353/jod.1996.0016; Adam Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Devel-
opment," New York University, Department of Political Science., 2007, , accessed April 15, 2017,
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/sisson.pd
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fill the void left by an ineffective state?
Putnam and the so-called ’new Institutional’ Approach.
According to the established literature, trust matters for developing democracy; not
because it causes democracy in and of itself, but rather because it helps foster the con-
ditions in which democracy can grow. Authors differentiate between the kinds of trust,
particularly the difference between generalized, particularized, and institutional. The
new institutional approach tries to reconcile the two schools of though by examining,
what those researchers feel, are the best portions of each. In his seminal work, Making
Democracy Work (1993), Putnam, et. al. examine social trust and institutions through
the case study of Italy. They argue Italy is a perfect test case for the importance of
institutions and trust because, in 1970, the Italian government instituted a series of in-
stitutional reforms across the country at the same time. From the level of regions and
society, the North had a prevailing culture of more civic action, while the South had a
cultural tradition of societal distrust and political patronage. This allowed them to hold
institutions constant while allowing civic traditions and other societal attributes to vary
in relation to strength of and efficacy of regional so-called democratic governments.
They demonstrate one of the key indicators of a thriving democracy is a strong civil
society. Putnam106defines civil society, at the political level, in terms of institutions that
act independently of the state.107 Further, an important measure of civicness present in
any society is social trust. There are two kinds of trusters: those who trust the people
they don’t know (generalized trusters) and those who trust the people they do know
(particularized trusters). He and his colleagues conclude generalized trusters are joiners,
that is, those who identify as generalized trusters are more likely to join civic groups which
are the basis for social capital that Putnam feels is absolutely vital to the functioning of
106 Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradi-
tions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993); Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone:
America?s Declining Social Capital," Culture and Politics, 2000, , doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62965-712.
107This is contrasted by civil society in pre-modernity, which was seen as a function by the state and of
the state Mary Kaldor. Global Civil Society: An Answer to War? (1st ed.). Boston: Polity;Giddens,
The Consequences of Modernity ; Robertson, R. "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the
Central Concept." Theory, Culture Society : 15-30.
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a strong civil society.
Social capital, can be thought of as the accumulation of trust one carries based on
previous actions allowing them to be understood as ’trustworthy’, in turn allowing those
with direct experience to ’vouch’ for those with high levels of social capital. From the
perspective of the individual, social capital encapsulates behaviors and attitudes towards
politics, as well as interpersonal trust and cooperation.108 Specifically, social capital con-
tains the features of social life -networks, norms, and trust- that enable participants to
collaborate with a host of others to pursue common goals with confidence. Examples in-
clude individuals joining social (bowling leagues) or volunteer groups (such as the Shriners
or Elks). This sort of networking allows people to form ties outside of their family and
close relations. It is within these groups people share ideas about politics and expand
their knowledge of the political system. These people are, in turn, more likely to become
politically active– a necessary characteristic of effective liberal democracy. In order for
people to feel comfortable forming these networks, people must feel they can trust those
outside of their family or ethnic group. People who join are people who trust.109 Gen-
eralized trust operates from the assumption most people will share the same beliefs and
values, as well as claim membership to the same moral community.110
His work in Italy supported these claims. Putnam finds those regions of Italy, which
tend to be in the North, with historically high instances of civic action are more likely
to engage with political institutions for purposes of furthering democratic values. By
contrast, societies with historically low instances of civic cooperation, which tend to
be in the South, have institutions that are weak and ineffective. He posits the people
of the South do not have a wide-base of trust networks and, as such, do not extend
trust to political leaders nor institutions. While the people are very politically active,
they are not civically active; the are often looking for personal patronage rather than
democratic political goods or accountability. His work in the United States comes to
108Jeffery J. Mondak, and Adam F. Gearing. "Civic Engagement in a Post-Communist State." Political
Psychology : 615-37.
109 Putnam and Leonardi, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 169-71.
110Eric M.Uslaner, and Richard S. Conley. "Civic Engagement and Particularized Trust: The Ties
That Bind People to Their Ethnic Communities." American Politics Research, 2003, 331-60.
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similar conclusions. There he finds a decline in civic involvement in the US is the result
of declining social trust that he blames on technology.111
It is further argued generalized trusters are not only more likely to engage with the
system, but also support democratic values. In turn, as institutional trust is fostered,
this feeds back into societal trust at the generalized level. Known as the "virtuous cycle",
this represents the hallmark of any strong democratic system.112Fukuyama agrees calling
social capital, the crucible of trust claiming it is paramount to building and sustaining
democracy.113 He takes this idea a step further; those states which exhibit low-trust have a
history of authoritarian systems and a culture of mistrust of outsiders.114 Because of this,
a strong emphasis is placed on the importance of generalized trust. It is recommended
those societies who are seeing a decline in social capital must join civic groups, engage
with other members of society or risk losing democracy.
Putnam’s dire conclusion has prejudiced particularized, or strong, ties. Particularized
trust is based on the idea people trust those only in their family or friends and do not
trust those outside or from different ethnic backgrounds. It is claimed, because these
individuals do not join traditional social groups, they are not creating social capital,
nor bridging across to widen their social circles bringing in new ideas and information
about government and democracy.115 Instead, they are simply bonding; this offers no new
growth to the group and leads to the atomization of society. This theory claims social
capital116 based on bridging is vital to the development and sustainability of democracy
(Putnam 1993; 2000). This sort of trust is seen as detrimental to the creation or sustaining
of democratic polities. Thus, the combination of institutional and generalized trust has
been the main crux of trust measurement and understanding in relation to a country’s
ability to democratize.
111Robert Putnam "Bowling Alone"
112Putnam and Leonardi, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
113 Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: The
Free Press, 33.
114Ibid.
115Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology. 78, no. 6 (1973):
, doi:10.1086/225469.
116 i.e. People whom join the face-to-face groups that make up civil society.
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Critiques of Putnam: Fukuyama, Ingelhart, and more.
Fukuyama’s more recent works are an exhaustive account, among other things, of trust
and institution building, across the globe from prehuman times to modernity.117 He takes
more of an institutionalist approach to trust and institutions, meaning he ultimately feels
that institutions matter for building social trust, though he does offer context to his as-
sertions. Examining the history of institution building and democratic stability or decay,
he found additional variables to consider. His work uncovered when a state developed
democracy as being a predictive factor in its ability to create institutions and civil society,
as well as sustain democracy or fall into political decay. He calls this sequencing: those
states, he claims, that developed democracy before they went about the business of build-
ing a modern state were more likely to develop problems surrounding good governance
than those states who inherited a modern state from an autocratic regime.118 He also
emphasizes the importance of a national identity before nation building. Those states, he
claims, that have multiple notions of national identity are more likely to face problems
building an overarching national narrative that helps unify and strengthen institutions
and society as a whole. All of this is set against geographical concerns. The quality of
institutions implemented, the strength of national identity going in, will fall apart of the
geography does not tend towards a conducive environment for said bureaucracies and
institutions. Fukuyama’s position is more dynamic than typical institutional approaches,
indicating geographical, political, and social patterns on the ground shape how countries
developed and can perhaps even predict challenges to the system.
For example, Fukuyama takes issue with Putnam’s conclusions about Southern Italy
and historical low-trust being the cause of vertical nature of institutions that perform
poorly.119 Noting the vertical power ended in the Kingdom of Sicily in 1164, the real
117 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay:
From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2015).
118Ibid. 30.
119Not only the role of history in the creation of societies and institutions, but also the geography
in which the entire setting is placed. This is a key difference which Putnam does not explore in any
particular detail. He points to societies in Papau New Guinea and Africa who are still largely tribal
societies and who never developed the Weberian model in the first place and are still patrimonial. See
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reason for ineffective governance in the South today rests in the inverse of Putnam’s
own reasoning. Fukuyama instead points to a weak central authority characterized by
its inability to prevent the exploitation of pensants at the hands of its aristocracy.120
Ultimate by the time Italy was undergoing unification, the North was unable to create an
overarching national narrative with the South whom they regarded as ’country bumpkins,’
and Piedmont lacking the strength to drive such a narrative.121
Regarding the role of trust, Fukuyama does warn against what he calls narrow trusters,
that is, those people who trust the people they do not know though do not trust the
people they do know. This implies there is importance to the role of particularized trust
in building democracy, instead, one finds this is downplayed as being detrimental to the
growth of social capital because of the potential for atomization. However, this betrays
a lack of understanding of the dynamic trust process. It is not particularized trust in
and of itself which leads to atomization; atomization of the individual does not happen
in a vacuum, but rather the result of negative interactions with those we know, as well
as those we do not know. Therefore, perhaps atomization should be seen as a separate
product of negative trust interactions and not wholly the blame of particularized trust in
and of itself.
Fukuyama claims individual trust is based on interaction within societal constraints
and norms in a given time. In other words, trust is given or not based on experiences,
both positive and negative within the political and social spheres. One of his most
important departures is the belief that societies are not trapped in path-dependency. He
feels states must have leaders with the political will to change what must be changed
and to maintain what is good. Citizens must work together to form civic institutions to
hold those in control accountable for political goods and demand democratic governance.
Still he emphasizes the importance of social capital122 and generalized trust in sustaining
Chapter 7 in: Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to
the Globalization of Democracy (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015)
120Ibid. 112.
121 Ibid 110-113
122 ...calling social capital the ’sine qua non of stable liberal democracy.’ "Social Cap-
ital and Civil Society - Francis Fukuyama - Prepared for delivery at the IMF Confer-
ence on Second Generation Reforms," International Monetary Fund, accessed April 20, 2017,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htmfigI.
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democracy.
Ronald Inglehart’s research finds no supporting evidence for the importance of social
capital, however. In evaluating 43 countries of the World Values survey, he employed
regression analysis to answer whether or not membership in voluntary associations di-
rectly impacted democratic stability, as Putnam claims. He does not indicate there is
no connection between social capital and democracy, simply, he is unable to support a
causal claim through his own empirical investigations. While the correlation between so-
cial capital and democracy is high, the relationship itself was not found to be statistically
significant.123 Still, using the same data, he does find significant evidence for social trust
playing a key role in sustaining democracy.124 Indeed, it is countries who rank high on
personal "well-being" and "interpersonal" or generalized trust that will see democracies
flourish.125
Prevailing Measure of Social Trust.
Because trust is one of the variables to determine the amount of democracy in a
nation or the ability for it, accurate description and subsequent measurement is vital.
Since the theoretical underpinnings are ineffective and prejudicial, and new approach to
understanding trust must be considered that is more inclusive and dynamic than previous
understandings. This view of trust has inspired the World Values Survey (WVS) archive
director Jaime Diez Medrano to create a "Trust in the World" report based on the
importance of generalized trust. The Trust in the World map ranks countries on their
amount of ’trustiness’; a country who receives a ranking of 20 or below is considered
’more careful’ when trusting others and a country who receives a score of 140 or above
is ranked as ’more trusty’. When one looks at the the most recent rankings from Russia,
they rank as "cautious" with a score of 55 out of a possible 140+. Looking at other
former communist states, Romania comes in at 43; Lithuania is 52; Poland is 40; while
123 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Post-modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change
in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 193.
124Ibid. 194.
125Ibid. 197
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the Ukraine registers with a score of 60.126 The most commonly used measure of social
trust is the World Values Survey social trust indicator.127 Scores on social trust, past
and present, have been accepted and repeated numerous times in various research since
the survey’s inception in 1981.128 In Russia, where hitch-hiking is as common as public
transportation, it makes one wonder how valid these claims really are.
The WVS measures components of social change around the world. Topics covered
are religion, gender, good governance and democracy, to name a few. The representative
surveys are carried out in 97 states, covering 90% of the world’s population.129 However,
when one examines the methodology of the WVS as it relates to social trust, one finds only
a single question is asked to gauge something as nuanced as trust: "Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people?" 130. Does this question really measure trust? Is it really possible
to accurately measure social trust with just one question? My answer is a resounding
no. Recent attempts of the WVS to answer these criticisms have resulted in a four-
level generalized trust question. However, this measure, when used, is deployed alone
to indicated the amount of trust in a given nation. Does this question answer any true
measure of trust? The author believes the WVS question only tell part of a deep and
winding process. Placing "trust" within the bounds of an single-dimensional model of
high or low trust societies does not account for the true complexity of trust.131 Visualizing
and measuring trust in this manner betrays the bankruptcy of current understanding of
how trust operates, uncovering the gaps in the accepted literature on trust, as well.
126World Values Survey, 2006
127Simone Polillo, "Globalization: Civilizing or Destructive? An Empirical Test of the International
Determinants of Generalized Trust," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 53, no. 1 (2012): ,
doi:10.1177/0020715212448666.; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for
Consolidating Russias Democratic Transition," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001):
, doi:10.2307/2669359.
128"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
129"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
130"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
131Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
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2001, , doi:10.4324/9780203428092chapter5.
42
Gaps in the General Literature.
The culturalist approach can be applauded for recognizing the importance of historical
and cultural influences on the creation of state institutions and trust relations. Ignoring
or downplaying the role of culture in both arenas, as institutionalists do, is, at best,
folly. Political structures and social relationships are not created in a vacuum. States
are nested in cultures, which are nested communities, all of which exist on a timeline of
historical experiences. At the same time, denying or dismissing the role of elite driven
aspects of institutional creation or change is also a misstep. As we will examine in the
next chapter, creating strong democratic institutions can have the effect of stimulating a
growth in institutional trust and stability.
The glaring deficit of the emphasis on generalized trust is two fold: first, it assumes the
unidimensionality of trust and ultimately resigns a country of trusters to one category or
the other. This results in the exclusion of the other with often negative impacts.132 The
reality is, we are not solely one truster or the other: we are a combination of each form
of trust. Secondly, this approach completely ignores or downplays how these societies
have developed their own trust systems in spite of institutional failings and how they
are still capable of supporting and demanding democracy. Further, it does not take
into account modern technology and its role in ’re-embedding’ people back into their
local communities, as well as bridging across to unknown others across the globe via
online social networks. As previously stated, some questions about the legitimacy of
this approach have surfaced and new methods have been employed to ascertain the true
nature of social trust, however these have also fallen short.
The gaps in the current literature are thusly unable to capture the nature of trust
specifically or reflexively because they are structurally flawed. Putnam has reified trust
by removing its dynamic nature as well as emphasizing one characteristic of trust over
another, thereby neutering the human element of trust relations. Fukuyama emphasizes
the lack of path dependency on any given society, indicating their ability to break the
cycle. Ultimately, however, he has emphasized the role of generalized trust in democratic
132 Ulrich Beck, "Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision," Constellations 16,
no. 1 (2009): , doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2009.00534.x.
43
sustainability while eschewing the role particularized trust relations play.133
Conclusion.
This chapter has explored the background of democratic state building and the re-
sulting political and social order on the path to modernity. It is important to recall
that while Enlightenment thinkers who postulated man in the State of Nature as being
individualistic were in fact not so. The archeological and anthropological evidence points
to our ’natural’ state as being communal based on familial bonds. Setting down into
communities resulted in our selecting leaders which ultimately placed us in the position
of subject. The difficulty in maintaining control over far-flung agrarian centers resulted
in a situation where the pensants were largely self-governing. Politically and socially,
society was ultimately governed by the tyranny of the cousins. Family bonds were still
important, as they were in the State of Nature, however society adapted to meet the
current circumstances. Bringing this idea together with the current literature on trust,
we can see that family bonds have been important for us to engage with those around
us, as well as the political world. The coming of modernity "opened the walls" and
saw rapid advances in technology which had a dismembedding effect from out local envi-
ronments and family bonds, emphasizing the individual over the community. The state
began trying to compensate for this growth and its negative effects by creating more state
bureaucratic institutions in order to deliver needed political goods. However, the Indus-
trial Revolution exposed the state’s initial willingness to collude with business interests
rather than deliver for its citizens, particularly in the American experience. New forms
of civic and political interest groups were formed to demand their rights in the face of
the increasing exploitation of the poor. Citizens banned together with those they did not
know but who shared their same values in order to hold the system accountable. In the
face of the global wave of Marxism, the state recognized it must adapt or fall. It chose to
adapt, showing the power of civic action, as well as the political will of leaders to make
such changes in order to preserve the system. The lightning speed pace of modernization
133GJames. "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia’s Democratic
Transition." American Journal of Political Science Vol. 45, no. No. 1 (2001): 51-68.
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hurdled forward in the post-War Era accentuating the depth citizens have been removed
from their locales. The massive shrinkage of time and space has allowed us to use tech-
nology to create new networks of trust that blur borders, incorporate our families and
reconnect us to our communities through computers and the Internet, and new commu-
nication tools such as mobile phones and Skype, and new social platforms FaceBook and
reddit. This new technology has allowed us to re-embed ourselves back into our locales
and re-establish bonds with family and create new bonds. This is an important idea going
forward. Giddens talks about the creation of a new global form of civil society through
the use of technology. This begs the question, have we been focusing on the negative
aspects of technology while ignoring the increasing positive role technology is playing in
reconnecting us with one another and global others, perhaps deepening trust bonds with
family and generalized others? The current culturalist and institutional approaches both
fall short of explaining the role of institutions and trust in the modern world. The cultur-
alist bottom-up approach resigns states and their citizens to the path-dependent position
of high or low trust and high or low institutional performance based on historical and
cultural patterns. If change occurs it will be slow and problematic. The institutional top-
down approach traditionally focuses on the design of institutions, claiming this will solve
all ills. If the institution is designed ’correctly’ with all the proper (Western) trappings of
democratic values, everything will fall into its natural and right place. This will generate
good-will in society and it will feed back into institutions, again feeding back into soci-
ety. Putnam attempted to account to account for the short comings by acknowledging
the role of institutions but still falls back on the path-dependent thesis. His thoughts
on trust also do not account for the dynamic nature in which people actually trust and
form networks. His hyper-focus on generalized trust and outmoded forms of civil society
are ineffective. Fukuyama uncovers the misplaced focus on European development of
the state and ideas of civil society as well as recognizes that the future of democracy in
any given state is not path dependent. However, he falls back into the trap of claiming
the important of generalized trust, at the expense of particularized, in formation of in-
stitutions and democratic consolidation. Building on this understanding the WVS has
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created generalized trust questions, which are unidimensional in nature. This results in
a flawed measure resigning a society to one sort of truster or another without the needed
complexity. When forming trust networks, we do not typically rely on unknown others to
the exclusion of family, nor visa versa. As such, a new understanding of trust, as well as
a new measure must be developed. A new approach to understanding trust must answer
these questions: What is the nature of trust? Does particularized trust matter and, if
so, how does it affect democracy? How can we appropriately measure trust to capture
its true and dynamic nature? For potential answers, it is is important to examine the
current research on trust in the region to see if there are clues to how different societies
outside of the typical Western and democratic experience have tackled such issues.? The
next chapter will follow a similar pattern and will also occur in two parts: In Part I, I
will present background into the Post-Communist history and trust experience, as well as
Russian history and experiences with trust. Further, in Part II, I will examine a selection
of researchers who attempt to measure trust in the Post-Communist and Russian sphere,
specifically.
46
Chapter 3:
Background on post-Communist States and Review of the Specific
Literature.
Introduction.
The coming of the Third Wave democratization led many in the fields of comparative
politics and international relations to assume a teleological path forward. Just as Marx’s
historical materialism posited the coming of Communism was inevitable, the growing
assumption led by Francis Fukuyama, declared a sort of historical liberalism stating the
coming of liberal democracy was inevitable. This global wave of liberalism would result
in the ’End of History’, meaning all political history of regime change would end, as the
standard bearer form and ideal regime will have been met globally. This ’end of history’
would also mean the end of global wars, as it was believed democracies do not war with
one another.134 Indeed, Communism in the home of revolution, the USSR was collapsing
under its own weight. As the Berlin Wall fell, and states within the Communist ’sphere of
influence’ broke away, as Soviet Republic began seeking and declaring their independence,
it seemed as if this theory may bear fruit. Civil society groups such a Solidarity in Poland
were pointed to as evidence of a growing civil society emerging, breaking away at the
chrome gilded facade of a crumbling regime. This came to a head when Boris Yeltsin
mounted a tank outside the Russian White House in Moscow rallying the military behind
his democratic movement, putting down their arms abandoning the attempted coups by
the Communists trying desperately to grasp on to the dying Communist state.
134Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton
University Press, 1993), 119.
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After the collapse, what unfolded was anything but teleological. Some states, such
as Poland, saw incredible gains towards a legitimate liberal democratic state including
increasing societal trust and civil society. Others, such as Russia herself, saw a broken
state claiming to seek liberal democratic ideals, but in practice, created an increasingly
corrupt and authoritarian state, lacking in social trust and the trappings of a free and
independent civil society. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report135 follows states
of Central Europe, the Balkans, and Eurasia as they shed authoritarianism at the end
of the Third Wave and ranks their progress towards or regression away from democratic
consolidation.136 Rather than a domino effect culminating in a global order towards lib-
eral democracy, an examination of the data reveals a more persistent backsliding towards
authoritarianism for the past twelve years in a row (Figure 1). This is a great area of
concern. Many theorists in the literature pointed towards a history of autocratic rule
and an inability to adapt to democratic values and expectations. Others still pointed
to ineffective institutions that were either half-heartedly pursued, initiated too late, or
at worst, not at all. The answers to these questions are vital; if we truly care about
democratic reform, strong institutions and social trust, we need to understand the people
or a given society, as well as the nature of trust itself.
Figure 1: "Nations in Transit Report", 2017. Changes in Democracy Score.
135"Nations in Transit 2016," | Freedom House, January 04, 2017, accessed July 19, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2016.
136For a detailed description of each ranking for purposes of measurement, please see: "Na-
tions in Transit Methodology," | Freedom House, October 07, 2016, , accessed July 19, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-methodology.
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The gaps in the general literature betray the likelihood of deviant cases in other
political and cultural circumstances. Indeed, a deeper look at the literature on trust
shows a large body of work on the states of the former USSR and its influential sphere.
As such, it seems an appropriate place to examine trust more closely. What different
kinds of regimes have emerged since the fall? What is the historical background actors
are operating against? What does trust look like in the region? What does civil society
look like, and further, are there new forms of civil society and trust networks emerging? I
will first explore the relevant background of the post-Communist and post-Soviet sphere.
Next, I will then examine the specific literature on the region to see if any gaps from the
general literature can be filled. What can be learned here can be used as a possible path
forward to a more dynamic understanding of the nature of social trust.
Part I: Background.
Initially after the fall of the USSR in 1991, theories regarding the trajectory of post-
communist systems fell into one of two pre-existing camps: modernization or transitology.
The former tended to draw comparisons on modern states and their transition from pre-
modern or authoritarian system to a more modern state system.137 Modernization theory
focused on levels of industrialization present. It was believed the way to change a politi-
cal system was first through the modernization of the economy towards a more capitalist
system, which would force social and ultimately political changes, and finally democratic
regime change.138 This idea was peddled heavily in the post-War period with the onset of
the Cold War139 and the perceived need to promote democracy and capitalism throughout
the world as a way of staving off Communism. The later built off modernization theory,
however focused on actor-oriented explanations vs purely economic ones and stressed
137Max Weber, Peter Lassman, and Ronald Speirs, Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
138Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53, no. 01 (1959): , doi:10.2307/1951731.
139 Jordan Gans-Morse, "Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist
Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm," Post-Soviet Affairs 20, no. 4 (2004): ,
doi:10.2747/1060-586x.20.4.320.
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there were no structural preconditions required for democracy to take root.140 Partic-
ularly, the kind of economy is not deemed relevant in a state’s ability to democratize,
but rather the level of social unity present, elite bargaining with opposition leaders, and
finally, the quality of elite lead transition involving the co-opting of the opposition (which
determines the strength of democratic outcomes). Scholars of modernization posited one
would expect any transition to be linear in nature, assuming a single end-point: liberal
democracy. In short, the coming of liberal democracy was ’inevitable.’ 141
When it became clear modernization explanations, related to economic changes, were
insufficient, and time proved we had not, in fact, reached the End of History142 after the
Third Wave, some theorists began searching for other alternatives. They became aware
that, rather than being teleological in nature, transitions in post-communist states seem
to have divergent courses from Latin American democratization that do not easily apply
across regions or even sometimes, within the region itself.143 Indeed, authors who have
attempted to cross-compare have run into dead ends, something researchers the former
USSR and sphere, specifically, point to a uniqueness of the Soviet and post-Communist
cases.144 Katherine Verdery notes:
In my opinion, to assume that we are witnessing a transition from social-
ism to capitalism, democracy, or market economies is mistaken. I hold with
Stark, Burawoy, Bunce, and others who see the decade of the 1990s as a time
of transformation in the countries that have emerged from socialism; these
140 Friedbert Rb, "Guillermo O?Donnell/Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,
Bd. 4: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore/London 1986.," Schlsselwerke
der Politikwissenschaft: , doi:10.1007/978-3-531-90400-990.
141Mike Alvarez et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," Studies In Comparative International Devel-
opment 31, no. 2 (1996): , doi:10.1007/bf02719326. ; Adam Przeworski, "The "East" Becomes the
"South"? The "Autumn of the People" and the Future of Eastern Europe," PS: Political Science and
Politics 24, no. 1 (1991): , doi:10.2307/419369.; Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," The National
Interest, 1989, http://www.kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf.
142 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," The National Interest, 1989,
http://www.kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf.
143Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1971),
32.;Jordan Gans-Morse, "Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist
Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm," Post-Soviet Affairs 20, no. 4 (2004): ,
doi:10.2747/1060-586x.20.4.320.
144Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53, no. 01 (1959): , doi:10.2307/1951731.; Vladimir
Gelman, "Transformatsiya v Rossii: politicheskiy rezhim i demokraticheskaya oppozitsiya," Moscow:
MONF , 1999.; Linz 1996
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transformations will produce a variety of forms, some of them perhaps ap-
proximating Western capitalist market economies and many of them not....145
Questions have continuously been raised whether or not liberal democracy is truly the
most appropriate end point in the region. Further, concerns around such a litmus test
might cause scholars to miss characteristics which are unique to post-communist states.
The transformation approach has emerged out of this debate. It required the theorists
to continuously re-evaluate the current state of transformation and update previous find-
ings with new information. It is not path dependent and has no particular end-point
in mind.146 However, as Gans-Morse (2004) points out, this is perhaps not the best ap-
proach, either. He proposes a more moderate approach; specifically, taking from transfor-
mology the notion of consistently revisiting one’s models and expectations and updating
them, while comparing them to the most likely and closest seeming short term endpoint
of a specific regime or state. In other words, a more appropriate comparison might be
more towards an authoritarianism or hybrid regime rather than a comparison to liberal
democracy.147 The next section will examine the kinds of regimes one might expect in
this region.
The varieties of post-communist transitions.
The varieties of regimes types are a hotly debated topic though most agree, for pur-
poses of empirical measurement, one cannot simply place hard markers between regimes
because of the high variability between them. For the sake of ease, only the three major
regime types will be discussed.
Regime types: Democracy.
There are 3 main regime types, all of which are present in the post-Communist, post-
Soviet sphere: democracy, authoritarian, and hybrid regime. The first of these regime
145 Katherine Verdery, What was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996), 15.
146 Ibid.; Gans-Morse 2004
147Gans-Morse 2004.
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types seems the most obvious. The term is used often to describe specific states or ideals
for developing states, however the truth is more elusive. The question over what is and
is not a democracy has been an ongoing affair for decades and its characteristics is hotly
debated.148 For example, some theorists prefer a minimalistic definition of democracy,
amounting to an ’electoral democracy’ which provides its citizens the right to vote in
elections, as well as minimal or restricted levels of some other rights to speech, press, and
assembly providing some context to the right to vote.149 While some see suffrage as a
necessary condition, they do not feel this in and of itself is sufficient to capture democracy.
As such, these researcher would, for example, claim the United States was not truly a
democracy until slavery was abolished, others would deny the title until women had
the right to vote, still others would deny it until the Civil Rights movement gained its
victories through the Civil Rights act,150 or the inclusion of marriage equality. In other
words, a minimalist description falls short of considering human rights.151
In his seminal work Polyarchy, Robert Dahl, attempted to grapple with this ques-
tion.152 Dahl, eschewing in some sense the word ’democracy’ 153 favors the term polyarchy
to describe polities requiring truly competitive elections that are both free and fair, but
also have a buttressing guarantee of certain rights which make life in such a system
have more meaning. These include the near absolute freedom of expression as well as
148 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.
Chapter 3, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Juan J. Linz, "Types of Political Regime and
Respect for Human Rights," in Conditions for Civilized Politics: Political Regimes and Compliance
with Human Rights, ed. Asbjrn Eide (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), 186.; Joseph A.
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed. (London: Allen Unwin, 1947); Robert
Alan. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press, 1971); Larry Diamond,
Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999),
and many others.
149Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States
(New York: Basic Books, 2009); Alexis De Tocqueville, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Delba Winthrop,
Democracy in America (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
150 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed. (London: Allen Unwin,
1947), 269.
151 Juan J. Linz, "Types of Political Regime and Respect for Human Rights," in Conditions for Civilized
Politics: Political Regimes and Compliance with Human Rights, ed. Asbjrn Eide (Oslo: Scandinavian
University Press, 1996), 187.
152 Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press, 1971).
153 Ibid., 2. Dahl makes the point clearly he does not believe a true democracy has ever existed in the
history of the world in which its citizens were truly deemed equal and given rights accordingly. He also
states what we imagine as democracy does not always produce ’good’ and exists on a sort of spectrum.
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organization and association.154 Also vital were a free and independent press, and assur-
ances that policies crafted by governmental elites actually reflect the manner in which
people vote or otherwise express their preferences. Dahl understood states could have
some characteristics but not all which made it difficult to compartmentalize some states
into a specific box. This is especially true of nations shedding a hegemonic past and
transitioning towards ’something else.’155
Taking from deTocqueville, Larry Diamond (1990) explains any sort of democracy
given any name can be viewed as a work in progress and can be continuously improved
upon.156 However the generally accepted true standard form of democracy is known
as liberal democracy. It is considered the gold standard by which all other regimes
are compared as it provides the best hope for ’reducing social injustices and correcting
mistaken policies and corrupt practices.’157 It builds upon the basic tenants of electoral
democracy and adds several characteristics:
∗ Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in fact, by the autonomous
power of other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parlia-
ment, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability)
∗ Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies, in fact as well as in
constitutional theory, with (democratically) elected officials of the state; in partic-
ular, the military is subordinate to the authority of elected civilian officials.
∗ Electoral outcomes are uncertain.158 The opposition vote is significant and there
is a presumption of party alteration in government. No group that adheres to
154 ...provided it is done within the confides of the law. For example, on cannot scream FIRE in a
theater, or threaten the life of the President.
155 Ibid., 7. See the Figure 1.2 Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization. Dahl posits a variety
of circumstances in which a regime could be moving towards one position, away from another, or back
again.
156 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 18.
157 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.
Chapter 3, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy;
Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
158 Adam Przeworski’s notion of democracy as "institutional uncertainty" comes to mind. Political
alternation is possible. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms
in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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constitutional principles is denied the right to create a party and contest elections.
∗ No group (regardless of ethnicity, culture or religious beliefs) is kept from expressing
their interests in the political process or from speaking their language or practicing
their culture.
∗ Citizens have continuous and numerous avenues to express and have their voices
be represented- these include independent associations and movements, which they
may elect to join.
∗ Sources of information, aside from government information, (to include an indepen-
dent media) are easily accessible.
∗ The individual is granted extensive freedoms as they relate to speech, belief, opinion,
expression, demonstration and petition.
∗ All citizens are equal under the law, even if they have few political resources.
∗ Groups, as well as individual liberties are protect by an independent judiciary-their
decisions are respected and upheld by other sources of power.159
Diamond also suggests that these criteria imply an eleventh condition: "if political au-
thority is to be constrained and balanced, individual and minority rights protected, and
rule of law assured, democracy requires a constitution that is supreme." The rule of law
is vital because, in part, it helps ensure the citizens are able to trust their government
and its institutions. He argues that:
"The citizenry will be more likely to favor democracy if they have faith in their
leaders. As, their leaders give them greater freedoms and protection through
the rule of law, citizens will have a higher approval rate of Democracy. The
regime should also focus on human rights to help ensure legitimacy among
its people. It is through a liberal form of democracy that this high rate of
legitimacy is obtained."
159 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 11.
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As such, a liberal democracy requires political leaders to have the ’political will’ to check
their own power, be subject to established rules, and support a thriving civil society.160
The bureaucracy is a vital part of the modern state as imagined by Max Weber and
democracies tend to have a stronger rule of law, as well as effective bureaucracies providing
adequate political goods for their citizens.161 In turn, democratic institutions and the
rule of law are said to provide citizens the space to trust one another, thereby increasing
societal trust.162
Regime types: Authoritarian.
By contrast, an authoritarian regime can be described as a regime which lacks demo-
cratic characteristics.163 This vague depiction demonstrates that often times, the lines
between democracy and authoritarianism can be blurred.164 There are three main forms
of authoritarian rule, military, personalist, or ideological, however a regime may be a
combination of these. This also betrays the reality of high variance between regimes
permitting them to fall into any infinite number of places along the spectrum of authori-
tarianism, in turn even making typology difficult.165 Further complicating matters, often
times the stated beliefs and ideals of the Supreme Leaders in authoritarian regimes are
not ’authentic’, that is, what they proclaim is not translated into appropriate action.
Instead, they are simply words intended to give a perception of certain ideals to the
outside world.166 Nonetheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, modern states have
specific characteristics, this holds true even if the state in question is authoritarian. One
160 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Rev-
olution. Chapter 3, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Larry Diamond. "Assess-
ing Global Democratization a Decade after the Communist Collapse." Address to the Workshop
on Democratization, New Europe College and Romanian Academic Society, Bucharest May 6, 2002
http://www.stanford.edu/ ldiamond/papers/romaniaspeech.pdf.
161 Weber 1958*
162 Rothstein 2006*
163 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 53.
164 Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan J. Linz, Democracy in Developing Countries
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 17.
165 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 167-179.
Further, Linz does a respectable job outlining typologies which can be found beginning with figure 4.1
on page 174 and detailed descriptions beginning on page 184.
166 Ibid. 50. One can think of North Korea’s official name as "The People’s Democratic Republic of
North Korea." There is not a universe in which any political scientist would place North Korea anywhere
along the democratic spectrum.
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will typically find judiciaries present, as well as some form of bureaucracy and supporting
institutions, as well as a legislature and an executive; one could even find relatively free
elections and participation among its citizens.167 What helps distinguish an authoritar-
ian regime is the amount of participation allowed by its citizens and the degree to which
repression is used to control them.168
Judiciaries are present in authoritarian regimes, as well as some form of the rule of
law. Typically, however, the executive and related government institutions are exempt.169
When permitted, it is often conflicts between citizens or otherwise non-political cases
which are heard. The presence of a judiciary or limited rule of law does not guarantee a
fair resolution as wealthy private citizen or businesses are more likely to be able to pay
off judges to rule in their favor. This can lead to a political culture in which bribery or
reliance on informal networks are accepted as the common currency to ’get things done’,
expanding the reach of corruption and reducing institutional trust.170
Formal institutions in authoritarian regimes can be the point of co-option of political
or civil opponents.171 Authoritarian leaders often attempt to bring their opposition under
their control by offering them positions in government, or access to resources provided
by specific institutions. One can also find cases where family members or prominent
members of the leader’s particular ethnicity or religious sect are also offered positions.
At its worst, institutions can be headed by multiple leaders who have no skills related
to the institutions they govern, nor care to obtain them, resulting in the degradation of
the functioning of the institutions. This can also result in a weakening of the state as a
whole. At its best, leaders who gain these roles may actually strengthen the institutions
they lead, providing the regime with needed stability.172 Regardless of regime stability,
167 The case of Iranian Theocracy comes to mind. While the Ayatollah has the final say, and the
Guardian Council finalizes a selection of Presidential candidates, the people do participate in elections
and their choices are upheld.
168 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 179.
169Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
170Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 179.; Alena
V. Ledeneva, "Practices of Exchange and Networking in Russia," Journal of Financial Crime 6, no. 3
(1999): , doi:10.1108/eb025886.
171 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 161.
172 Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling
Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 04 (2012): ,
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however, authoritarian institutions tend to suffer from low levels of institutional trust
because in the end they either do not produce enough political goods for their citizens or
are perceived as corrupt or both.173
Where this co-option is met with resistance, the use of repressive tactics is employed.
However, this can be a delicate balance. Too much repression or high-level violence
can breed counter-violence and potentially regime collapse. An effective authoritarian
will be able to circumvent high-level violence by eliminating the opposition, preferably
through coercion. However, trying to co-opt the opposition through violence is costly both
financially and militarily.174 This quandary, known as the dictator’s dilemma, highlights
a leader’s fear and uncertainty in the amount of support s/he has, thus can lead to an
irrational amount of finances spent in attempts to placate the opposition. This is not
always possible. In such cases, leaders may resort to violence with various rates of short-
term success and long-term stability.175 Any act of violence is likely to reduce institutional
trust. Still further, perceived instances of corruption among activists or other citizens
can reduce social trust.176
Civil society, if permitted at all, is usually repressed. Often times, what the state
might call civic participation is really state-sanctioned and/ or mandated rallies, interest
groups, or unions. This repression tend to stem from the fear of the leader in losing
control of the message from the center and is seen as a direct threat to legitimacy of
the state.177 This environment tends to lead to low levels of generalized social trust and
an increase in particularized trust relations. However, this is not a terminal diagnosis
doi:10.1017/s1537592712002861.
173Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Glob-
alization of Democracy (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).
174 Though recent scholarship also indicates violent struggles can also lead to regime duribility and elite
cohesion in some authoritarian regimes. Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Beyond Patronage:
Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," Perspectives on Politics 10, no.
04 (2012): , doi:10.1017/s1537592712002861.
175 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 161. This is
often seen in African personalist regimes, for example, which high rates of regime turn-over. Lucan A.
Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001.
176Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," World
Politics 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.
177Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War,"
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001.
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for civil society. Indeed, we do find that social movements can arise out of civil society
and challenge the state.178 Again, here, co-option can be employed through patron-client
relationships, promises of resources,179 or a variety of physically coercive methods such
as targeted low-level violence.180
One may see military rule, party pluralism, or single-party rule in authoritarian
regimes.182 One may find a legislature in which the legislators are elected, in others
they are appointed, or one may find a combination of these. Authoritarian regimes can
have several democratic elements, such as a popular vote for the Executive or a reliable
judiciary for non-political cases.183 In single-party regimes however, while elections may
occur, the net result is a citizen’s perceived choice of voting yes or ’rubber stamping’
whatever it is the state has put before them. In still others, citizens may be provided
with a series of choices giving the people relative power in an attempt to boost legitimacy
and increase trust. 184
Regime types: Hybrid.
Sometimes referred to as the ’grey zone’, a hybrid regime is generally defined as a state
which combines democratic and authoritarian elements.185 Some theorists deem hybrid
regimes as being diminished forms of democracy, however recent scholarship suggests
some cases may actually be diminished forms of authoritarianism. As with democratic
and authoritarian regimes, one can see significant variance between hybrid regimes falling
anywhere between regimes which lean more towards democracy and those who lean more
178 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 18.
179 Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War,"
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authoritarian. Attempts have been made to parse out the varieties of hybrid regimes;
Robert Dahl termed hybrid regimes ’near polyarchies’, Diamond, Linz and Lipset refereed
to such regimes as ’semidemocratic’, Diamond discusses ’pseudodemocracies’, Livetsky
and Way cover ’competitive authoritarian’, and so on.186 Again, while such states may
not be democracies or authoritarian regimes, they are found in modern states, which
allows for a useful starting point of analysis for hybrid regimes.
Bureaucracy and institutions are present, as they are vital to the functioning of any
modern state. However, the degree to which they are effective varies. Hybrid regimes tend
to focus on informal rules and networks which typically exist alongside formal rules and
related institutions; the degree to which informal practices are given up for formal rules
institutions is a predictor a state is moving more towards democracy. Of course, as a state
begins to regress and expand reliance on informal practices tends to predict backsliding
towards authoritarianism. Where institutions experience lower levels of trust, one will
find greater levels of reliance on informal practices and networks. In short, commitment
to democratic rules of the game can be measured by performance of institutions and
levels of good governance. Where institutions elections and political parties seem to be
improving in function, a greater hope of transitioning to a democratic polity is predicted.
However it is important to keep in mind, transition towards democracy is not always the
true aim of a hybrid regime, even if their stated goals claim otherwise.187
One will also find legislatures and executives present in hybrid regimes and, as such,
popular elections. Whereas, typically, an authoritarian regime can be marked by its pre-
dictability in outcomes, hybrid regimes experience fierce electoral battles, whose outcomes
can sometimes be unpredictable. However, one can find instances where the political op-
position is harassed or sometimes assaulted, where coverage of elections and candidates
is fair and balanced, and the overall process may be rather opaque. Hybrid regimes
do have regular elections and tend to be free from blatant or massive vote rigging.188
186 Diamond 2002; Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner,
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Where political alternation is not popularly believed to be feasible, or is not a political
reality, again, institutional trust will lag. Further, some hybrid regimes effectively have
single-party rule, even in the presence of a perceived multi-party system. This results
in a circumstance where the ruling party co-opts smaller parties into a broader coalition
effectively blurring the lines between parties. Or one might find such a vast number of
parties, it confuses and diffuses the political arena of a state, resulting in citizens who
feel they are not truly being represented.189 Once elected, however, it also remains un-
likely that popular demands will be met with any great frequency. Voting patterns in the
legislator or policies in the executive will be less likely to reflect the will of the people,
also resulting in lower levels of institutional trust.190
The rule of law will be present, at least on paper through a constitution and/ or written
laws and regulations. However, the extent to which these are followed and consequently,
the extent to which the elite are also governed by these laws may vary. While some
regimes may ’crack down’ on lower-level bureaucrats, typically, the highest levels are
exempt from such a crackdown.191 Weak or uneven rule of law can also lead to mistrust
within society. 192
Common features of Communist systems that affect trust.
Overall, the Communist system could be characterized by a lack of choices the citizens
had in relation to risk-taking behavior with state institutions. In other words, trust was
assumed by the state, regardless of whether or not the citizens gave it. Left without
alternative choices, citizens were expected to simply vote ’yes’ and rubber stamp whatever
policies, initiatives or symbols that were put before them. Without pluralism, there was
189Drogus 2015*
190Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups,
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no other viable option. The Party presumed to speak for all workers and citizens and
knew what was best for them, so ’alternative’ options were seen as irrelevant, at best,
or subversive at worst.193 As Mistzal points out, the system was binary: we the people
and they the bureaucracy.194 And there is no way we can act as a check against them.
Without the opportunity to ’practice risk-taking’, this leaves society in a vulnerable place
during a regime transition towards a democratic system that requires it. It also results in
a system in which the people are forced to turn inward to one another, to rely on or form
informal trust networks, resulting in what researchers would call a ’low-trust’ society.195
There is a reliance on informal networks to fill the gaps when the bureaucracy is unable
or unwilling to provide political goods.196 As we will see, it seems the people swapped
out one set of despots for another, which has a direct impact on their ability to trust both
socially and generally. This will be outlined in more detail in the next several sections.
Political and Social Order during Tsarist rule through the Revo-
lution.
The absolute monarchy of the Tsars reigned over a repressive and strict caste system.
The Feudal structure fixed an individual to a specific rung on the socioeconomic ladder,
based on birth. One’s positioning determined his or her prospects for social mobility,
with only very few exceptions. The Russian peasantry very much like in pre-modernity,
often lived in far flung areas away from the center or regional authority; as such they
were typically self-governing, relying largely on krugovaia poruka, or joint responsibility.
Everyone was responsible for ensuring the prosperity and survival of the village and those
who fell short or broke laws or deviated from expected norms were punished according to
193 Alexey Tikhomirov, "The Regime of Forced Trust: Making and Breaking Emotional Bonds between
People and State in Soviet Russia, 1917-1941," The Slavonic and East European Review 91, no. 1
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village councils.197 Serfdom was also a particular feature. Tied to their land and beholden
to the moneyed gentry, they lived short, hard lives. Challenging this political and social
order was to risk the often-brutal wrath of the Tsar, regardless from which caste you
came.198 Since the time of Catherine the Great, discussions surrounding the notion of
eliminating the system were entertained, though it was clear the nobility were violently
opposed to such an idea. It would not be until Alexander II, who instituted some civil
and agrarian reforms, would the serfs be free from their age-old bonds to landed nobles
in 1861. But this reform was muted by the still centralized autocratic political reality,
resulting in unfinished freedom.199
While Alexander II’s failure to adopt more sweeping democratic reforms eventually
resulted in his death in 1881 at the hand of socialist revolutionaries, the Russian people
saw little benefit from a change in leadership.200 His son, lost faith in reform as a result of
his father’s assassination and took the policy of entrenching power. Alexander III openly
targeted those who advocated political changes and social reforms. He cracked down on
religious freedoms, supporting a policy of "Russification" to erase ethic identities.201
After the early death of the Tsar,202 his son Nicholas II took the reins of power.
Raised strictly in the belief of the Tsar’s divine right to rule and anti-reform policies he
held the line against any reform. The tide was changing socially and politically in Russia,
particularly after the loss of the Russo-Japanese War which exposed the weak state of
the Tsar’s Navy and military might, as well as the debacle of Bloody Sunday where the
Tsar’s guard fired on peaceful protesters. The endgame had begun for the Tsars, but
even those who sympathized with both reformers and the monarchy felt a centralized
government was still the state’s best hope for survival. They tempered their words with
deference to the need for a strong, centralized government. Consider this memorandum
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to Nicholas II from his Chief Minister, Sergei Witte:
"The great danger which resulted from centuries of stagnation, and threat-
ened our country’s very survival, calls for unity among us and the formation
of a strong authoritative government that will be backed by the people’s
confidence- this alone can rescue our country from present chaos."203
Russians who sought political change found little encouragement in Orthodox Church
pews either. Throughout the time of the monarchy, church leaders taught that the Tsars
were anointed by God, and therefore predestined to rule. Similarly, all members of society
were told it was also God’s divine will they were born into a specific class and they should
be content with their predetermined lot in life. The role of the Church was, in short, to
reinforce the political and social order under the Tsars.
The February abdication of the Tsar to the Mensheviks and subsequent October
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 seemed to offer the first real opportunity for change on
behalf of Russia’s oppressed and poor. Instead, the Soviet order merely transformed
existing institutions. They swapped loyalty to the double-headed eagle of the Tsars with
devotion to the hammer and sickle of the Soviet worker. But while a peasant farm boy
might now indeed rise to become Premier one day (ala Nikita Khrushchev), the Bolsheviks
stressed the importance of the "labor collective" over the needs of the individual. The
promise of the redistribution of wealth alone was to be considered adequate reward, rather
than encouraging the achievement of individual goals. As the Soviet system matured, the
extent of a Russian worker’s political power was to vote "yes" to a slate of Communist
party candidates. The "role of the self" of the average Russian had been quickly reduced
to effectively "rubber-stamping" the new but equally centralized authoritarian system.
It quickly became evident the promises of Lenin were empty: The Russian Revolution
merely exchanged one set of despotic rulers for another who, perhaps, were even more
brutal.
203 Rempel, Reform and Reaction Under Alexander II and III, http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/ grem-
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Stalinism: Political, Social Order, and and the regime of ’forced
trust’.
There are two main schools of thought regarding institutional trust under Stalin. The
first is that trust under Stalin is defined by its absence. It posits that trust during Stalin’s
reign was undermined due to the perceived need for political order, as achieved through
oppression. The second is that Stalin’s regime created "forced trust".204 Under this
school of thought, the oppressed citizens have no choice but to place their trust in the
state, so that they may feel some control over their environment. However, it seems both
forms of trust existed during this time. Trust in broader society was decimated and trust
in family and friends was also damaged.
Political Order.
After Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin moved quickly to consolidate power. By 1927,
he had removed all political opposition and touted his new plan: "Socialism in One
Nation". Under this doctrine, the Soviet Union would no longer rely on the hope of a
global revolution, or assistance from a Socialist Europe.205 The New Economic Policy
(NEP)206 was discarded in favor of a Centrally Planned Economy (CPE).207
The CPE policy called for the eradication of cottage industry and blat’. Lenin had
allowed such businesses to continue as a necessary evil, but Stalin argued that mod-
ernization of industry was only possible by eliminating competing industry even at the
smallest scale. The CPE also required the collectivization of the peasantry.208 Through
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collectivization, it was argued, the state would consolidate resources to address the needs
of industry.209
While many supported Stalin’s push for collectivization, it met resistance from the
kulaks, the so-called "rich peasants" who stood to lose their agricultural wealth. In re-
sponse, Stalin launched a carefully-constructed "us vs them" propaganda campaign. The
kulaks were portrayed as greedy capitalists and subhuman animals. They were character-
ized as traitors who would hoard grain and slaughter animals rather than join collectives.
In August of 1932, Stalin drafted a new law proclaiming that "persons misappropriating
public property must be regarded as enemies of the people."210 Kulaks who did not com-
ply were sent to labor camps or executed by the secret police (OGPU). But with food
shortages sweeping the country, Stalin’s campaign succeeded in convincing many that
the kulaks simply "got what they deserved."211 Propaganda campaigns of this nature are
typical of governments that systematically target a portion of the population to advance
social and/or economic change. But unlike Hitler’s genocidal assault on the Jews, Stalin’s
targeting of the kulaks was based primarily on class, not ethnicity. In Stalin’s mind, the
kulaks were obstacles to the Centrally Planned Economy and the future of Socialism. 212
Stalin ultimately achieved his goals through taxation, famine and force. At least five
to eight million Soviet citizens starved to death.213 Some estimates suggest as many as ten
million people starved to death in the Ukraine alone, with more dying across Russia due
to the combination of famine and forced collectivization.214 Ironically, even at the apex of
the famine, the USSR was still exporting grain: from 864,000lbs in 1930 to 10,000,000lbs
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in 1933. This dichotomy helped undermine trust in Soviet institutions among those who
survived.215 Those who were duped by the system, were either unable or unwilling to
believe any other version of events if it contradicted with the state, exemplifying forced
trust. Vassily Grossman’s Forever Flowing216 depicts exactly this scenario of forced trust
in Chapter 14. A young woman who works at the offices of a collective farm in Ukraine
sees everything that is happening to the kulaks, however convinces herself the propaganda
is correct, and finds herself angry at the kulaks and indifferent to their suffering. She felt
she had to make the lies a truth in order for her to make sense of her chaotic surroundings
as the Holodomor waged on.
The kulaks were not the only victims of Stalin’s fear and paranoia. From the 1920s
through the late 1930s, Stalin launched purge after purge across the USSR. Everyone
from the lowest peasant to Stalin’s inner circle were touched.217 Nikita Khrushchev
plainly described this era in his "Secret Speech" (1956): "I often talked with Nikolay
Alexandrovich Bulganin. Once when we two were traveling in a car," he said, "It has
happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when
he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next: home or to jail? Such
is the story of many in the top echelons of the Party and Stalin’s inner circle." 218 Two
of Stalin’s main political enemies, Bukharin and Zinoviev, were arrested and tortured by
the NKVD in order to provide false confessions of their alleged crimes and conspiracies
against the state (Siegel 1998). Leon Trotsky fled to Mexico, where he was later traced
by the NKVD and assassinated under direct orders from Stalin. Trotsky’s entire family
was systematically hunted down and killed after Trotsky left Russia (Edvard Radzinskii,
Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia’s
Secret Archives (New York: Anchor Books, 1997) 438. Trotsky’s case was extreme, but
not unique in Soviet society. An estimated 2000 artists, writers and intellectuals were
sent to labor camps or prisons. So were scientists suspected of spying. Dissidents were
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frequent targets: the arrest and assassination of Sergey Kirov, once an ardent supporter
of Stalin, typified the "Great Purges" of 1936-38. During this period, families often
paid a price for the choices of their dissident relatives. Wives were routinely arrested
with (or shortly after) their husbands, and their children were then sent to orphanages.
An estimated 200,000 children were sent to homes around the USSR 219" Cahiers du
monde russe : Russie, Empire russe, Union sovique, ats indndants 39, no. 1 (1998):
, doi:10.3406/cmr.1998.2520.. Children 16 and older were labeled "socially dangerous
elements" and sometimes shipped to gulags. Dissident children of any age were closely
monitored for subversive behavior220.
By 1938, it was determined that arresting mothers not directly linked to the alleged
acts of their husbands was not an economically prudent policy. It simply cost more for
the state to care for these orphaned children. The process was halted, but for hundreds of
thousands of children the damage was already done. Many blamed themselves for what
happened to their parents. Some strived to be the best Soviets they could be, hoping to
prove that their family’s fate might be some terrible mistake. Others volunteered for the
front lines during the war in hopes of "rehabilitating" their own parents’ reputations 221.
During the purges, people were encouraged to turn in all "enemies" they personally
knew, even their neighbors or coworkers. In some cases, people would give up the first
name that came to mind to save their own lives or spare their families. In others, this
system was used to settle personal scores, rather than any instance of true subversive
behavior. According to recent estimates, a total of 2.5 million people were arrested.
Of those, approximately 700,000 were shot and killed222. It is easy to see how, in this
environment, the average citizen might lose trust, not only in government institutions,
but also everyone in society.
Not all were ready to blame Stalin, however, indicative of the forced trust in the
system.223 Many still believed him to be a protective and loving father, and felt he
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could not possibly know the cruelties being perpetrated against the Soviet people. Many
even wrote to him, hoping he would save them from the rapacious NKVD. The Soviet
system had made clear that they were the particular authority who defined who and
what was trust worthy and it was the citizens who must earn their trust. This is perhaps
one reason why letter writing was so prolific: letters are filled with a deference and love
towards Stalin, proclaiming their deep loyalty, explaining some mistake must have been
made in their particular case, appealing to Stalin via a proclamation of loyalty. Of course,
letters went unanswered, forcing many to internalize what had happened to them or their
family members and make a variety of excuses in order to make sense of their now chaotic
world view. This seriously damaged a healthy notion of trust in Soviet institutions.224
Civil Society and Social Order.
Some of problems that lead to a decrease of institutional trust also correlate to a
decrease in overall trust within the population, both generalized and particular. The
collectivization of the kulaks and the Great Purges had a dire effect on how the Soviet
people related to one another. The forced trust in the system created a situation where,
so long as everything was stable, those who were not labeled ’enemy of the state’ could
publicly engage with one another across ethnic and social divides. Stalin also sought to
bring all civil society based organizations (obshchestvennye organizatsii) under the control
of the state, further complicating generalized trust. It is through civil society people
build on and express generalized trust in one another and act on it for the betterment of
themselves and society. State control of civil society left the populace no place to turn
to honestly engage in society under to the oppressive state system.
Only those organizations that were under control of the state and were believed to
promote Stalin’s vision of a Soviet society were permitted, all others were dissolved.
The nomenklatura system guaranteed party control over civil society and through the
Secretariat.225 The Komsomol (Communist Youth League) was meant to serve as a
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model for future socially-based groups.226 Officers were appointed by Communist Party
officials and answerable to them.227 By contrast, the Zhenotdel, or Women’s Department
of the Central Committee Secretariat, was initially given the power remove obstacles in
the path of women’s rights. But fear of "bourgeois feminism" lead to the dissolution
of the Zhenotdel in 1929 (Schrand 1999 ; Buckley 1989, 70). Lenin himself had formed
The RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers). But Stalin believed the RAPP
overrun with "Trotskyites" 228 and replaced it with the Union of Soviet Writers by 1932.
The famed novelist Maxim Gorky would lead the first meeting of the Union of Soviet
Writers, using the opportunity to describe the new "Soviet Man" literature should aim
to portray: "He possesses a faith in the organizing power of reason. He is conscious of
being the builder of a new world, and although his conditions of life are still arduous. He
has no grounds for pessimism."229
Soon only artistic works deemed "socialist in content," which promoted Socialist re-
alism, were permitted.230 Artists that complied with Stalin’s will were greatly rewarded,
particularly writers. They were given lavish apartments and received some of the highest
pay in the USSR during his rule. This is because Stalin felt they were the "engineers of
the soul". 231 The most celebrated art and literature of this period were those works that
also served as an instrument of propaganda for the state.
The artists, writers and poets who opposed this new ideal were sent to labor camps.
The poet Osip Mandelstam died in one such camp, despite efforts by Anna Akhmatova
and Boris Pasternak to intervene on his behalf.232 Akhmatova’s own work was banned
as "bourgeois." Even the life-long Marxist playwright, poet and propagandist Vladimir
Mayakovsky became disillusioned with Stalinism’s artistic restraints and took his own
life. The examples of these beloved artists were not uncommon.233
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The Russian Orthodox Church was another bastion of civil society. Long vilified by
the Bolsheviks, the Church saw renewed scrutiny under Stalin. The Church was banned
from performing charitable acts, and confined to sermons and sacraments.234 With the
Church diminished, Soviet leaders believed citizens would abandon it When the plan
failed, priests were rounded up, jailed and sometimes executed (Radzinsky 1996, 244).
Churches were closed, their property seized. As new cities sprung up, churches were not
built with them. Forty-six thousand churches existed prior to 1917. By 1939, only one
to two hundred remained (Davis 1995, 13). Those that did existed under strict state
oversight.235
The Church persisted in this fashion until the Great Patriotic War, when some
churches were reopened. But the reigns of the state were only pulled tighter, as the
Church became assimilated into the nomenklatura system The Church was now used as a
tool to offer legitimacy to Stalin’s rule and policies.236 But it was unable to independently
represent the needs of the people or act in their interests.
By the late 1930s, nearly all aspects of Russian civil society functioned as an ap-
pendage of the Soviet state.237 While it is true that this process began under Lenin, who
was said to distrust any organization that wished to be independent, the deathblow was
issued under Stalin. The authentic social bonds that could not be found in public spaces,
citizens often could not find at home, either.
Family life. In times of deep social and political upheaval, family usually turns to
one another for comfort and support.238 But families living in Stalinist Russia could find
little comfort at home. The system encouraged family members to report their own kin
for anti-Soviet tendencies, remarks and actions.239 The story of the young kulak Pavlik
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Morozov was touted as an exemplar for Soviet youth. Mozorov allegedly discovered that
his father, the Chairman of the Village Soviet in the small farming village of Gerasimovka,
was forging documents. As a loyal Soviet, young Mozorov reported his father to the GPU
(state police). His disapproving family purportedly murdered him for his actions, but were
later rounded up and executed themselves for their heinous act. The story (now doubted
by historians) was touted by Stalin as a symbol of noble Soviet youth. Monuments were
erected in Pavlik’s name, songs were sung about him in schools, and poems written of
his sacrifice. The message was clear: The Party was more important than family.240
Further, if a family member was arrested, this brought shame to the whole family. It
was not uncommon for some to disown their accused family in an effort to help themselves
and the rest of their family. An excellent account of this in Soviet literature can be found
in the book Sofia Petrovna, written by Lydia Chukovskaya.241 Originally written in the
1930s, Chukovskaya hid the work for fear of it being found, knowing it would put her life
at risk (Medvedev 1974). It was first published in France in 1965. Though it is a fictional
account, the story itself is based on her own experiences and encapsulates family life in
the time of the purges.242
The novel tells the tale of Sofia Petrovna and her son, who are happily living a
successful life in Stalinist Russia. Suddenly, Petrovna’s son is accused of subversive
behavior and arrested. She cannot believe it. Her son was a model Soviet; a member of the
Komsomol and dedicated to Socialism and to Stalin. His picture was shown on the front
page of Pravda for his model life. She advocates on her son’s behalf to everyone, confident
he would be set free once the powers that be realized their "mistake". Petrovna even
writes to Stalin, but her letters go unanswered. Meanwhile, Petrovna is talked about at
work, and eventually fired. Ostracized, her closest friend commits suicide from the stress.
Reassessment. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998); Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the
Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR," The American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (1987): ,
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Life becomes almost unbearable. Then, years later, she finally receives a letter from her
son in which he proclaims his innocence. Realizing his case cannot be won, she burns
the letter to save herself .243 Generally speaking, society became hyper-atomized during
and after the Great Terror, often shrinking ever inward toward the individual himself.244
According to Khodyakov,245 it is within the family unit, as well as the extended family
unit, that we first learn to trust. It is through positive experiences with our family that we
learn to trust other’s in our in-group. When that trust is damaged, particularized trust
is shattered. For many living under Stalinism, this was their experience.footnoteDonna
Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR,"
The American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (1987): , doi:10.2307/1962579.
Some historians argue that, while the atrocities of the Stalinist period cannot be
discounted, the objectives of the period were still achieved. Under this school of thought,
had industrialization and collectivization not been pushed through via Stalin’s aggressive
5-year plans, Russia would have likely fallen to the Germans during WWII. Society
was structured around the common struggle My storim Kommunizum! (we are building
Communism!) a promise of increased living conditions. For those who bought into the
system and were not marked as "enemies of the state" they may have felt the new social
contract forged by Stalinism were indeed met. But even this sympathetic interpretation
of Stalin’s acts cannot dispute the result that his policies had on civil society and trust
within the USSR by the time of his death in 1953. Only under Khrushchev, would society
come to understand the depths of what had transpired during this time.
Khrushchev and a New Political Order.
After the death of Stalin, and after some power struggles within the Politburo, one
of Stalin’s vydvizhentsy246, Nikita Khrushchev, was selected to take his place. He began
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the business of restoring order and regaining legitimacy for the system were paramount
in his mind, in order to save the Soviet political structure. This required several fronts
that required immediate action: 1) destalinization. 2) what to do with the massive num-
ber of political prisoners? 3) the looming housing crisis and 4) agricultural reforms.247
Khrushchev felt his actions were vital for the survival of the Revolution. However, his
policies and pursuit of ’mature communism’ were met with mixed reviews by the peo-
ple.248 He was also faced with an International incident which caused disappointment in
more than one corner of society.249 Social order focused on the development of the New
Soviet People through a relatively more open space for discourse and expression, appre-
ciation of the arts and science. Overall, the Thaw was marked by periods of freedom
followed by periods of repression, which saw the forced trust system begin to crack.
De-Stalinization. The most striking difference of this time came about most clearly
during the 1956 XX Congress "Secret Speech" where Nikita Khrushchev aired the excesses
of the elite under Stalin, as well as a limited number of the crimes committed under
Stalin’s rule; a full confession might cause chaos in more than one corner. It was done
so behind closed doors in a session of the Communist Party delegates. He was careful
to paint Stalin as the perpetrator of all crimes and everyone under his rule, even the
elites, as victims of his tyranny and the system itself correct and successful.250 Famously
coining the word, Khrushchev called the blind adoration of Stalin a ’cult of personality’
and outlined the need to stamp this cult from existence and ensure that such a cult of
one man could never rise again.
The secret speech was leaked in an attempt to control rumor, it was ordered the
speech to be read at every Party meeting thought the USSR. 251 and sewed confusion
from Poland to Moldova to Moscow to Vladivostok.252 However, for the first time since
247
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the 1920’s, public discourse was finally taking place. Fear of arrest was gone, freeing
people to have the space to air grievances with the regime and generally engage in public
discourse. Local literary groups were the most active in this regard however just about
any meetinghouse was a ripe location for community members to meet and discuss what
was going on. Public-opinion polls began in earnest to gauge the mood of the people.253
Rather than deepen legitimacy as was hoped, many in society were skeptical of the limited
admission of wrongdoing by Khrushchev, as well as abdicating guilt on the part of party
elites. Still others refused to believe any of it and resisted anti-Stalinist rebukes. Many
felt it was the bureaucracy standing in the way of ’building communism’ and not outside
influence from capitalist elements. The elites took from these public debates and polls
they needed to focus on repackaging the message for public consumption, just as was done
under Stalin, to re-establish order and focus on the building the "New Soviet People."
They also became keenly aware of the danger this public discourse had unleashed. As a
result, further debated were limited and discussion that was deemed as ’anti-Soviet’ was
banned from public spaces.254 People went back to discussions behind closed doors with
trusted family or to writing letters to local officials with little success.
Prisoners. The death of Stalin left an another major immediate question: What to do
about the millions of political prisoners in the gulags? It was well known the overwhelming
majority had actually committed no crime, ergo, they must be released.255 While they
understood the moral necessity of release, they feared the political fallout which might
occur as the evidence of the horrors of the Great Terror retuned into society.256 How
could the elite justify their complicity in the arrest, murder, and incarceration of these
people and simultaneously justify their continued role in the power structure? The great
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poetess Anna Akhmatova said during this time, "Now they are trembling for their names,
positions, apartments, dachas. The whole calculation was that none would return."257
The official position was it was necessary to try and right the abuses of the past, while
at the same time denying the system had been wrong. However, doing so would call into
question the legitimacy of the whole Socialist society and political structure.258
Following the "Secret Speech" there was significant improvement on the procedure
in identifying and releasing eligible prisoners. However, one lingering issue remained:
prisoners did not leave the cams with the necessary certificate of rehabilitation. They
had to obtain this of their own accord which could prove to be a difficult task which,
in some cases, could take years to obtain. Historian and former zek 259 "rehabilitation
became a sacred word; the rehabilitation certificate became a sacred document." 260
Some zeks who were offered a higher level of rehabilitation than others. Those who
were formerly privileged Party members often had the luxury of anther privileged Party
member in good standing willing to intervene on their behalf upon their return and speak
for them. Many also received a hero’s welcome.261 This was not the case for the average
Russian without such connections; their reality was quite different. Some others were able
to circumvent these problems by participating in what became known as the "Khrushchev
deal." This was created as a (hallow) method of regaining control over the political order
and legitimacy. It was a basic, unspoken system of purchasing silence from released
prisoners could gain a greater level of rehabilitation in exchange for their silence. The
idea was that many of the prisoners might want to put the horrors of their past behind
them. This would also allow the system to have some sense of security there would be less
upheaval and questioning of the system resulting from their unjust incarceration. Years
of abuse in the gulags tended to make some complacent to this option.262
Housing. In an effort to make good on unkept Party promises of new housing since
257Ibid.
258Ibid. 257
259Russian word meaning ’prisoner.’
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the Revolution, immediately after consolidating his leadership in July 1957, Khrushchev
launched, what was often characterized as, "perhaps the most ambitious governmental
housing program in human history."263 It yielded approximately 34 million units of living
space, and more than 126 million people -more than half the country- moved into them.264
This was in stark contrast to previous Party policy on housing which had minimally at-
tempted to supply every family one room within a large flat. From an empirical point of
view, Khrushchev’s housing campaign entailed a sweeping transition from kommunalka265
to "single-family" living.266 Single family apartments had been built during the Stalin era,
but they were largely reserved for members of the state and Party elite, or for hero work-
ers.267 Further, krushchyokova268 were minimalist in nature, as were the new trends in in-
terior design. Khrushchev saw his housing as promoting Soviet egalitarianism contrasting
the Stalin era which Khrushchev felt was consumed with individualism and materialism
in architecture and design and as such were gaudy and over-done.Susan E. Reid, "Com-
munist Comfort: Socialist Modernism and the Making of Cosy Homes in the Khrushchev
Era," Gender History 21, no. 3 (2009): , doi:10.1111/j.1468-0424.2009.01564.x.
However, problems with the krushchyokova were evident immediately. First, they
were too small and cramped for many families. While they came with so-called "luxurious
storage rooms", it was often necessary to convert this space into another bedroom. As a
result this "bedroom" lacked any ventilation or windows.269 Overall, the insulation was
very poor making the krushchyokova drafty- a particular problem during frigid Russian
winters. The housing also lacked elevators, unlike Stalin-era housing. This made the
lives of elderly citizens difficult if they happened to live on upper floors. Society was
generally underwhelmed with what they saw as shoddy and impractical construction and
design. While some appreciated individual living space, it was clear the system fell short
of reasonable accommodations for the practical needs of everyday family life.
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Agriculture and Food. However, since the 1940s, Khrushchev advocated to help resolve
food shortages in the USSR by planting corn. Specifically, the corn project was aimed
primarily at producing feed for livestock and end the ongoing shortage. This in turn
would produce more meat and milk for the people, making it possible to finally ’catch
up’ with and ’overtake’ America and potentially win the Cold War. His dogged pursuit
of corn led to his not so affectionate nick-name of kukuruznik.270 The idea of a Soviet
"corn belt" was promoted to meet these goals.271 An Iowan corn farmer named Roswell
Garst sold corn seed to the Soviets and became an informal adviser for Khrushchev.272He
informed him of the necessity to grow the corn only in the southern regions of Russia
stressed the important of pesticides; his advice was largely ignored. It was decided to
plant the corn in additional places like Siberia, with a hostile climate, and only fertilizers
were used. The result was predictable: the crops failed to produce at levels Khrushchev
promised. His ’corn crusade’ resulted in a loss of personal legitimacy for the Premier, as
well as the state.273
A series of other poor decisions were made by Khrushchev in relation to agricul-
ture. The end result was low food supply, ballooning breadlines, and rising cost of food.
Outside of Russia proper, these feelings of ineptitude within the state as well as politi-
cal oppression were most acutely resulting in growing sense of nationalism which would
boil over later. Igor Ca’u and Mark Sandle, "Discontent and Uncertainty in the Bor-
derlands: Soviet Moldavia and the Secret Speech 1956-1957," Europe-Asia Studies 66,
no. 4 (2014): , doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.899768.; Tony Kemp-Welch, "Khrushchev’s
Secret Speech and Polish Politics," Europe-Asia Studies 48, no. 2 (March 1996): ,
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as Hungary and Poland; these were met with an iron fist, despite Khrushchev’s promises
of their being "many paths to socialism.’274 An October 1956 rebellion in Hungary was
brutally crushed resulting in more than 2,500 dead and 13,000 injured. In Russia proper,
circumstances were not much better. In June of 1963, a rebellion ensued in the city of
Novocherkask; the Soviet Army or the KGB ultimately fired upon demonstrators killing
26 people and injuring 87 more.275 The violent crack-down, reminiscent of the Stalin-era,
caused Khrushchev’s public opinion to plummet even further. In order to avoid further
upheaval, he was forced to dip into state cash reserved to purchase foodstuffs to restock
the Soviet food supply.276
Cuban-Missile Crisis. The state also lost favor with the people for what was seen
as incompetency regarding international relations. The Cuban-missile crisis was seen as
being one of the largest blunders of his career. Looking for a way to increase Soviet
nuclear power against the US, he devised a plan to place intermediate range missiles in
Cuba. Castro agreed to this plan believing that the presence of nuclear missiles on its
soil would halt any plans of the US to attempt to invade Cuba. American reconnaissance
planes uncovered the missile sites and President Kennedy took action. As tensions on
both sides mounted, nuclear was seemed more imminent. Kennedy proposed if the USSR
would remove the missiles from Cuba, the US would give their assurance to not invade
Cuba.277 Khrushchev entered into an agreement with Kennedy and used the US promise
regarding Cuba as a show that he won the battle. However, most Russians did not see
it that way; they felt this was a show of weakness and evidence he allowed the US to
dictate terms to him regarding their own national security.278 During Stalin, citizens felt
the state was externally strong and able to protect them from external threats, though
weak because they were unable to provide adequate internal security or political goods.
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It would be Khrushchev’s overall impression of ineptitude by the elite that would result
in his ’retirement’ from the office of general secretary in 1964.279
Khrushchev and a New Social Order.
Khrushchev’s policies had a resulting impact on the social order of the post-Stalinist
era in several ways. First, thinking back to release of prisoners, upon their return they
might face neighbors or family members who condemned them. Many in society were
faced with a problem: they, like the elites, were expected the face the people they were
accused when it was expected the zeks would never return. This created unease and a
mutually decided upon segregation and mistrust amongst the two populations in society.
Citizens who were not prisoners did their best to separate themselves from zeks, as they
were a reminder of a terrible past everyone wished to forget. Similarly, zeks generally
found it difficult to re-assimilate into society because they felt no one -not even their own
families- would be able to understand what they had experienced, nor did they want them
to.Zeks had difficulty assimilating on all fronts. While the official position was that zeks
were to be compensated two months of their previous salary and have first priority for
housing, this was often difficult to obtain, in part because the prisoners themselves were
not aware of their rights. For those that were they sometimes encountered officials who
were also genuinely unaware of these rights, as well. Further, they often had difficulty
finding employment. While they were not required to tell employers of their former-
prisoner status, their documents were often marked with travel limitations: a classic
hallmark of the formerly accused. 280 However, for those zeks who were fortunate enough
to find sanctuary in their family units, a different life was now possible. Society was
beginning to reforge highly localized trust networks surrounding kinship which could
again provide security and stability. This was a time in which strong family units were
seen as the foundation for building a strong Communist state.
279 This was the offical line, though he was indeed ousted. Donald J. Raleigh, "Russia’s Favorite:
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Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 1 (1999): , doi:10.1080/09668139999092.
79
Family Life. Perhaps most importantly, the Thaw made family’s homes a safe place
once again. Soviet society was again based on highly localized trust surrounding kinship
which could again provide security and stability where one could speak freely about life,
politics, or seek help in difficult times.281 Family connections during this time helped
place one’s trust orientation to other people. When the system was unable to provide the
goods or services you needed, asking family members for help or assistance was always
a reliable place to start. Interpersonal or particularized trust is the core of the vast
social networks that were revived during the Thaw and persisted beyond the collapse
of the Soviet regime. This was only made possible by the release of strictures to the
family unit, a drastic reduction in the use of fear and terror to and within family units
and the virtual elimination of the former policy of family informing. Overall, the era
exemplified by the XX Congress was distinguished by the dismantling of Stalinist terror
and authoritarianism creating the space for citizens to take chances on outside others and
forge relationships to bridge across to unknown out-groups.282
Blat’ networks. Blat’ networks channeled an alternative currency "an informal ex-
change of favors" that introduced elements of the market into the planned economy and
loosened up the rigid constraints of the political regime.283 This practice blended within
society to such depths that one came to expect blat’, as either a giver or receiver, from
their circle of friends, family and acquaintances. On short, it was a social norm. The
societal boundaries became particularly fuzzy as many favors were favors of a particular
kind, i.e.: "favors of access." Examples include bribes, barter, entrepreneurship and small
enterprise or cottage industry and became a needed tool to ’get things done’ in Soviet
society.284 These exchanges took place at within all levels of trust and was a product of
the state’s inability to deliver political goods.
At the institutional level, blat’ was also practiced among so-called "Red managers"285
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in order to compensate for the shortfall in goods or raw materials needed from the state
to complete their tasks and or production quotas.286 While -overall- the government
tolerated blat’, engaging in this system was still seen as risky requiring high-levels of
trust in the other. If the state discovered they were trading goods and or services -
even to cover shortfalls- they risked arrest or punishment. As a result, building and
maintaining trust within these non-official relationships was absolutely vital.287 These
connections made between managers became a form of generalized trust. This is because
they were not forming connections with the institutions themselves, but each person in
their individual capacity in a series of "side-deals." As the years progress and the system
begins to fissure, dependency on these informal networks will increase.288
Generalized and particularized trust often times were intertwined. This is because
connections were often first made amongst family members to acquaintances outside of
their own circle or in-group. Within this informal system, intermediaries were extremely
important. Whether you were the intermediary or you were in search of one, reputation
was vital. Establishing a good reputation as ’a person with connections’, as the con-
nection itself, or as a recipient meant you were better able to feed your family in times
of hardship or make your life more comfortable through the purchase of such items as
theater tickets.289 Frequently, the connection holding access to the goods or services one
needed had absolutely no kin relation to one’s self and could even include people outside
one’s own ethnicity.290 This lends further credence to the legitimacy of both strong and
weak ties, breaking the "social divide’ as they relate to social trust in post-Stalin Soviet
society. These trust networks extended out into Soviet civil society, as well.
Civil Society. The concept of the "New Soviet People"291 was introduced and rein-
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forced in school, as well as popular literature, movies, arts, and civil society. Though still
controlled by the state, groups such as the Komsomols, labor unions and guilds were given
much more freedom to create ideas, and to interact with one another, and act on behalf
individuals within their groups.292 Leaders became extreme adept at circumnavigating
the system in order to get what they wanted or needed by working within the system
rather than against it. This was accomplished, in part, via blat’ using their connections
within government, or made connections through intermediaries.293
Society also saw a relaxation of the binds that were previously placed on the arts
seen most clearly through a resurgence in the arts and literature which was severely
repressed under Stalin. The XX Congress broke many of the taboos which previously
existed regarding the expression and discussion of the horrors of the gulags. Themes
regarding the gulags and anti-Stalin sentiments began to pour into literature, memoirs,
film and literature. Once banned books and writers were rehabilitated. Many of whom
were rehabilitated posthumously.294
Literature and art from the Thaw period became an important outlet to vent the
horrors of Stalinism and illuminate weaknesses in the system overall. Aleksandr Solzhen-
itsyn’s work, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich was one which received immediate
acclaim. The power of Solzhenitsyn’s writing comes from his own imprisonment from
1945-1953. Never before had such a revealing tale of life in the gulags been available
for public consumption. One Day was harsh in its criticism of the Stalinist forced labor
system. The brutal details which clearly outlined the reality of prisoner life captivated
many who read it. Controversial poetess Anna Akhmatova’s work was being published
again after a ban under Stalin. Having been a victim of the Stalin’s purges as well, her
poems wreaked of the agony, fatalism, despair, and hope so many in society were feeling.
292Gleb Tsipursky, "Conformism and Agency: Model Young Communists and theKomsomol-
Press in the Later Khrushchev Years, 1961-1964," Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 7 (2013): ,
doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.824140. This was true for children in the Young Pioneers as well, see: J.
W. Hahn, "The Komsomol Kollektiv as an Agency of Political Socialization," Youth Society 1, no. 2
(1969): , doi:10.1177/0044118x6900100206.; Evans 2004.
293 Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" Social
Research 76, no. 1 (2009): , http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146.
294Larissa Adler Lomnitz and Dianar Sheinbaum, "Trust, Social Networks and the Informal Economy:
A Comparative Analysis," Review of Sociology 10, no. 1 (2005): , doi:10.1556/RevSoc.10.2004.1.1.
82
Overall, her work is largely seen a subversive and sometimes outright attack on the Soviet
system.
However, the overwhelming popularity of such literature, particularly among the youth
began to create problem for the government as people began to protest or publicly speak
their minds about the contradictions and hypocrisy they felt existed in the system.295
This resulted in a form of institutional remorse where the government again created
strictures reigning in artistic and literary expression.296 A famous example of this over
compensation can be seen in Boris Pasternak’s Dr. Zhivago, which was unjustly seen as
subversive and critical of the system.297
Dissent was on the rise, particularly among the youth and intellectuals. The Thaw,
and subsequent de-Stalinization, merely served to expose the inherent contradictions and
corruptness of the system. Informal groups and networks, or kompanii, began to take
the place of formal groups, such as the state controlled Young Communist League, or
Komsomol. They showed particular lack luster enthusiasm for organized events, were
derelict in their duties, or presented ’deep apathy.’298 Expectations were rising out of
this liberalization, ala deTocqueville,299 and the state failed the anticipate or meet these
expectations at every turn. The youth that grew up under the Thaw and would later
become the elite would be heavily influenced by this period. But for now, they remained
stymied.
Brezhnev: reassertion of state power and stability.
Lenoid I. Brezhnev, another of Stalin’s ydvizhentsy, was chosen by the Central Com-
mittee to take the office of the General Secretary. Political order was in a relative state
of chaos, as such, he felt it was his duty to restore order from the top down. His plan was
295 Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of ’Developed Socialism’ The Soviet ’Thaw’ and the Crucible
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called ’developed socialism’. Ironically, it was a movement away from the hyper-focus on
development and outpacing capitalist states, and a focus on ’forced maturity’ and stabil-
ity.300 The Politburo felt the Thaw must continue, but do so in a more controlled way.
Overall, its goal was buttressing Soviet power via controlled release of state repression,
as well as complete control over domestic affairs, though offered mixed results. This was
also a time in which the state saw great gains in security assets and military production
which resulted in gains in political legitimacy.
Brezhnev: Political Order.
Much of the political order was defined by the "Brezhnev Doctrine." It is not an
official law but rather a stated guiding principle for how to approach the growing unrest,
particularly in the Eastern-bloc. It was outlined in the Soviet run state newspaper Pravda:
There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Commu-
nist parties have and must have freedom to determine their country’s path of
development....301This means that every Communist party is responsible not
only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire
Communist movement... Each Communist party is free to apply the prin-
ciples of Marxism-Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it cannot
deviate from these principles (if, of course, it remains a Communist party).
In concrete terms this means primarily that no Communist party can fail
to take into account in its activities such a decisive fact of our time as the
struggle between the two antithetical social systems-capitalism and socialism.
This struggle is an objective fact that does not depend on the will of people
and is conditioned by the division of the world into the two antithetical social
systems.
The Brezhnev Doctrine can be analyzed in two main parts: The latitude given to the
regions in governing their own affairs and pursuing Socialism how they saw fit, as well
300 Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of ’Developed Socialism’ The Soviet ’Thaw’ and the Crucible
of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972," Contemporary European History 15, no. 2 (May 2006):.
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attempting to do so within structures the state deemed fit. For example, Brezhnev sought
to rebuild relationships with party leaders in the regions; not with the political institutions
themselves but through personal trust relations. To this end, Brezhnev adopted the policy
of doveire k kadram, or ’trust in cadres.’ 302 This was done, in part by awarding medals
and honors to regional party leaders, to which they returned in kind, or personally visiting
leaders when they experienced a death in the family. ’Trust in cadres’ manifested in a
near free-reign policy given to local First Secretaries, so long as they maintained positive
relations with Brezhnev, and acted within the larger Socialist order, and was employed
with varying degrees of success.303
Brezhnev felt strongly the way to strengthen political legitimacy was to open trade
in a limited fashion to import goods that have been developed elsewhere, particularly
in Western Europe. He also promoted this idea to allies in the Eastern Bloc, as he
felt this was the simplest method of gaining immediate access to high-technology, but
also to ease the financial stresses facing the USSR. It was also somewhat contradictory
to the Brezhnev Doctrine calling for a renewed understanding of the divisions between
capitalist economies and socialist ones.304 Further, this ’market socialism’ was a clear
departure from the hyper-focus on playing developmental ’catch-up’ that occurred under
both Stalin and Khrushchev. Nonetheless, this left the country’s numerous scientists
and engineers little room or permission to innovate. This pivot towards the West began
immediately as did the improvement of relations with West Germany, referred to as
Ostpolitik, and resulted in a further ratcheting down of tensions and hostilities, or dnte.
Strictures were also released on Eastern Bloc satellites flow of liquid capital from the
West. Reversing Stalin’s strict refusal of Western capital or loans from the Marshall plan,
Brezhnev understood the stability of the Soviet economic structure was in immediate peril
and the influx of cash was needed.305 He also pursued dnte with the United States; though
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this included only modest increases in exports to avoid criticism from other communist
states and retain legitimacy.306
From the point of view of political and economic net gains, Brezhnev’s policies did
bring needed goods and money into the system, in turn, making it possible for the
state to deliver on promises of political goods to its citizens. Living standards rose
significantly. People could now afford to purchase a car, more household appliances,
as well as televisions and telephones. Food lines shortened then vanished, stores were
stocked, factories were adequately supplied.307 This relative influx of political goods
fostered higher levels of trust and confidence in the state. Some experts at the time
believed history would look back favorably on the Brezhnev era and deem it the most
successful of the Soviet era. This prediction has borne fruit; indeed, this period is often
reflected upon even today with great nostalgia, but mostly among Russian citizens. This
will be discussed more in the coming sections.
Ultimately, the de-emphasis on innovation and reliance on imports only hurt the
Soviet economy, resulting in stagnation.308 This is marked, in part, by both the need
to import grain in from the U.S. 1975 after bad harvests, as well as the decline in the
industrial growth rate which plummeted to its lowest point in some fifty years.309 Though
the production rate in industry (especially steel, petrol), as well as agriculture largely
recovered by 1980, increased demands of inefficient central planning were unable to cope.
Citizens seeing their lifestyles improving, suddenly saw them level off or drop.310
Once again, society in both the professional and personal realms turned to their blat ’
networks in attempts to fill the gaps, even if it meant stealing from the state: in the
eyes of the average citizen, the real crime would be to steal from one another. The
state was failing in their duties to provide, as such, it should be expected.311 Reliance
Vaughan, "BEYOND BENIGN NEGLECT: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND THE POLISH CRISIS OF
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on the ’second economy’ and cottage industries increased; the black and grey markets
flourished. Corruption and bribery also rose, reinforcing the belief bureaucracy was, at
best, inefficient, and at worst incapable. It also betrayed the need to circumvent official
channels to get the stuff of everyday life done. Overall, many citizens still felt their
material lives were better than they were even ten years previous.
At the same time, Brezhnev sought to focus on ’scientific and technological’ advances
rather than moving the whole of society towards ’developing communism’ as Khrushchev
had. This seemed to have an effect on society as a whole. Under Khrushchev, all peoples
were said officially to have a part in ’building Communism’; it was seen as a collective
struggle. Under Brezhnev, this struggle was only reserved for those citizens with the sci-
entific and technological know-how, leaving out whole swaths of society from the equation
of ’developed socialism.’312 And one of the main areas of focus was state preparedness
and security.
Security. Though Brezhnev sought dnte with the West, this did not preclude a focus
on military industry and preparedness, an area the USSR has some comparative advan-
tage.313 Soviets were largely willing to accept economic hardships if security was the net
return. The global prestige of being a citizen of a superpower was a great source of pride
for Russians of the day. Adam Ulam states:
"The Soviet patriot believes that the function of the state is to be as powerful
as possible. He remembers that tsarist Russia was defeated in World War I;
now his country is one of the two greatest influences in the entire world. This
is a sort of surrogate for his sufferings. Whatever else it has done to him, Com-
munism has made Russia a much more powerful country." "A Fortress State
In Transition Brezhnev’s legacy: stability, security and–perhaps–stagnation.,"
Time, June 23, 1980.
Under Brezhnev, the state increased production of military assets and expanded its ar-
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senal. While the state was amassing more weapons stockpiles, the winds of nationalism
were blowing across the Soviet periphery.
Brezhnev: Social Order.
The tensions brewing in the Eastern Bloc were percolating just under the surface.
While both Khrushchev and Brezhnev crushed rebellions, the underlying problem only
retreated in order to regroup. Nationalism was expanding. The social order under Brezh-
nev was beginning to show nascent civil society, particularly in the regions of Eastern
Europe. Growing dissatisfaction with the system, as well as growing nationalism spurred
these movements. While there were a series of riots and civil unrest across the empire at
different points during Brezhnev’s rule,
footnote Donald J. Raleigh, "Russia’s Favorite: Reevaluating the Rule of Lenoid Il’ich
Brezhnev 1964-82," Russian Studies in History 52, no. 4 (2014): , doi:10.2753/rsh1061-
1983520400. two main events would exemplify this period: The Prague Spring and the
Polish Crisis.
The Prague Spring. As in Russia, there was a decrease in mandatory participation in
state programs among the youth, particularly in the military. The discontent that lead
to this ennui and peaceful but visible agitation turned into criticism of General Secretary
Novotny and the party elites. Students and intellectuals began making demands for
reform. Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party (CCP),
joined in these critiques and reasoned a less dictatorial move forward was the only option
forward for peace and stability. Brezhnev agreed, though did not formally choose sides.
Ultimately, as troubles intensified, Dubeck was given the position of General Secretary
of the CCP and a period of ’controlled’ liberalization began.314 Though Dubeck gave
multiple assurances to Brezhnev the situation would not spiral out of control as it did
in Hungary in 1956, the amount of liberalization was worrisome to party elites back in
Moscow. In the end, they convinced him the Spring had gone too far: allow it to stay its
course or risk the collapse of the whole system.
314Ibid.
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After the Communist Party in Ukraine contacted Moscow out of fear the unrest would
spread there, Brezhnev was placed in a corner. He, reluctantly, ordered the invasion of
Prague in 1968 to erase the notion of socialism with "a human face."315 Czechoslovakia
was invaded by some 20 Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions totaling some 250,000, as well
as 10 division from Poland, Hungary, and Eastern Germany for added effect. While they
could not fight back militarily, the people bound together through networks of neighbors
and friends, as well as strangers, and resisted for additional ten months through non-
violent means.316 The invasion only deepened the lack of trust in the Soviet system,
particularly among some of the peoples of other satellite nations, and increased nationalist
sentiments.317
The Polish Crisis. U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served
under the Carter Administration warned of potential unrest in Eastern Europe. This
was especially true, he felt, in his homeland of Poland, noting active civil societies gain-
ing independence from the state.318 Indeed, rising costs of food resulted in a massive
labor strike in 1980 headed by Lech Walesa, a common electrician turned trade-union
activist and Solidarnosc (Solidarity) head, and the Catholic Church in Poland. The Pol-
ish government met the revolts with a willingness to reform and increase liberalization.
Solidarity was given the official seal of the Polish government to be an independent labor
union with full rights to strike.319 Concerns spread from East Germany to Moscow over
the implications of the Solidarity victory. The message of this grassroots worker’s rebel-
lion would definitely spread via radio programs The Voice of America, and Radio Free
Europe/ Radio Liberty and could mean, according to the head of the East German party
Erich Hornecker, ’the death of socialist Poland’ was ’imminent.” 320
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However, given the size of the revolt, and the stretched resources of the Soviet system,
both economic and militarily, Brezhnev, was not keen on intervention.321 KGB head and
Brezhnev advisor insisted action would not be possible even if it meant Poland would fall
from Soviet control. Despite repeated pleas from the Polish First Secretary Jaruzelski,
Moscow refused to send in troops to bring the Solidarity movement under control leaving
it for the First Secretary to manage alone; Brezhnev informed him, if he was going to act,
the time was now or never. Moscow abandoned Jaruzelski out of fear of bloodshed, as
well as the idea that Socialism could not be save through the use of force. Further still,
Soviet leadership felt it was vitally important to uphold the detente with the West.322 In
the end, it would be Jaruzelski who would declare martial law in 1981 in an attempt to
bring the movement to its knees. Polish society, like Czechoslovakia before it, retreated
again into itself, turning to one another in order to regroup, with renewed distrust of the
state. Jaruzelski won the ’battle’ of ’81 under Brezhnev only to lose the upcoming ’war’
of ’89 under the ’young’ prot of Yuri Andropov: Mikhail Gorbachev.
Gorbachev’s reforms and the roll of trust in the Soviet collapse.
By the late 1980s, the centralized Soviet economy was in dire straits. In 1985, moder-
ate Politburo apparatchik Mikhail Gorbachev rose to become the new General Secretary
of the Communist Party. Keenly aware the Union was cracking under the pressures of
the Cold War and the weak Centrally Planned Economy, Gorbachev set out to reform
the system, in order to preserve it. But Gorbachev’s reform initiatives, glasnost’ 323 and
perestroika,324 would ultimately sow the seeds of the Union’s own destruction. Another
complicating factor was the growing nationalism across the eastern bloc and the trans
caucuses, that would seal its fate. 325
Glasnost’. Once the new policy of glasnost’ was implemented, the people of the
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USSR felt emboldened to unleash grievances in a manner they had not been able to since
the beginning of the Khrushchev era. While initially met with some skepticism out of
fear of blowback that was a hallmark of earlier periods of so-called openness, eventually,
Soviet society came to understand the seriousness of this movement.326 Empowered, they
began to openly criticized even the foundations of the system itself. Gorbachev himself
was not immune, though it was his own policies that allowed this openness to take place.
News and information was flooding in from the West and the Russian press was also given
freedoms. A free press meant, together with a free society, the system could be held to
account for promises not kept.
cope with this level of openness. This is best exemplified by the Chernobyl nuclear ac-
cident of 1986, and subsequent local attempts at cover-up. Local officials were concerned
about the ramifications they would face for the disaster; it was a legitimate concern
based on past experiences with the regime. However, once he was finally briefed on the
full extent of this event, Gorbachev took swift action, including allowing international
assistance, collaboration, as well as investigations into the crisis itself at all levels. Cen-
tral to the notion of perestroika was glasnost’. Everything, all reforms, flowed from this
premise; the state, he insisted must be open to pluralism,327 new ideas, and even criti-
cism if Socialism was indeed to ever survive. It must be built, he felt, on a solid ground
of legitimacy and faith in the system. This was a very stark departure from what one
would have expected to see in previous eras, where internal conflicts, upheavals, and dis-
asters would have been completely covered up and concealed from the outside world.328
Nonetheless, the tragedy exposed the extent of the crumbling infrastructure on the world
stage and at home. The loss of life and the initial cover-up resulted in a loss of trust in
the system.Ibid.
Perestroika. When Gorbachev had assumed the helm of the USSR, the economy was in
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crisis mode, despite his attempts to color it as "pre-crisis.’"329 The concept of perestroika
was not a new paradigm for the general secretary and he cultivated it carefully over time.
It was initially conceived by him, before his tenure began, in a vague manner focusing
mostly on changes in the psychology of the collective; this allowed the space for it to
be interpreted in any number of directions. As time progressed, he synthesized current
economic realities with the need for new attitudinal approaches, making the direction
of perestroika much more defined. Gorbachev was convinced that a transformation to a
nationalized economy, with targeted elements of capitalist enterprise, and a restructuring
of the system to reflect these changes, was the right path to strengthen collectivism and, in
turn, the Russian people. As the policy was implemented, it continued to morph into what
he referred to as revolutionary perestroika,330 towards an even more liberated economy,
and even towards greater "democratization",331 despite the best efforts of hardliners in
the Party. He strongly advocated uskoreniye332 of economic reforms. To this end his
vision described a return to Leninist NEP which was widely supported by the people;333
further, he advocated for the so-called "500 Days" plan to convert the centralized economy
to a market orientation in less than two years. Gorbachev felt this was the only way
to strengthen the socialist economy. He promised limited private property, enterprise,
and limited private ownership of the means of production, particularly in agriculture.334
Further, he promised these reforms would deliver a tangible difference for the people. In
the end, his reforms did not produce as quickly as he was promised.
During the 19th Party Congress, he advocated, and won the support of the delegates
to create a new legislative body called the Congress of People’s Deputies. This was a
body that would be elected directly by the people, insisting the Party would still play
a centralized role. Regardless, this was another revolutionary action. For the first time
in the history of the USSR, it was suggested the Party and the system itself, win the
329 Bhary 1993
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no. 3 (1993):.
331 In the Socialist understanding of the word, not the Western understanding.
332acceleration
333Ibid.
334Ibid.
92
confidence of the people as exemplified in open and free elections, rather than the legit-
imacy and confidence be assumed. This gave his discussion of pluralism more meaning,
and suggested other parties, besides the Party, might have answers or solutions as to the
future of the people and the system. Another structural change was the creation of the
office of "President", a role Gorbachev assumed in March 1990. He then reaffirmed and
strengthened the notion the Party must win over the public if it wished to have a role in
the future of the state, though legitimacy through election was not a requirement for he
saw necessary for himself.335 This came to an end in 1991, when Boris Yeltsin became
the first popularly elected President in Russian history, creating 2 parallel governments.
Yeltsin and Gorbachev were forced to share their power, with Yeltsin as President and
Gorbachev as Soviet Premier.336
Gorbachev’s reforms and Social Order.
At the core of both glasnost’ and perestroika was a call or greater public participation
and grassroots action. This was something the people of the USSR and sphere gladly
took up, though not as Gorbachev envisioned. Until this point, uprisings had taken
place in a single country at a time. Seweryn Bialer sagely predicted, "They will not be
so lucky in the ’80s."337Meanwhile, the kindling of the dissolution of the Soviet Union
had already been ignited. It started in the relatively far-flung client states of the Soviet
Union throughout the Eastern Bloc. The Center stopped providing subsidies to the
periphery, accelerating the rate at which market reform was necessary. Once again,
people turned to their social networks to help fill the gaps, or to create new enterprises
in an effort to support their families.Ibid The problems soon spread across the Soviet
Union like a contagion. It began in 1987, in the Baltic region, when the government of
Estonia demanded autonomy. The other two Baltic republics, Lithuania and Latvia, soon
followed. Gorbachev was trapped; his situation mirrored that of his mentor Andropov’s
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in 1968. He could not move against these rogue republics without military force; doing
so would, not only jeopardized Gorbachev’s western support, it would contradict his own
policy of glasnost’. Moscow was silent.338
A ground swelling of popular revolt burst forth. The Berlin Wall was literally torn
apart by the people of East Berlin sending a then KGB operative, Vladimir Putin, running
for his life.339 Civil society regrouped and Solidarity rose again, seizing power in Poland.
The people were banding together in these so-called "low-trust" and atomized societies to
demand their rights, something the prevailing school of thought would deem impossible.
The power of the Central Authority was paralyzed; they refused to intervene in these
uprisings or aid local Party apparatchiks, instead trying to hold steady in Moscow. 340
The other shoe dropped in August of 1991. In a desperate move to save the Soviet sys-
tem, a group of Communist Party hardliners organized a coup d’t, kidnapping Gorbachev.
They announced on state television that he was no longer fit to govern because he was
ill. Russia spiraled into chaos as Swan Lake was being broadcasted over the airwaves.
as was typical under the Soviet system when some unhappy event had taken place. My
Perestroika, etc. Protests were organized in Moscow, Leningrad, and several other major
cities of the Soviet Union. President Yeltsin, now acted to protect Gorbachev from the
Communist coup. In a move that has been seared in to the minds of people across the
world, Yeltsin climbed atop a tank aimed at the protestors in front of the Russian "White
House", he called on them to resist en masse. Taking a bull horn, he called out, "Sol-
diers, officers, generals! The clouds of terror and dictatorship are gathering over the whole
country. They must not be allowed to bring eternal night!"341 He hailed himself as the
"Guardian of Democracy." Crowds swelled to over 100,000 angry Russians. The soldiers
themselves rebelled, saying that they could not fire on their fellow countrymen. After
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three days of relentless protests, realizing they were powerless without military support,
the coup organizers surrendered.342 The people were still reeling from the high for the
"August Days" and had flung their support behind the democrats. Reading the mood of
the people and seeing no other political alternative, he resigned his post December 25th,
1991. By January of 1992, the USSR had collapsed. Communism was an ideology based
on economic dialectics. From beginning, the struggle of the collective for a perceived end
goal of economic and social equality for all. My storim Kommunizum343 was the heart of
the collective idea. Stalin said it could be measured by how the lives of everyone were im-
proving and it was he who made the conditions possible. Once Khrushchev’s knee-capped
the Stalinist legacy, and focus was shifted to the Party rather than just one man. Ergo,
all that was left of the Communist ideal was the Party and the notion of their common
struggle: My storim Kommunizum! That, too, was taken away, abandoned by Brezhnev
in favor of ’developmental socialism’, leaving only the Party and the economic metric.
Under Brezhnev, the increase in living standards was present and tangible, even through
stagnation. However, by Gorbachev, the economy was showing wear. By introducing
pluralism, he now called into question the legitimacy of the Party. The only remaining
litmus the people had to measure the success of Communism and the justification of their
struggles, the economy, was in free fall.344 Communism was now "empty of meaning."345
It was not the collective actions of the nationalists movements in and of themselves that
caused the Union to collapse; it fell because Gorbachev did not successfully narrate a new
collective struggle. His attempts to save the system through reform in order to increase
legitimacy had the reverse effect. Instead, this era was reminiscent of the Prague Spring
in an important way, as deTocqueville observed. Political legitimacy of the system was
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dead, and as such, so was the system; it just refused to admit it. As such, the people
turned to one another and their trust networks in search of a way forward. They expe-
rienced a freedom and openness through the cracks in the system and demanded more
reform towards liberal democracy.346 It would be Yeltsin, who would ultimately deliver.
Post-Soviet Russian Reforms and the question of trust.Yeltsin-
Putin.
After the fall of the USSR, the stated claim of the path forward was a political and
social order geared towards building liberal democracy. However, they were foiled again
by a new set of reformers. After many promising gains, and even more sets-backs, the
hope of the democratic political order would finally collapse completely under the next
President, Vladimir Putin, who never forgot how the state abandoned him in eastern
Germany. Ultimately it would be the people who would pay the price. Those who fell
behind or were looking to get ahead, they would simply fall back to what has always been
their life-preserver: their trust networks of one another.
Yeltsin years.
After the collapse in January of 1992, so much new hope for the future existed. Though
the country was divided on Yeltsin, the people largely let down their guards, they were
ready to give this experiment a chance. The Levada Center’s polling at the time shows
57% of respondents were somewhere between neutral or very positive in relation to their
feelings about Boris Yeltsin in September 1993.347 This is key. Once a strong, viable
leader, who seemingly had the political will to bring Russia out of the darkness, to
bring her long awaited freedoms, economic security, and independence, climbed on top
that take, they were largely ready to put behind them the years of Soviet oppression,
stagnation, the pains of their past. Through collective action, the people saw their voices
do matter. It seemed many people were ready to do what was necessary to build liberal
346Diamond 1999*
347 "Fall of the USSR and Yeltsin Era," Levada Center, accessed March 09, 2017,
http://www.levada.ru/en/2016/04/05/fall-of-the-ussr-and-yeltsin-era/.
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democracy.
Yeltsin swiftly acted to crush the Communists; he swiftly ordered, by decree, the
dissolution of the Communist Party in order to make a counterrevolution more difficult.
He also suspended publication of the communist paper Pravda. Yeltsin did this in at-
tempt to silence dissent. Yeltsin felt the only way forward would be with a very rapid
set of reforms, undoing the old order as quickly as possible. Western advisors fell all
over each other in order to be a part of the new reforms. Members of the Clinton Ad-
ministration turned to a think tank of Harvard-based economic policy consultants and
academics for guidance. The so-called "Harvard Project", in turn chose a group of young
Russian reformers from St. Petersburg to help shape the fledgling democracy. Led by a
charismatic former government economist named Anatoly Chubais, the "Chubais Clan"
quickly cemented their ties to the Ivy league experts.348
Deputy Prime Minister Ygor Gaidar developed the idea known as "shock therapy",
which was essentially a release of the market and prices. The results were disastrous;
inflation skyrocketed to over 2000%.349 Privatization of industry was also kicked-off by
Anatoli Chubais. Citizens were given vouchers they would sell or use to buy stick in
privatizing companies. In the end, the state’s assets ended up in the hands of the ’red
managers’ for a fraction of what they were worth, creating an instant oligarchy class
concentrating wealth in the hands of a few. Of course, it was the average Russian who
suffered.350 However, the plans implemented amounted to nothing more than ’market
bolshevism’ complete with pyramid schemes, and outright deception and theft.351 Citi-
zens lost their entire savings. Joblessness and homelessness ballooned during this period,
even among the highly educated. In an effort to cope, some turned to cottage industry, or
to their blat’ networks. Those who had businesses or factories utilized "shadow barter":
a complex system of trade or "payment in kind" where people within the company use
348Janine R. Wedel, "How the Chubais Clan, Harvard Fed Corruption," Los Angeles Times, September
12, 1999, , accessed April 2, 2017, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/12/opinion/op-9170/2.
349William H. Cooper, "Russia?s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the
United States ," Federation of American Scientists, , https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf.
350https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/privatizingrussiaDOTpdf
351Peter Reddaway, Dmitri Glinski The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against
Democracy, 2001, p. 34
97
a network of intermediaries to get items needed to allow the proper functioning of the
factory. This is a holdover from the Soviet system, as well. Those with the means, left
Russia, resulting in a brain drain.352 The market had been freed but there were not
sufficient democratic institutions in place to support and protect the people. "Bogatomu
idti v sud - tryn-frava; bednomu - doloi golova"353 was the norm once again. Judges
were grossly underpaid, could be easily bought by the highest bidder leaving justice the
province of the wealthy. The police, who were also under paid, also became more corrupt.
For-hire mercenaries became common in order to protect bank owners from one another.
Shoot-outs in the streets to resolves financial debts or grievances, and all manner of law-
lessness became a common feature.354 This resulted in an environment where suddenly,
it became difficult to know whom one could trust.355 One thing was clear, the state had
failed in its mission to protect the people.
The Constitutional Crisis of 1993 did little to ease people’s minds. Yeltsin’s opponents
moved to have him deposed. It ended with Yeltsin calling in the tanks and firing upon the
Duma, killing more than 140 people.356 He dissolved parliament and called new elections.
The new Constitution that was drawn up gave him "super presidential" powers, diluting
the powers of the Duma. It also created a dual cameral legislature. The Constitution
was ratified by popular vote two months later. Yeltsin and his reforms were seen to be
corrupt, incapable, inept, or worse. His approval rating plummeted to single digits, while
support for the Communists was surging. While he eked out a win in 1996 for a second
term, it is widely suspected the votes were rigged and the real winners in ’96 were the
Communists.
The economy, after a yearlong rally form 1996-97, began to crack and then collapse
352Ibid
353 "If a rich person goes to court, it is all the same for him; if a poor person does, he looses his head."
354 http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media92500en.pdf ; JefferyKhan, ”V ladimirPutinandtheRuleofLawinRussia, ”Georgia Journal of International Comparative Law36, no.3(May1, 2008) :
.
355 Richard A. Easterlin, "Lost in Transition: Life Satisfaction on the Road to Capitalism," SSRN
Electronic Journal 71:, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1118263.
356Sonni Efron, "In Moscow, a Dirge for Defenders of White House : Russia: Thousands of hard-
liners gather to pray for victims of violence at Parliament, and to curse Yeltsin.," Los Angeles
Times, November 14, 1993, , accessed March 5, 2017, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-14/news/mn-
569451white− house.
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in 1998.357 The IMF was called in to create a bailout package. That failed. The Rus-
sian banks began devaluing currency. The collapse of the economy in 1998, as well as
the various corruption scandals surrounding Yeltsin and his cabinet, Yeltsin’s "Rule by
Decree" government, bloated bureaucracy filled with friends or patrons, the seemingly
constant rotation of Prime Ministers, had cemented in the minds of the Russian people
the system had failed, and did little to endear them to "democracy." The people reverted
again, back to one another in order to survive, replying on the trust networks, and blat’,
and "shadow barter" just as they had done under the old regime.358
In the end, Yeltsin would resign, promoting his newest Prime Minister, Vladimir
Lenin, who had gained fame related to his ’investigations’ into the Moscow Apartment
Bombings, and subsequent Second Chechen War, of which he was in charge. Some ac-
cepted his line about his heath as the reason for his resignation. It was well known
Yeltsin was a drunk and not the most robust man. Others felt his strategic retirement
on December 31st, 1999 was to anoint Putin as his chosen successor.359 Some scholars
take this a step further and charge, Putin was chosen because he could be trusted to
keep Yeltsin’s corruption secret.360 Whatever the reason, the Russian people were not
impressed with the Yeltsin era. The Levada Center polling in January 2000 showed 67%
of the respondents felts their lives were made worse under Yeltsin. Still further, only
10% of the citizens surveyed at the end of 1999 felt their country was headed in the right
direction.361 However, as the year ended and a new one began, Russia’s "Freedom Score"
was 4.5 with a ranking of "Partly Free."362
357 According to Ariel Cohen, Several factors contributed to the drop in foreign investor confidence
in the spring and early summer of 1998. The communist-dominated State Duma passed legislation
prohibiting foreign ownership of more than 25 percent of the stock of Unified Energy Systems (UES),
the national electrical monopoly, at a time when foreign ownership already was over 28 percent. Foreign
investors became jittery when a huge government-owned oil company with oil reserves worth tens of
billions of dollars that was slated to be privatized failed to attract any buyers at the asking price of
2.1billion.”Russia′sMeltdown : AnatomyoftheIMFFailure”TheHeritageFoundation, 1998.
358Ledeneva How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and
Business Chapter 5. 2016
359 Levada Center poll at the time shows 40% of respondents attribuited this to his health, while 28%
attributed it to Putin, in particular. http://www.levada.ru/en/2016/04/05/fall-of-the-ussr-and-yeltsin-
era/
360 Karen Dawisha;
361http://www.levada.ru/en/2016/04/05/fall-of-the-ussr-and-yeltsin-era/.Thatnumberincreasedto75%inDecmeber2000.
362Freedom House Freedom in the World Report, 2000.
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The Putin era.
Before the March 2000 Presidential elections, Putin had a book of published, issued
’letters to the public" in various newspapers, and made many TV appearances. This was
done in order for the people to become more acquainted with him; his public popular-
ity polls hovered around 2% when he assumed the seat of Prime Minster just months
before.363 In these communications, he makes a strong case for the need to hold back
on developing democracy, or as he implied "grandiose plans," all at once while target
reforms are pursued. For example, he claimed one of the most important areas of reform
was the rule of law, cracking down on corruption, as well as judicial reform.364 He felt
everything else flowed from here. He promised to strengthen Russia’s economy, increase
modernization, and continue the pursuit of democratic goals. 365
As the Second Chechen War wagged on, Putin took the helm of the Russian Federa-
tion. The first few years of Putin’s presidency were enigmatic He is a master of vagueness
and double speak when outlining his specific policy prescriptions. He lauded the value of
democracy, yet at the same time attacked its institutions. He claims to be a promoter of
democracy, yet he has attacked both the independent press, as well as various religious
organizations, such as the Salvation Army, YMCA, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. He has
largely made good on his promise of regaining control over ’law and order’, except, of
course, when it comes to political opponents or any form of accountability for himself or
his apparatchik. Indeed, his first act as President was to sign a decree granting Yeltsin
and his family complete immunity. He openly praises Russia’s multiparty system, yet
viciously attacks political opponents. And while the Russian people were looking for a
renewed hope in President Putin, he had little intent on delivering. As Putin’s chief
of staff, Alexander Voloshin has said behind closed doors, "The Russian people are not
363Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, "The Rollback of Democracy In Vladimir Putin’s Russia,"
The Washington Post, June 07, 2005, , accessed April 6, 2017, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/AR2005060601723.html.
364Putin said there are several big problems that must be taken into account if the nation are to
make any "grandiose plans." He called democracy a ’dictatorship of law’, and went on to say, "Only an
effective and strong state can afford to live according to the rules, according to the law, and it alone must
guarantee freedom of enterprise, freedom of the individual and society."Otkrytoe pismo izbiratelyam",
accessed May 10, 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24144.
365Ibid.
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ready for democracy."366
Consolidation of power via uneven rule of law and political corruption. Putin im-
mediately went about the business of consolidating his power. Unlike the Yeltsin, those
around Putin did not eschew the idea of a "party of power." Yeltsin disliked party politics
and felt the need to stay above the fray and not join any party so long as he was Pres-
ident. However, when Putin was being named as his successor, those around Putin felt
creating a party of power was vital, in the short term, to ensure his success and a smooth
transition, though was left unfinished after this election.367 He continued to surrounded
himself with members of "The Family", Yeltsin top aids and advisors. Overtime, his
inner circle shifted away from "The Family" and more towards the siloviki , former spies
from Putin’s KGB days. During this time, he also took aim at Russia’s oligarchs.
One in particular, caught the ire of Putin and his siloviki, oil tycoon Mikhail Khodor-
kovsky, who was, among other things, funding opposition parties, as well as NGOs. When
Putin called a meeting of the oligarchs to discuss the future of Russia, Khordorkovsky
openly questioned Putin about a corrupt state oil field deal. He also called for a more open
Russia, where the old ways of getting things done, via corruption and back-room deals,
was put behind them. This enraged Putin, regardless of his measured public response.
He had sealed his fate.368 He would be arrested on trumped up charges related to tax
evasion and fraud, his oil company Yukos, became state property, and his assets seized.
This action signaled the beginning of Putin’s war on the oligarchs, which won support
among the Russian citizenry who blamed them for their suffering during privatization.369
At the same time, the so-called "color revolutions" were taking place across regions of
former Soviet control or influence. He has personally lived through popular revolt in East
Germany and he has never forgotten the experience.370 The fear of such a revolt spreading
366Baker, Peter, and Susan B. Glasser. "The Rollback of Democracy In Vladimir Putin’s Russia."
The Washington Post. June 07, 2005. Accessed April 6, 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/AR2005060601723.html.
367 File footage from Putin’s meeting with the Oligarchs.
368Masha Gessen, "Vladimir Putin and Mikhail Khodorkovsky: One Man’s Truth,
Another Man’s Tyranny," The Hive, January 29, 2015, , accessed April 6, 2017,
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2012/04/vladimir-putin-mikhail-khodorkovsky-russia.
369Ibid.
370Vladimir Putin, First Person (London: Hutchinson, 2000), 80.
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to Russia dominated much of the restructuring of the political system form top down to
civil society below. However, this was done without changes to the Constitution. Putin
and his elites began to consolidate power within the existing system, by simply changing
election laws, resulting in what amounts to a single party rule. This meant elections
moving forward must have expected outcomes, in the name stability. Onerous changes
were made in 2005 to the process of registering political parties before elections. The
official line, of course, is to make the system more democratic. Specific rules were penned
in such a way it became impossible for new parties to meet the difficult to meet signature
requirements or pay outrageous deposit fees. A law passed in 2007 reduced party the
number of parties allowed from 44 to 14. Further, some older parties who had popular
leaders were wholesale rejected from registered for technicalities or vague, unspecified
reasons, allowing smaller parties with less popular candidates to register. This had the
net effect of funneling support away from opposition parties and candidates. United
Russia would utilize popular candidates to bolster their ticket in certain elections only
to withdraw their name once the election was over. However, most members of United
Russia had little popular sway; once the popular names were removed another member
would occupy the seat who had little interest in truly representing the people of the
district in question.371
Another change was the removal of the popular "against all" option on the ballots.
This option allowed frustrated voters the chance to still participate in the process, if only
to express their disapproval of all candidates.372 This would sometimes lead to scenarios
where run-offs were possible, creating additional costs and uncertainty for the center.
The removal made necessary the removal of minimum voter turnout. Ultimately, the
strategy worked, making United Russia the dominate party in the Duma. Parties other
than United Russia are either closely aligned making them virtually indistinguishable or
pushed to the margins of irrelevance.
371 Darrell Slider, "Putin and the Russian Electoral System: "Reforms" To Prevent Regime Change,"
The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 34, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1163/187633207x00049.
372Alexander Nurnberg, "Russian Independence Day Recalls Collapse of So-
viet Union," The New York Times, June 12, 2006, , accessed April 7, 2017,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/13/world/europe/russiasumm.html?mcubz=1.
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This strategy was taken to the regions, as well. In an effort to eliminate regional
parties, registration laws were also implemented regionally and unevenly. Established
parties were exempt regionally, as well. The same policy of listing popular candidates on
regional ballots, only to remove them, was also employed. In 2007, these open lists ballots
were eliminated in the regions. He seized power from regional governors by removing
popular election, citing corruption amongst their ranks, making them agents of the center
rather than of the people creating a power vertical of accountability to the center and
the party.373 Ultimately, elections returned in 2012, however the political order had been
established. In other words, in order to stay in power, a governor must please the center
creating a principle-agent problem.374
To his credit Putin did do a great deal to reduce corruption in the lower ranks of
state institutions, as well as ensure a proper functioning of the rule of law for every day
citizens. Booming oil prices afforded him the financial liquidity to push forward with
judicial reform. His new initiative "Plan for the Improving the Courts 2002-2006"375
focused on judicial and legal pay, as well as restoring the prestige and legitimacy to the
institutions. Criminal reform in 2002 and civil law reform in 2003 was vital in establishing
the rules of the game.376 This has made every day interaction between the citizen and legal
institutions much more functional. Citizens generally feel they have a fair shake if they
ever have to go before a court of law, be it civil or criminal, increasing legitimacy and trust.
However, supporting institutions, which are vital for the full functioning of the rule of law,
have been severely curtailed rendering them neuter. Wherever democratic institutions
cross with political considerations, one can assume they have been compromised by the
state in order to entrench power and maintain "stability."
Attacks on the free press. Ironically, though oligarch Boris Berezovsky via his media
empire helped catapult Vladimir Putin to popularity and success in the Presidential
373 Darrell Slider, "Putin and the Russian Electoral System: "Reforms" To Prevent Regime Change,"
The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 34, no. 1 (2007)
374 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, "Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Con-
tract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev," Publis 40, no. 4, ,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40865420.; http://carnegieendowment.org/files/russianawakening.pdf
375 this plan was also expanded through 2011.
376"Russia," Country report | Freedom in the World | 2004, April 11, 2013, , accessed April 6, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2004/russia.
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election, he was one of his first targets. Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of Media-Most’
and independent NTV, was also targeted. Putin was enraged at critical coverage of his
government. Berezovsky saw the writing on the wall and fled to Britain. Guisinsky
was arrested; prosecutors levied, what most considered were, trumped up charges related
to corruption during the privatization years. He ended up in exile in Spain, forced to
sign over his media holdings to Gazprom-media. The state took over all other TV and
newspaper outlets over the next few years.377 By 2002, the last established independent
TV station, TV-6, was taken over by the state. These events led Freedom House to
update Russia Freedom of the press report to "Not Free", a rating of 66 out of 100, as of
2003 and has shown a steady decline ever since.378
Independent TV media does exist in some fashion in Russia, however it is either shut
down after a brief period of operation, not easily accessible or have significant viewer-
ship. Vague anti-extremist laws379 are given a wide berth and can be applied in just
about any instance making censorship and shutdowns relatively easy. Strict enforcement
of these laws tends towards "self-censorship" otherwise the price can be steep. TV Dozhd
(Rain) is a recent example of this phenomena. After airing questions regarding the Siege
of Leningrad in 2014, the state pressured cable companies to withdraw their broadcast-
ing rights. However, some believe it is more politically motivated. The station worked
with opposition Alexei Naval’ny’s investigations into corruption. They were forced to
adopt an online subscription model to remain active.380 Investigative newspaper Novaya
Gazeta has also moved to online only formatting. They have a history of turbulent events
surrounding their intensive investigation around corruption and human rights violations.
Reporter Anna Politkovskaya was found killed outside of her apartment after critical re-
377"Russia," Country report | Freedom in the World | 2003, April 15, 2013, , accessed April 6, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/russia.
378 "Russia," Country report | Freedom of the Press | 2004, March 14, 2013, , accessed April 5, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2004/russia. and reports 2002-2017.
379Federal Law No. 398 passed in 2013 - gives the prosecutor general a short cut around the court and
direct Roskomnadzor to shut down websites which call for ’extremist’ activities. It is often used as a
weapon against opposition leaders and websites.
380Daniel Schearf, "Russia’s TV Rain Swims Against Tide in Sea of Kremlin Propaganda," VOA,
April 26, 2016, accessed April 5, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-s-tv-rain-an-island-in-sea-of-
kremlin-propaganda/3303338.html.; Freedom House Freedom of the Press Report, 2015.
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porting of the human rights violations during the Second Chechen War.381 She is not an
isolated incident. Indeed, a total of six of their reporters have been murdered.382 The
paper reported sponsors had been fleeing the paper due to pressure from the Putin gov-
ernment. Many other journalists who have been critical of the Kremlin have been badly
beaten during the course of duties. These laws have also extended to online bloggers, as
well. Sergey Reznik, who had written blog entries alleging corruption of local officials
in Rostov-on-Don, was sentenced to a three-year prison term for, among other things,
"insulting a government official."383 The new Yarovaya laws, under the pretense of com-
bating terror and extremism, increased prison sentences for anyone caught ’promoting
terror or extremism’ online and forces internet companies to hold and decrypt anyone’s
data at the will of the state.384
With the TV and print media in control of the state, Putin was free to ensure his
vision of Russia and world events was the prevailing narrative.385 Indeed, in 2015, 88%
of respondents named TV as their main source of information while the Internet was a
distant second: only 30% named it as an important source. However, this is starting to
change; a 2017 survey shows a drop in reliance on TV to 78%, as well as an increase in
the use of the internet for news to 39%. Further, only 50% of Russians believe the TV
news; this is down from 63% in 2015.386 In addition to strengthening ’extremist’ laws
online, they have resorted to online propaganda campaigns, and automated internet ’bots’
to disseminate propaganda and attack dissenters. Recent studies also show alternative
independent sources are gaining influence via RuNet, or the Russian Internet;387 and
381http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/world/europe/08russia.html?mcubz=1
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384Freedom House Freedom of the Press Report 2017; Mike Eckel, "Russia’s ’Yarovaya Law’
Imposes Harsh New Restrictions On Religious Groups," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, July
12, 2016, , accessed April 5, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-yarovaya-law-religious-freedom-
restrictions/27852531.html. ; Valeria Zenovina, The President of the Russian Federation signed the
"Yarovaya Package", Garant.ru, July 17, 2016, http://www.garant.ru/news/782190/
385"Tret Rossii za Borbu s "Ryatoj Kolonnoj"," Levada Center, July 14, 2014, accessed May 1, 2017,
http://www.levada.ru/2014/07/14/tret-rossii-za-borbu-s-pyatoj-kolonnoj/.
386"Rossiyane stali menshe dovepyat’ telenovostyam," Interfax.ru, February 12, 2017, , accessed April
25, 2017, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/549537.
387"Rossiyane stali menshe doveryat telebideniu," Levada Center, , accessed May 2, 2017,
105
the Levada Center number support this. They show an increase in those who trust the
internet for news an information to 37%.388 The Kremlin is struggling to keep up.389
Weakening civil society. Independent civil society has been under constant attack in
Russia under the Putin regime. Religious charity groups have been forced to register since
1997 die to a law passed to boost the prominence of the Russian Orthodox Church. How-
ever, in 1999, the state started pushing back against certain non-Orthodox groups citing
’extremism’ refusing to authorize their re-registration. Groups have included the Salva-
tion Army, and the YMCA. They continue to face protracted legal battles in Russia.390
Other religious groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses have also fallen victim under the
Yarovaya laws. Its members are being registered as ’terrorists’; their names appear on
a registry with member of al-Qaeda and ISIS.391 Some cite their U.S. headquarters as
making them ripe for suspicion. Others point to their refusal to be political.392
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also fallen prey. A 2012 law forced
many NGOs to register as "foreign agents," and pay heavy fees, if they received min-
imal funding from organizations outside of Russia and tend to target political groups,
though this is vaguely defined, and those focusing on human rights.393 Some organi-
zations buckled under the financial pressure and were forced to shut down completely.
In 2014, the law was amended so the Ministry of Justice could register an organization
without their knowledge or permission. The Levada Center, Transparency International
Russia, Russian Research Center for Human Rights, and over 150 other organizations
have been registered since 2014.394 The costs of being labeled a "foreign agent" are tan-
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gible. They face loss of reputation, difficultly working with other organizations sue to
fear of "guilt by association", decreased capacity to engage in civic activities, cumbersome
paperwork, and hefty fines.395 One can now also include the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion.396 They are also prohibited from engaging in "political activity" which can often
hinder their work. For example, providing reports to the United Nations, campaigning
against political initiatives, raising public awareness over human rights issues, corrup-
tion, etc., publicizing public opinion polls and data, and much more.397 As a result, the
number of civic organizations is down 33%.398
This creates a situation where public participation in civil society is difficult. As of
2014, participation in NGO activity ranks around 5% in the city of Moscow and about
2% nationally. Of course these numbers were measured just before the 2014 laws were
implemented.399 In larger cities, people have more opportunities to interact short term
for certain causes or simply meet people of like mind, about a third of the population of
Moscow fall into this category. There are, of course, other opportunities that arise when
tragedies happen and individuals are moved to help and participate in coordinated events.
Politically speaking most people do not see any benefit in appealing to governmental
authorities through such acts as petitions, human rights appeals. They feel they are
more likely to see results through their informal blat’ networks.400
The state has moved to "nationalize" some civil society groups in order to neuter them.
Indeed, the state has granted $112 million dollars in funding to civil society groups in just
2016 alone. The groups that are typical recipients are those who eschew political causes,
such as health and social groups. However, this means human rights and environmental
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25, 2017, http://www.levada.ru/2014/09/09/potentsial-grazhdanskogo-uchastiya-v-reshenii-sotsialnyh-
problem/.
396"Briefing on Shrinking Space for Civil Society in Russia," Human Rights Watch, February 24, 2017,
, accessed April 25, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/24/briefing-shrinking-space-civil-society-
russiaf tn4.
397Ibid.
398Olesya Zakharova, "Vladimir Putin Loves Civil Society (As Long As He Controls It)," Foreign Policy,
October 12, 2016, , accessed April 25, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/12/vladimir-putin-loves-
civil-society-as-long-as-he-controls-it/.
399"Potentsial grazhdanskogo uchastiya v reshenii sotsialnyh problem," Levada Center, , accessed April
25, 2017, http://www.levada.ru/2014/09/09/potentsial-grazhdanskogo-uchastiya-v-reshenii-sotsialnyh-
problem/.
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groups, for example, are excluded. The money comes with restrictions: they can have
their grants revoked for political statements or working with groups that are deemed
"foreign agents." Further, pro-Kremlin student groups such Nashii have been mobilized
to create a countervailing narrative to the anti-Kremlin opposition.401 However, this runs
the risk of the state losing additional legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
Lack of political alternation, attacks on political opponents and political dissent.
When the Russian constitution was adopted in 1993, already gave the President sub-
stantial powers in terms of power-sharing with parliament, or more precisely, the lack
thereof. Attempts were made to correct the balance of power issues under Yeltsin, how-
ever they were met with opposition. In 2007 when Putin’s second term was coming to
a close, many wondered what Putin would do. Would he go into private life? Would he
remain some position of power, perhaps as Duma deputy?402 Will Prime Minister Viktor
Zubkov take the helm and Putin be his Prime Minister? Questions were answered in a
surprise move when his Deputy Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev announced he would
run for office and, if elected, he would appoint Putin as his Prime Minister. Putin en-
dorsed Medvedev as the head of his United Russia party. The pair easily held control of
the Presidency with 70% of the vote. Not long after entering office in 2008, Medvedev403
announced the powers of the President would be extended from two, four year terms to
six year terms. His presidency showed some attempts at independence from Putin. In
particular he was more open to warm relations with the West, switch focus from natu-
ral resource driven economy to an economy of the future emphasizing technology, and
he attempted to relax domestic controls over civil liberties and increase transparency.404
Though public opinion polls showed Medvedev as being popular,405 in September 2011,
he announced he would "step aside" and Putin would assume the spot of Presidential
401Julie Fedor Rolf Fredheim. "We need more clips about Putin, and lots of them: Russia’s state-
commissioned online visual culture". Nationalities Papers Vol. 45 , Iss. 2,2017
402http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/world/europe/02russia.html
403 The pair have a long relationship going back to Putin’s days with Anatoly Sobchack, chairman of
St. Petersburg city council where Medvedev worked under Putin as an advisor.
404 He was largely unsuccessful here. Katri Pynnoniemi, "Science fiction: President Medvedev’s cam-
paign for Russia’s ’technological modernization’" Demokratizatsiya 22 , no. 4 (2014):.
405Levada Center polling as of August 2011, a moth before the announcement in September, show
Medvedev at 63% popularity and Putin at 68% popularity."Indikatory odobrenie organov vlasti," Levada
Center, , accessed April 25, 2017, http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/.
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candidate on the United Russia ticket.
This sent the country into high dudgeon; many were not interested in what they felt
was a never ending cycle of Putin rule. After a series of smaller protests throughout
the month, on December 24th, 2011 tens of thousands of Russians took to the streets
protesting the United Russia ticket, but also reports from international elections experts
alleging ballot stuffing and widespread fraud in the December Duma elections.406 Videos
also appeared online reportedly taken by voters allegedly showing various forms of election
fraud. Various news agencies spoke to the protestors. The overall feel was anger; they
had gone out and voted but evidence demonstrated a foregone conclusion and their votes
were pointless. They were tired of Putin and blamed him for the high rates of corruption
in the country.407 Mikhail Gorbachev publicly called on Putin to step aside as he had
done in 1991 and make way for new leadership.408 Seeing popular dissent filling the
streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and smaller protests across the country, shouting
’Rossiya bez Putina!’ 409 was sobering for Putin. Protests continued to break out well
into the new year. May 6th, 2012, the day before his inauguration for his 3rd Presidential
term, Putin was faced with large protests in Moscow. It became known as the Bolotnaya
Square case; approximately 400 protestors were arrested, including opposition leaders
Alexei Naval’ny and Boris Nemstov. Protests would continue despite new laws cracking
down on protests.410 However, protesters and experts have both pointed to the lack of
unified and organized opposition for failing to make progress. In the past, opposition has
been largely stymied due to the government’s effective campaign against the so-called
"fifth column." 411
The government has waged a brutal war on TV, in print, and online, as well as in the
406Ellen Barry, "Rally Defying Putin’s Party Draws Tens of Thousands," The New York Times, Decem-
ber 10, 2011, , accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-
protest-in-moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html.
407Ibid
408"Fresh Voices Against Russia’s Old Regime.," Levada Center, January 2012, accessed April 2, 2017,
http://www.levada.ru/en/2012/01/16/fresh-voices-against-russia-s-old-regime/.
409 Russia without Putin!
410Gleb Bryanski, "Russia’s Putin signs anti-protest law before rally," Reuters, June 08, 2012, , accessed
April 2, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-protests-idUSBRE8570ZH20120608.
411Joshua Yaffa, "Putin’s New War on Traitors," The New Yorker, June 18, 2017, accessed April 2,
2017, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/putins-new-war-on-traitors.
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court rooms against the opposition. Opposition leader Alexi Navalny is a prime example
of this. A young attorney, he came to prominence via his Live Journal account exposing
corruption or local politicians and other officials.Alexei Navalny, "Alexei Navalny’s Live
Journal" , accessed June 11, 2017, http://navalny.livejournal.com/. His unique approach
(taking pictures of the wrist watches of various officials and comparing their worth to
public records showing their salaries) and his charismatic personality helped him grow
a sort of cult like following online. Once it became clear he was posing a threat to the
state, he was arrested and tried on trumped up charges of corruption. This is typical
Soviet-style politics: blame the opposition for what they are accusing you of, arrest them,
try them, and convict them. The European Court of Human Rights ruled the arrests and
cases against Navalny were politically motivated and without substantiation.412 Russia
watchers and human rights organizations point to Russia’s growing fear of Navalny’s
increased popularity as a reason to discredit him so he will be unable to run in the next
presidential election in 2018.413
Navalny’s efforts since 2012 have become much more organized. He has established
satellite campaign offices across the country, even in the far East. Indeed, his online
campaigning has become more sophisticated, as well.414 He is present on a multitude of
social networks where he, or proxies, constantly push content, including highly produced
special investigation videos, live streams, and candid reactions to news of the day. He
continues to expose alleged corruption through complex investigative reporting and puts
together impressive and witty videos he posts online which receive high viewership both
inside Russia’s borders and beyond.415 One of his most recent, published March 2nd of
this year, was an expos Prime Minster Dmitry Medvedev alleging vast corruption via his
charity organizations in which "Dimon"416 allegedly hides properties and money. This
412"Navalny and Yashin v. Russia - 76204/11," HUDOC - European Court of Human Rights , accessed
April 19, 2017, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-10301.
413Alec Luhn, "Alexei Navalny: Russian opposition leader found guilty of em-
bezzlement," The Guardian, February 08, 2017, , accessed May 25, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/alexei-navalny-russian-opposition-leader-found-
guilty-embezzlement.
414Clare Sebastian, "Alexey Navalny and Russia’s YouTube insurgency," CNN, June 12, 2017, accessed
April 19, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/11/europe/russia-navalny-youtube-protests/index.html.
415Aleksei NavalnyRu, YouTube, accessed April 19, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/user/NavalnyRu.
416 Dimitry Medvedev. He does not like the diminutive, which is why, of course, it is used freely in the
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video was viewed as of June 11th, 2017 over 22,781,621 times.417 There is evidence in
recent months his efforts have borne fruit. Organized protests erupted across Russia (not
just in Moscow) after the video was aired. March 12th of this year saw vast protests in 90
cities across Russia.418 Many of the protesters were youths though the demographics ran
the range of age. However, the youth aspect is interesting; most of the youth involved in
his protests have grown up under Putin and know no other system. One would imagine
they have been socialized to this political culture, however they are revolting. Exact
numbers are difficult to gauge but this is a promising development for civil society going
forward. Through the use of new forms of civic engagement, the people are banding
together with unknown others in order to stand up and demand their rights. This is a
test for the Putin regime.
As a function of this double system between democratic words and authoritarian
deeds, Russia’s "freedom score" has consistently dropped since 2000 and has landed at
the level of "consolidated authoritarian regime" in 2016.419Yet his personal trust rating is
at 74% as of November 2016.420 Indeed, it seems Putin has developed a near Stalin-esque
level of cult of personality, something Khrushchev has warned about some 60 years before,
however there is early evidence this is fading.421 Nonetheless, it is important to keep in
mind it is Putin who has driven his country towards a consolidated authoritarian bent.
This was in no way an ’inevitable’ direction resulting from the weight for authoritarianism
in Russian history. After all, it was the people who rose up all over the Soviet Union, and
not just in her periphery. They answered Yeltsin’s call to not allow the Soviets to drag
them back into the darkness. What Russian needs now, are leaders who have the political
will to resist corruption and the courage to push Russia back towards a free society the
people rightly deserve. However, they must be prepared to demand it for themselves.
video entitled: "Don’t call me Dimon!" Aleksei Navalny, "Don’t call him "Dimon"!" Aleksei Navalny’s
YouTube (video blog), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7GF9g.
417https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7GF9g
418Clare Sebastian, "Alexey Navalny and Russia’s YouTube insurgency," CNN, June 12, 2017, accessed
June 19, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/11/europe/russia-navalny-youtube-protests/index.html.
419"Freedom in the World 2017," Freedom House, September 25, 2017
420"Institutsionalnoe Doverie," Levada Center, October 13, 2016, accessed October 19, 2016,
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Part II: Specific Literature on Trust in Russia
As with the general literature, researchers on Russia and its sphere can be broken
down in to two main strains of thought: the culturalists and the institutionalists. Here,
both camps will be explored. Next, the gaps in the specific literature will be uncovered.
Finally, lessons will be synthesized and a way forward will be proposed.
The Culturalists.
These researchers claim Russia is doomed because of its long history of strong leaders
under both Communism and Imperialism. For these researchers, Russia’s societal trust
is based on centuries of experiences which are deeply ingrained in their civic and political
culture, not amenable to short term changes, leading to a lack of trust in institutions. The
idea is Russians have been socialized from a young age to have no faith in government.
The culturalists believe trust in institutions is taught from an early age in the pro-
cess of socialization within cultures, as are other forms of trust. Institutional trust is
established through a society’s political culture. Due to socialization, their form of trust
is particular. Citizens of these states are not joiners and therefore are not likely to be
exposed to differing ideas concerning democracy. Culturalists believe that civil society
and social capital really did not exist under the old regime and that so-called practice
has continued into the new regime(s). As such, trust and social capital are only weakly
related to organizational membership in Eastern Europe/ Post-Communist and former
Soviet states.422 Established norms of low trust in a given society will result in auto-
matic low trust in institutions. In the end, because of these norms, they feel Russia
will not likely be able to overcome the collective action problem sufficiently to form a
strong liberal democracy because of its long history of authoritarian leaders under both
Communism and Autocracy. If they do, it will be a very long and slow process, as such
societies are very slow to change. Researchers such as Almond and Verba, to Samuel
Huntington423who believes Russia is stymied by inexperience with democracy, long histo-
422Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).
423Ibid.; Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy’s Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991): ,
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ries of authoritarian rule, Orthodox tradition,424 and a culture that favors authoritarian
leaders.425
It is important to note here the types of organizations people matter for both join
for the culturalists and the institutionalists. After all, there are democratically undesir-
able groups, such as the Nazis in the Weimar, who would use their power for ill gains.
Nonetheless, as Letki and Evans (2012) specifically point out, trust and social networks/
civil society did exist under the old regime: it merely operated in a different, yet no less
important fashion. That type of trust in Russian society has persisted in Russia and
remains today, perhaps in an altered form. With this critique in mind, some researchers
offer a bit more hope for Russia and those within former sphere of influence of the USSR.
The Institutionalists.
This is in contrast to the instrumentalists who believe trust in Russia is based on
institutional factors, that is how well the institutions in Russia operate and provide
political goods to the people. These researchers feel political performance and economic
success is what drives trust from the top down. In other words, when society trusts their
institutions who will adequately provide economic stability and democratic performance,
trust will be felt at the level of the individual and spread out into society fostering trust
in institutions and engendering generalized trust, cooperation and work, in part, to solve
the collective action problem.426
Those in the instrumentalist camp believe change is possible, because trust in insti-
tutions is rationally based. As such, they find poor performance and economic inequality
have a great impact on generalized trust. The idea is, if a state and its institutions can
provide political goods to its citizens, they will generate high levels of trust. By contrast,
if a state is unable or unwilling to provide adequate political goods to its citizens and/
doi:10.1353/jod.1991.0016.
424 Orthodoxy is particular to Huntington.
425 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy’s Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991): ,
doi:10.1353/jod.1991.0016.
426Mishler and Rose 2007*
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or see their leaders and institutions as corrupt, the amount of trust in unknown others
reduces. 427 It results in a vicious circle of trust and distrust between citizens and their
leaders. Instrumentalists do not dismiss outright the notion of cultural influence on the
trust calculus, however they emphasize that citizens evaluate a change in regime based
on performance today based on experience rather than persist with previously taught
beliefs.
Instrumentalists can make their case when examining trust in a times-series and com-
paring that to known instances of economic or political turmoil; a clear pattern develops.
Mishler and Rose found these "shocks to the system" coincided with a reduction in insti-
tutional and generalized trust.428Nonetheless, their research finds the strongest support
for the "top-down" theory, however the results also show the "bottom-up" perspective is
also statistically significant, though has a lesser power variance in their models. There-
fore, they advocate taking a mixed approach moving forward.
Letki and Evans (2005) employed a similar method by measuring what rate democracy
was at in 1989 and measuring the "shocks" that occurred after the fall of the USSR and
the creation of new constitution in 1993-94, and then measuring the differences using
a posttest survey completed in 1998.429 Their results yielded a cyclical pattern where
initial trust is degraded by political and economic disappointment in institutions which
will rise again over time when institutions are preforming to their satisfaction and then
drop again with societal disappointment.
Additional research also found similar cyclical patterns, called these public and private
cycles, examining the undulations that existed and continue to exist under Putin. When
the public felt relatively comfortable with the economy and the political environment,
fostered by the idea that they can do nothing about their situations, society would retreat
427William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" Comparative Political
Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002. , Natalia Letki and Geoffry Evans, "En-
dogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe," British Journal of Political Science,
2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242. , Elena Chebankova, "Public and Private
Cycles of Socio-Political Life in Putin’s Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 26, no. 2 (2010): , doi:10.2747/1060-
586X.26.2.121.
428The Impact of Macro-Economic Shock on Russians" Post-Soviet Affairs 2010.
429"Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe". British Journal of Political
Science. 2005
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into the private cycle in where individual goals and material wealth. According the
Chebankova, the new public phase is in its infancy and is a result of the growing discontent
with the growing income gaps between the wealth and the poor as well as the state of
opaqueness within their political institutions. The concern with the retreat into the
private realm is when people withdraw, they are less politically and socially active. This
lack of activity allows unsavory acts of corruption to go unchecked, entrenching deeper
and deeper into the institutions and among the political elite, a view Lussier would agree
with. When people feel the effects of inequality of job instability, they tend to feel as
though their political freedoms are suppressed and cannot muster the political will to act.
It becomes a vicious circle were elites are free to impinge on the democratic rights of the
citizens. What these researchers offer is a contextual understanding of Russia and that
one key to understanding how trust operates in relation to democracy is by viewing the
effects over time.
Specifically in regards to corruption, Mishler and Rose, using the Corruption Percep-
tions Index (CPI), examine the gap between perceived levels of corruption and actual
corruption in Russia to measure what effects this has on levels of trust in Russia.430
Further, they examine if either perceptions of corruption or actual instances of corrup-
tion have any impact on the current regime. They link perceptions of corruption with
performance and trust in institutions, which they also measure. They show there is no
evidence for corruption or political trust to have any impact on support for the current
regime or democracy itself. In fact, they found that while 89% of those surveyed perceive
their institutions as corrupt, this had no statistical significance in relation to support
for the current regime. Further, the only significant variable was economic performance.
At the time of the New Russia Barometer (NRB) survey, the oil market was "booming"
netting a 66% positive feeling towards the economy which showed an increase in regime
support, as well. They offer no insight, however, to how the perceived level of corruption
up top affects levels of trust down below at the individual level. In other research, the
authors do indicate that levels of institutional trust do impact generalized trust support-
430"Experience versus perception of corruption: Russia as a test case" Global Crime. 2010
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ing a "top-down" approach to how trust works in Russia. Alternatively, the do not show
any indication that trust or institutional trust has any impact of support for the current
regime. This is likely because society largely supports their idea of democracy, regard-
less of it distrust in institutions. This leads to the looming question: while society may
support the idea of democracy, in general, is Russia a democracy?
Most authors in the recent literature have been talking around the issues of the state
of democracy in Russia and exactly how to classify it. Calling a spade a spade, Karen
Dawisha reminds us that Russia is not a democracy, but an authoritarian regime of the
type she labels a "corporatist-kleptocracy." Her research focuses on the vary distinct form
of corporatism and kleptocracy which is completely different from states in Europe, Asia,
or America who are corporate.431 It does share with Italian fascism and Asian corpo-
ratism that the state has an inherent right to intercede and involve itself in all levels of
the economy, suppress uprisings and demands from labor, as well as social movements.
Of course, all of this undermines the liberal notion of democracy Putin espoused to be
in pursuit of when he took office. The key difference in Russia’s corporatism is the klep-
tocratic elements of "a closed circle of state officials, having suppressed both the market
and democratic rights, begin to use their position as state officials raid these newly-
renationalized companies for their private gain."432 It is because of these considerations,
Russian society is forced to create informal rules and networks on order to function from
day to day within the system.433
While solving the problem of a lack of institutional or interpersonal trust is beyond
the scope of this work, it is worth noting that Bo Rothstein (2011) offers this advice:
providing good governance. He agrees with many of the other authors regarding the
dangers of corruption and low trust. corruption as: a holder of public office who violates
the impartiality principle to achieve private gains. For the author, impartiality is vital
to good governance. When one applies the rules evenly and efficiently, good governance
431"Is Russia’s Foreign Policy That of a Corporatist-Kleptocratic Regime?". Post-Soviet Affairs. 2011.
432 Karen Dawisha, "Is Russias Foreign Policy That of a Corporatist-Kleptocratic Regime?" Post-Soviet
Affairs 27, no. 4 (2011): , doi:10.2747/1060-586x.27.4.331.
433 Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia modernise?: sistema, power networks and informal governance
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014). 19-49.
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is the natural result. He eschews the focus on democracy which dominates the literature
because he feels there are many examples of highly functioning democracies which have
large instances of corruption, kleptocracy, etc., ergo the discussion would be moot and
remove focus on where he feels it should be: good governance and impartiality. Good
governance requires specific principles guiding the state and its institutions and should
reward officials who exhibit impartiality while punishing those who do not. Rothstein
agrees that impartiality of officials is vital is cultivating trust within a society. Where
corruption is present, trust is reduced and inequality is fostered. Because he feels social
trust is an absolutely vital component of internal legitimacy (because it has both political
[support for government institutions] and economic [support and confidence in the market]
value), he feels governments who are unable to function effectively are the worst "social
ills" of all. However, is clear with this level of corruption that is so entrenched, that has
so many doing all they can to maintain the status quo, the measured effects mentioned
above on trust and democracy seem not likely to change anytime soon.434
The problems with both of these approaches to trust in Russia are clear. Both the
culturalists and the institutionalists focus on the importance of generalized trust. The
culturalists ignore the importance of particularized trust completely pointing towards a
bankruptcy of Western civic organizations and social capital all of which are measured
via liberal global institutions leading to the atomization of society. This creates a sort of
’West not the Rest’ version of trust. While the instrumentalists recognize the possibility
of alternate types of civil society and joining, they still emphasize the importance of faith
in institutions impacting generalized trust. Different societies have formed alternate trust
networks in reaction to a combination of factors which can include, but are not limited
to, authoritarian regimes, access to technology, religious beliefs, tribal societies, as well
as experience with others.435 This suggests it is possible to have a society which does
not feel connected to their institutions, yet still can function with one another, as well as
support democratic values.
434(Bo Rothstein, The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International
Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011) 104, 214.)
435Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia modernise?: sistema, power networks and informal governance
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014)19-49.
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Human beings are inherently social creatures; while various factors may cause them
not join ’typical’ forms of social groups, they will find other ways to interact and ex-
change information often through informal practices and networks and Russians are no
exception.436 In response to inefficiencies and paradoxical nature of Russian bureaucracy,
or sistema,437Russians lost faith in the system and developed their own informal rules
and networks in order to ’get things done’ in the face of competing bureaucracies and in-
terests which often stymied the efforts of every day Russians to function.438 What began
under the Imperial and Soviet systems, has continued on today, updated for the current
regime in response to modern technology, issues, etc. It suggested in post-communist
and post-soviet regimes such as Russia, different forms of civil society have emerged,
particularly online which are vibrant, personal, highly active, and sometimes politically
active.439 While investigating the Russian case, Lonkila discovered that the internet has
become the central tool in organizing groups to meet both on and oﬄine for both polit-
ical and non-political purposes.440 Initially, the Russian "hacker" culture began to form
almost as instantly as computer technology began to spread in Russia. It was born out a
bankruptcy of reliable information in what was happening within the country and the rest
of the world. Even under Gorbachev, reliable information was hard to come by. Russian
hackers used the new technology to exchange information with one another. After the
436Ibid.
437 sistema- (1) from Greek, "sistema", creation (sozdanie), constitution (sostavlenie), order or structure
of correlated and co-ordinated parts, working in a synchronised way; (2) in political contexts, a political
system or system of governance; (3) in the vernacular, a euphemism for the informal corporate code
followed in organizations (4) in hippy jargon, self-definition of the hippy movement in the USSR and,
more widely, dependence on the systematic intake of heroin, drugs, living from dose to dose; (5) in
corporate contexts, the "Sistema" corporation headed by Evtushenkov; (6) in this book, the system of
governance with its peculiar formal rules and informal norms, combined in a way that is non-transparent
for outsiders but recognized by insiders of the public administration in Russia. In the context of Putin’s
rule, a co-dependence of parasitic power elites and parasitic masses; an implicit social contract between
the rent-seeking elites conniving at enriching themselves at the expense of public resources or raiding
while not reforming/diversifying the economy, and the compliant masses, living at the expense of the
trickle-down income from the oil-dependent economy, producing little but engaged in entrepreneurial
scheming. "Glossary", in Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance.]
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 273-280
438Alena Ledeneva, "How Russia Really Works," Center for European Reform, May 22, 01, accessed July
10, 15, https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/e246unwrittenrules−
2203.pdf.
439Ibid.
440Markku Lonkila, "The Internet and Anti-military Activism in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 60, no.
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fall, the flow of information seemed to be improving, however, this was sharply reversed
under Putin.
The new president immediately set out new programs which included the breaking
down of public civic groups, and the free and independent media. NGOs were now
required to register with the state and meet harsh requirements for operating in the
Russian Federation. Some were outright barred (YMCA and the Salvation Army, for
example) and others struggled to meet the minimum requirements. This allowed the
state considerable control over the civic organizations which remained operational in
Russia; it also severely curtailed and later eliminated all public demonstrations without
a near impossible to obtain permit. Putin also began the takeover of independent media
and by 2003 brought nearly all media under state control. Those that remained were
minor and non-influential or seen as a threat to the state, even if they were critical of the
state.441
Under these conditions, Russian hackers began to find ways around these barriers via
RuNet. The Russian Internet began with a relatively very small number of people; this
small "community" of tightly knit IT professionals and several ex-patriates gave life to
RuNet via the LiveJournal blogging environment and with it a growing subculture. These
groups created their own legends and cult heroes, and the growing online community
religiously began following the projects and blogs of these individuals.442 Overtime,
these online spaces have come to form a legitimate sort of civil society in which people
exchange ideas with one another about a wide variety of topics. According to Lonkila,
these connections seem to operate as "weak ties" connecting people and transferring
information between different social groups.
In short, RuNet plays a critical role in civic activism. Examining anti-military groups,
Lonkila discovered:
Activists may not only search for and distribute information on the internet,
communicate with each other, the media, the public and the authorities, but
441Henrike Schmidt and Katy Teubener, "Control Shift Public and Private Us-
ages of the Russian Internet," Katy-teubener.de, 2006, , http://www.katy-
teubener.de/joomla/images/stories/texts/publikationen/controlshift01.pdf.
442Ibid.
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also recruit new members and organize online and oﬄine actions. In Russia,
the significance of the internet as an alternative medium for information diffu-
sion, communication and mobilization has grown markedly with the strength-
ening of state control over the traditional media, particularly television, in
the early twenty-first century. 443
Online news sites, e-mail and blogging systems are crucial for the disbursement of
information and communicating among activists, pressuring the authorities, and organiz-
ing online and oﬄine protests and demonstrations. Civil society, though not fitting the
Putnam vision of bowling leagues, is alive and well, for those who have access, reaching
across a wide variety of interest groups in Russia. Human beings are inherently social,
when faced with obstacles that make traditional forms of civil society impossible, they
will make due and work around the system to form connections and bonds with others
through vast social networks. These new social networks are not that much different than
the old. Both required interaction at some level with unknown others. Both are the fruits
of in direct response the authoritarian state pushing it down.
Khodyakov and the Strong-Weak State Model.
Khodyakov (2007) describes the trust relationship which was present in Soviet times.
He outlines a similar process of understanding trust as the culturalists do. Essentially,
strong-ties are one’s first interaction with trust. We learn to trust or not trust based
our interactions with immediate and extended family. This gives us confidence to then
branch out and form our own associations and friendships outside of the family unit.
These relationships are known as weak-ties. However, strong-ties do not lead to the
atomization of society, as culturalist believe.444 How one feels about their institutions
or government has no impact what so ever on how they trust one another. Khodyakov
(2007) finds this to be the case; particularly in the Soviet system. In Soviet society,
443Markku Lonkila, "The Internet and Anti-military Activism in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 60, no.
7 (2008): , doi:10.1080/09668130802230671.
444Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in
Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).; Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone:
America?s Declining Social Capital," Culture and Politics, 2000, , doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62965-712.
120
strong ties were important for meeting intermediaries whom you trust to help bridge
across to form weak-ties. Typically, a friend’s relative or another family member of your
own might act as the intermediary who would introduce you to someone they know and
trust who is outside of the group to help you obtain goods or services you might need.
445 The formation of weak-ties through one’s strong ties was an absolutely essential part
of survival under the Soviet system 446 Khodyakov offers his own definition of trust:
Trust is a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of
the other party’s actions based on: (1) the reputation of the partner and the
actor. (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions
about the partner’s actions, (4) the belief of the honesty and morality of the
other side.447
He uses this definition to establish trust as a process that must be evaluated on multiple
levels; particularly when extrapolating it out to social trust. He claims social trust must
be evaluated with this understanding at each level, particularized, general, and institu-
tional trust, and how they interact with one another in order to be properly understood
and evaluated.
In relationship with the state, institutional trust is independent from the other two
forms of trust. One can have no faith in the government but this does not interfere with
societies’ trust in one another. What impacts institutional trust is the relative strength
of the institutions. In the Soviet context, the state was seen as both strong and weak
at the same time; strong because they could provide some basic needs such as education
and healthcare, as well as a sense of security on the global stage, however, they were also
seen as weak because often, stores were empty and lines were long for some of the most
445Alena V. Ledeneva, "Practices of Exchange and Networking in Russia," Journal of Financial Crime
6, no. 3 (1999): , doi:10.1108/eb025886.
446Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.; Vladimir Gelman, "Subversive institutions, informal gover-
nance, and contemporary Russian politics," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45,
no. 3-4 (2012): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.07.005.);Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with
"Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" Social Research 76, no. 1 (2009): ,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146.
447Khodyakov, Dmitry. "Trust as a Process." Sociology, vol. 41, no. 1, 2007, pp. 115-132.,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.
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basic food items or other necessities.
This forced society at all levels, the individual, the state factory owner, etc., to turn
to one another in order to survive. Through a series of vast social networks, people were
able to get what they needed. The system is known as blat’ and continues to function to
a slightly lesser degree today. Ironically, what others saw as atomizing was anything but.
People made connections through the use of intermediaries, or po znakomstvu,448 which
would often result in bridging across to truly unknown others and even across ethnicities
to work together for shared interests. Because of the nature of the authoritarian state,
the risks of getting caught were real and could result in jail time. So there was a level
of risk involved, demonstrating the trust in the other while making these connections.449
The clear implication here is that what impacted institutional trust was the strength of
the state to deliver on its promises to the people in the form or strong institutions and
economic well-being.
There have been some attempts to include social networks when measuring how trust
operates in Russia though one in particular has interesting lessons to absorb. In his
examination of Russian society, Gibson (2001) tries to account for the lack of typical
networking groups in Russia and its implications for trust.450 He argues examining trust
in terms of social capital is the wrong focus. Just because people are not joining volunteer
groups does not mean society is atomized. Quite the contrary, it is possible for a state
or society to have vast social networks, which includes intermediaries, that substitutes
for social capital and can be used to function in much the same way.451 Social networks
would be similar to strong-ties, however does not include family members; they tend to
be co-workers, neighbors, acquaintances. Further, these must be people with whom they
discuss politics. For Gibson, social networks must be political in order to have value in
relation to democratization. Using Putnam’s litmus test, this would leave one to imagine
448Alena V. Ledeneva, "Practices of Exchange and Networking in Russia," Journal of Financial Crime
6, no. 3 (1999): , doi:10.1108/eb025886.
449Ivana MarkovTrust and Democratic Transition in Post-Communist Europe (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2006).
450James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russias
Democratic Transition," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.
451 Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.
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there being little to no hope for developing and sustaining democracy in societies with
low social capital.452 Ingelhart came to a similar conclusion; social capital itself is not
an important building block for democracy, but rather trust is. Trust is most important
when considering the support of democratic values and democracy.453
Gibson is able to demonstrate how one conceptualizes trust can have an impact on
the final outcome. I disagree, however, with the notion that social networks cannot
include family members. Turning to Habermas and his notion of the elements of civil
society, he relies heavily on the idea that family members are important players in the
development of civil society.454 One wonders, then, why they should be excluded from
social networks that are a vital part of civil society? This is something Khodyakov well
understands (2007). However, Gibson (2001) claims in order for social networks and
social trust to be useful that it must be political in nature. Ingelhart would disagree
with this stance; he claims social trust is often formed without any thought of political
discussion or action. Just because trust might begin at a non-political level amongst
family and friends today does not translate into an inability to do so at a later time or
when democracy is threatened. He further claims that social trust-independent of any
political ties- is the corner stone of civil society.455
Conclusion.
This chapter has covered the three main kinds of regimes one can expect in post-
Communist systems. A consistent pattern of backsliding has shown cause for concern
and heightens the need for more specific research in the variables affecting the reversals.
452 Putnam, Robert D. "Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital." Journal of Democracy :
65-78.
453 Michael Hout and Ronald Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Eco-
nomic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies," Contemporary Sociology 27, no. 2 (1998): ,
doi:10.2307/2654810. 127.
454 The initial reason the family was excluded from these notions was based on the male-dominated
society which wished to exclude women from its ranks due to the view they were not suited to be political
engagers. This changed in the 1960s and 70s with the coming of the women’s movement. Habermas
sought to include them as societal actors particularly suited to engage with the politics of the day (Kaldor
2011: 22).
455Michael Hout and Ronald Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Eco-
nomic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies," Contemporary Sociology 27, no. 2 (1998): ,
doi:10.2307/2654810. 127.
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It has also been uncovered that some regimes, though they have fallen back, are not in
a state of chaos, but rather have achieved stability. Patterns that are common among
post-Communist regimes were also briefly discussed. They share a common history and
shared memories relating to authoritarianism.
Indeed, Stalinism and its Great Terrors, as well as forced famines resulted in a polit-
ical and social environment of ’forced trust’, causing society to become hyper-atomized.
Not until the Thaw and de-Stalinization was Soviet society able to begin to experience
an environment where interpersonal trust relations were renewed. Continued ineptitude
by the state forced society to rely on one another through informal networks known as
blat’. However, creeping nationalism in Eastern Europe resulting from a lack of trust
in the system were brutally put down. Khrushchev’s promises of Communism by 1980
were clearly untenable, and under Brezhnev completely abandoned in favor of "developed
socialism." Focusing on dnte with the West and importing needed goods rather than fo-
cusing on innovation, and increasing production and military strength were the hallmarks
of the Brezhnev era. However, the loss of a common struggle of "building Communism"
left some listless. Further, political experiments with looser interpretations regarding
Marxist-Leninism in Eastern Europe renewed nationalist movements only for them to be
temporarily put down by local authorities. A new era of non-intervention emerged that
would shape the coming decades.
The reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev would unwittingly hasten the end of the floundering
Soviet system, rather than save it. Introducing pluralism into the system as part of
perestroika removed the central ideology necessary for the Communist system to survive:
it implies other voices may have answers and the Party alone did not carry them. This
idea was revolutionary, and together with glasnost’ exposed the system well in decay. The
people were now able to voice their anger and distrust openly. The brewing nationalism
in the East and around the Soviet system came to a head. Again, the state, strapped
financially and militarily, did not intervene to quash nationalist rebellions in Poland,
East-Germany, or the Baltics, in hopes of keeping hold at the center. However, Russian
nationalism also sprung up from the bottom. Citizens began to demand their rights and
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democratic leaders such as Boris Yeltsin emerged to oblige them.
The system finally collapsed under its own weight and a new hope for democracy
in Russia and the breakaway states finally emerged. In Russia, people were excited to
participate in elections, however the reality of the shock-therapy and privatization policies
saw their hopes dashed. The new system was just as corrupt, however now many social
protections were gone. Further, the democratic institutions needed to protect the people
from the new robber barons were not in place, or if they were, were inept or corrupt,
as well. Once again, society turned to one another in order to fill the gaps left by the
indifferent state, relying on their old trust networks and the second economy to survive.
The second democratically elected President has brought stability but rather than
fulfill the promises of creating a strong liberal democracy he has created a strong con-
solidated authoritarian state and seemingly endless rule. There is no real alternation in
place and the breakdown of civil liberties has taken place. Freedom of the press and
association are virtually non-existent. Civil society is extremely curtailed, as is civic par-
ticipation. However, there is new hope coming from the grassroots of society. Through
the use of new forms of civic engagement, particularly social networks, opposition leaders
and average citizens are braving danger and banding together in protest, demanding a
new political order.
This chapter also looked at research specifically examining trust in the region to see if
deviant cases can help build a better understanding of how trust works. While Putnam
and Fukuyama’s considerations are the crux of understanding trust and democracy today,
they fall apart on further examination. Their desire to eschew particularized trust is
an important failing, this is because it is the first step in the process of trust. Those
who identify as generalized trusters incorporate all experiences grounded in their cultural
realities which they gained over time and will continue to gain or lose through the process
of trust they first learned to navigate through their caregivers. Moreover, because trust
is grounded in time and space, as well as projected forward into the future, cultural
understandings of how trust networks operate must also be taken into consideration. In
other words, bridging to unknown others may not take the same form in Brazil as they
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do in Italy, America, Iran, or Russia.
The gaps in the current literature are thusly unable to capture the nature of trust
specifically or reflexively. Putnam has reified trust by removing its dynamic nature as
well as emphasizing one characteristic of trust over another, thereby extracting the human
element of trust relations. Even areas specific theorists are also guilty. The culturalists
notions of trust are so entrenched in the notion of particularized trust being atomizing,
they leave little hope for the future of Russian democracy. Similarly, institutionalist
approaches miss the mark, as well in terms of how particularized trust can be cultivated
to bridge to unknown others. research by Khodyakov and Ledenva reminds us that
partiluarized trust is the basis for bridging to unknown others and informal networks
operate in the Post-Soviet time and space to fill gaps the state is unable or unwilling to
perform. This creates bonds that act independent of the state and re-embed society in the
local and with one another. And while Gibson strives to account for social networks, he
still emphasizes generalized trust and the need for networks to be political in nature. As
such, a new approach to understanding trust must answer these questions: What is the
nature of trust? Why does particularized trust matter and how does it affect democracy?
Are atomized trusters different from particularized truster?
Chapter 4 will establish the theoretical support for the creation of a multidimensional
variable that builds on a process of trust. I will then build on these considerations and
advocate for a mix of culturalist and institutionalist approaches moving forward, adding
in the elements of particularized trust, as well as atomized others.
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Chapter 4:
Theoretical Framework: The Nature of Trust.
Introduction:The nature of trust and its process.
Particularized trust is the basis of trust formations. Without it, generalized trust can-
not be considered. Trust is the result of the process of trust experiences, both positive
and negative, throughout our lives grounded in time and space.456 Examining Erikson’s
stages of development supports this notion. At each stage Erikson underscores the im-
portance of primary trust developed as an infant for reinforcing positive values at each
stage. Our level of trust is a product of our upbringing, familial interaction, experiences
in school, with our neighbors, friends, society at large, and the group of seen and unseen
institutions in our societal cultural setting. 457 Trust is the first stage of a child’s de-
velopment. Children learn to either trust or mistrust those whom are charged for their
care, from birth to 18 months. This period is deemed as the most important stage of
development. Positive interactions with their caregivers informs the child s/he is safe and
can trust those around him/ her. "The amount of trust derived from earliest infantile
experience" [depends] on the quality of the maternal relationship.
456 Trust is a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the other party’s actions
based on: (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor. (2) the evaluation of current circumstances
of action, (3) assumptions about the partners actions, (4) the belief of the honesty and morality of the
other side. "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.
457Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963) 218.
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Mothers create a sense of trust in their children by "sensitive care of the baby’s indi-
vidual needs and a firm sense of personal trustworthiness."458 x In other words, caregivers
create a sense of inner security and outer predictability for the child via a continuity in
actions that fulfill the infant’s needs results in a rudimentary sense of ego identity. That
is, internal memories and anticipated sensations that the child correlates with the "outer
populations of familiar and predictable things and people"459 that build self-esteem and
confidence.460 This trust is carried with us through our different stages of development
and reassessed as we gain new knowledge and experiences over time.
The role of recognition in trust.
Our trust calculus, to trust or not trust, is based on this understanding when engaging,
particularly, with unknown others. Our decision to act to trust or mistrust is based on the
process of trust itself that includes positive and negative experiences related to recognition.
Our own identity, that is built from self-esteem and confidence, is challenged as we engage
with others in society. Hegel has demonstrated that subjects capable of action owe
their potential for creating a positive relationship to the self via the involvement in
mutual recognition.461 All this depends on the personal and physical interactions with
individuals who offer us special feelings of appreciation that we can return in kind. When
one experiences appreciation, they can then learn to turn these positive feelings inward,
building self-confidence.462 Honneth believes this can be taken a step further by using his
proposed structure to illuminate the various forms of social disrespect. This disrespect
can lead to atomization, of which we must remain cognizant. I will continue with that
idea and say it also has as an end how one builds on the process of trust relationships
within a similar moral infrastructure of the social life-world in which he describes.463
458Ibid. 249.
459Ibid, 218.
460Honneth, A. "Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory
of Recognition." Political Theory, 1992, 187-201.
461Ibid.
462George W.F. Hegel and Arnold V. Miller, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977),
112.
463 Honneth, A. "Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory
of Recognition." Political Theory, 1992, 187-201.
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Honneth offers his own patterns of recognition, that are quite similar to the levels of
trust: love, that is analogous to particularized trust that operates at the level of the family
and those you know; rights that correspond to institutional trust, that is your interactions
with the state’s institutions that are the caregiver of your right to recognition; finally,
solidarity, that aligns with generalized trust in unknown others. Solidarity is the act of
seeing yourself reflected in unknown others. It leads to empathy with the other. Honneth
does not link the various levels nor describe how one informs the other, instead each level
is bracketed or outlined in structure, that he fully admits. His aim is to name and define
the moral infrastructure itself in which the social life-world must consist of in order to
protect its members. A more complete understanding how recognition helps uncover the
nature of trust as a process, however, is illuminated by examining human agency and
how individuals and groups interact within and between the structure brackets.
The structure in which trust operates is hierarchical or nested. It has different levels
or brackets, as Honneth suggests, however individuals and groups are able to interact
with this structure.464 The prevailing culture is the stage in which the structure is em-
bedded and in which institutions of the state operate based on sculptural ideas, norms,
laws. These institutions are the keepers of the rights of individuals afforded by the state.
As such, trust in institutions will be a product of how affective those institutions are re-
garding the individual recognition and politics of recognition.465 Society itself is another
part of the structure, that is also based in cultural norms in time and space, and takes
to form of social institutions. Individuals within society will respond to societal norms
to interact with other levels of the structure via social networks and other forms of civil
society. Further, individuals can be fostered or hindered through experiences within the
structure as a whole. It is not static; in other words, serve to merely act on individuals
removing their agency. It is an organic structure made up of humans who actively en-
gage or disengage via the process of trust. The amount of trust each person has in any
given situation in unknown others or the people they know, or institutions exists on a
464Ibid.
465 see: Charles Taylor and Charles Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). The demands for recognition and inclusion that have arisen since
the 1960s in racial, ethnic, gender and other minority or socially marginalized groups.
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spectrum as a direct result of their experiences with the trust process. A process that
begins at birth and is constructed via familial relations, expanded upon, as the process
is continuous and ever evolving, to branch out to others in society with varying degrees
of inclusion and exclusion, and up the structural ladder over time.
The process of trust, described.
Therefore, the process of trust can be described in the following manner: human
beings trust via a continuous process, initially formed via our earliest trust interactions,
that are dynamic and change as we receive new information about the "other" or "others".
Our initial decision to trust in any given circumstance is based in prior experiences with
others, information about the other’s reputation, and our own personal interactions with
the other, knowledge about the circumstances surrounding the trust calculus, grounded
in time and space. As we receive new information in the form of experiences, knowledge,
etcetera, we update our prior information to determine the probability the other is has
integrity and is, therefore, trustworthy. It is a process that we engage in everyday, in a
myriad of situations, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes with full intent, but it is an
on-going process. Further, we are complex beings who trust in complex ways. We are
not solely one sort of "truster" or another. We create, to varying degrees, intricate social
networks that draw on all of those whom we trust, which one we rely on depend specific
circumstances, as we need them. Ergo, it is important that our trust in one another be
considered in such a way to to reflect, as close as possible, the nature in which we actually
trust and include separated into brackets via how they trust or do not trust, to varying
degrees, and can intermingle between these brackets as the process of trust is all trust
realities. If particularized trust is contingent, in part, on culture, so will generalized trust
be. Culture is the stage on which trust relations are played out. Moreover, it appears
society and individuals seek alternate routes to fulfill needs, when institutions of their
state and culture fall short of reciprocal recognition, by turning to one another, nurturing
individual level trust in other ways. The distinction is at which level is trust fostered,
and this seems to depend on the society in question.
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Theoretical difficulties with previous approaches.
The current approach to trust is Western in focus; it does not account for differen-
tiation in cultures and histories. As Erickson points out, we cannot remove trust away
from the time and space, as well as culture in which they are embedded and created.
Currently, the liberal trust approach has a hyper focus on generalized trust and creates
a specific western liberal version of civic organizations and civil society, that leads to a
minimum of liberal democracy: all of which are measured via liberal global institutions.
This creates a sort of West not the Rest version of reality that leads to the exclusion of
the other by the dominating group or system.466 It is vital we get at the true nature of
trust, as negative connotations based on flawed understandings have the direct impact
of excluding people and or groups, as well as states, from state and global benefits of
mutual cooperation and support.
Erickson argued that particularized trust formation correlates to the myriad societal
and political institutions. For example, the belief in a higher power and observance of
religious practices is correlated to the infancy stage of development. This is because one
is giving themselves over to God as their caretaker; having faith in God is the tantamount
to trusting one’s parents to fulfill one’s needs, both physical and emotional.467 Individuals
seek recognition in the process of trust creation not only with one another and society,
but with the state and its institutions. We turn to the state in an effort to ensure they
recognize us as individuals having a set of inalienable rights and entrust the government
to reflect ourselves in its vision.468 When they fail to recognize our rights in which they
are entrusted, a mistrust in institutions results. This is particularly the case for minority
and ethnic groups. Specifically, it is termed as a violation of the politics of recognition
that, too, is internalized as a form of disrespect, resulting in mistrust. After such violation
of trust, individuals or groups turn away from said institutions and toward one another.469
466Ulrich Beck, "World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society?" Theory, Culture Society 13, no. 4
(1996): , doi:10.1177/0263276496013004001.
467Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963). 220.
468George W.F. Hegel and Arnold V. Miller, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977),
113.
469 Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285. ; George W.F. Hegel and Arnold V. Miller, Phenomenology of
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This "turning inward" does not always mean individuals are resolved to be victims of such
an affront. They look to have their needs met through their social networks, that include
intermediaries from other groups who may have the ability to fulfill those immediate
needs. These interactions have the ability to branch out to address other unrequited470
needs of recognition from institutions.471 They bind together in-person or online to form
new social networks with unknown others who share their vision and reflect the other in
themselves; they can even band together to create alternate forms of global civil society
and institutions to address their desire for recognition. This myriad of activity is also a
process of trust formation that unfolds across time.
The problem of atomization.
In order to continue with our understanding of trust, it is important to discuss the
role of atomized others in relation to particularized trust. The literature claims that
particularized trust can lead to the atomization of society that is detrimental to democ-
racy.472 However, atomization is the absence of trust in others. Particularized trust is
based on trust in people you know. Atomization is the mirror negative of trust. Therefore
conceptualizing a bankruptcy of trust with those who do trust does not follow, logically.
Atomization occurs when individuals experience negative interactions with the people
they know and/ or society.473 Ultimately what humans seek is recognition of the self.474
Negative trust relations resulting in the lack of recognition can cause the individual to
lose trust in the world. School aged children, for example, become aware of the color of
their skin, the background of their parents and even the kinds of clothes they are wearing
in relation to others around them.475 They seek recognition from others of who they are
Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977),113.
470 Use of this word is intentional, as it relates to Erickson’s infancy stage that is tied trust creation,
that he in turn ties to institutions (1963: 229).
471 James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia’s
Democratic Transition," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.
472Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America?s Declining Social Capital," Culture and Politics,
2000, , doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62965-712.
473 Erikson. Childhood and Society. 248.
474 Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963). 222.;
Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. 113; Axel Honneth, "Integrity and Disrespect," Political Theory 20,
no. 2 (1992): , doi:10.1177/0090591792020002001.
475Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963). 229.
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and try to see themselves in others. The self necessitates validation by being directly
"satisfied or answered"; recognition takes place in the form of emotional encouragement
and acceptance.476 When others do not offer recognition it is out of the fear of the other
because they do not see them selves reflected in the other; this leads to the exclusion of
those who do not reflect their own sense of self. The excluded other will withdraw into
themselves, seeking comfort in those more like them in whom they will find acceptance,
recognition and trust. It is when they do not find trust, they turn inward to themselves,
away from society and family. These same kinds of interactions are modeled again and
agin throughout one’s life as they interact in different settings over time.477Therefore
if we turn away from trust, how can we be labeled as part of the particularized group
of trusters as Putnam and others would suggest? If we indeed wish to get at the true
nature of trust and how it affects democracy, it follows this group should be considered
separately when thinking about trust groups. A more appropriate approach would be to
examine trusters and non-trusters.
If we are truly interested in democratic values that consider the rights of individuals,
not only must we account for atomized others separately, we must consider the process
and events that lead to the atomization in the first place. This demands a reflexive
undertaking among individuals and societies. If we can recognize the causes, we will
better be able to address them and work to reincorporate the atomized other into society.
This process can, in turn, result in an increase of democratic values.
Further, It is important we do not underestimate the inherit, though perhaps obscured,
value that can exist when society turns away from state institutions and retreat into the
comfort and security of one another or the self. Gellner claims atomization may not
always be detrimental for democratic values. 478 Indeed, it may be a symptom of pending
change from the ground up. Humans are inherently social creatures; even in the most
trying times of institutional distrust, bonds are created sparks of resistance are ignited.
476George W.F. Hegel and Arnold V. Miller, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977), 111; Axel Honneth, "Integrity and Disrespect," Political Theory 20, no. 2 (1992): ,
doi:10.1177/0090591792020002001.
477Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963). 229.
478Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (New York: Penguin Bookss,
1996), 129-136.
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In severe cases, it can lead to demonstrations, new social movements within and beyond
state borders, and possibly even revolution of the oppressive regime. These individuals
and movements should be sought out and and their support for democratic ideals and
values be recognized.
Recognition of the other.
The previous section reminds us is not enough to consider trust in relation to the
current state of democracy inside of borders. We must be aware of how trust operates and
relate it to the current state of affairs for others. These others could be the marginalized
within societies, but also others, globally. Giddens work reminds us of what trust looks
for industrialized nations. But what about the rest of the world? When thinking about
others on the global stage Beck offers some insight. Taking Giddens notion of risk to
the level of state and international relations, it becomes the basis of what he calls the
world risk society. This occurs first at the individual level. Engaging with others can be
seen as risky. Beck would also argue that all individuals in society are more or less risky.
When a group represents risk, this leads to the marginalization of the group. He feels
risk (at the microcosm) involves a relation between at least two people, i.e. the "decision
maker" who takes the risk and the "other." The decision maker, once decisions are made
based in the reality of threat or perception of it, triggers a set of consequences on others
who may or may not be able to defend themselves. All of their positive attributes are
dissolved under the "reality" (real or imagined) of this "threat". In the horizon of risk
via cosmopolitanism, the purely black and white nature or events or situations -legal or
illegal, good or evil, right or wrong, etc., no longer exist. People become more or less
risky. For Beck, it is important to understand that all people as individuals pose some
level of risk for everyone else in society. While he does not specifically use the word trust,
the author argues the consequences of this use of the word risk correlates to trust. When
we trust, we are taking a risk, the degree of belief in the level of risk we take on is formed
by positive or negative interactions from past experiences at each level of trust. The
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amount of risk we take relates to our past experiences with others.479
Beck argues this risk defined world takes on a dichotomous relationship: "it is the
existent and the nonexistent, present and absent, doubtful and real" inhabiting the same
cognitive space. In short, it assumes that "the threat which does not (yet) exist really
exists."480 In the global space global space, global risks take on a moral and political
space of responsibility. The others in this space are near and far, present or absent whose
actions are more or less risky and do not take on the pure binary nature of good and
evil. For Beck, proximity, reciprocity, dignity, justice, and trust have meaning and are
"transformed within the horizon of expectation of global risk."481
Beck takes Giddens notion of global civil society (or risk communities for Beck) and
trust relations based on risk rather than fortuna (Beck would call this "uncertainty")
beyond the surface to allow for a reflexivity when evaluating risk or trust in modernity.
Trust based in risk for both Giddens and Beck is an attempt of the individual to regain
control over his environment by turning uncertainty into risk. Risk implies an educated
calculation for the probability of the degree of belief you have in the other depending
upon previous experiences or events or faith in "expert systems." Beck takes this a step
further: expert systems (institutions or government) often convert uncertainty into risk
in a rather ambiguous way that only seemingly can protect security and reduce risk.
However, this facade is quickly dashed when a catastrophic event occurs that the system
was unable to predict and prevent. This results, again, in uncertainty that the system will
then recalculate and transform (again) into risk. For global actors, trust is based on the
sense of security. There is an underlying assumption that the world is filled with risks of
all kinds and the state and other global actors are there to protect individuals from these
risks: famine, flood, terrorism, war, etcetera. If the state and global actors can protect
those under their charge and provide their needs, trust in the system is secured. However,
if a catastrophic event occurs and the state is unable adequately provide security for the
479Ulrich Beck, "Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision," Constellations 16,
no. 1 (2009): , doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2009.00534.x.
480Ibid.
481Ibid.
135
needs of society, the previous risk becomes uncertainty and trust is lost.482
Beck believes these realities cause people to form into risk communities that he believes
is a kind of "glue" for diversity. Global risks (that is, globalization, global warming, war,
etc) naturally create a sort of "compulsory cosmopolitanism" in which state lines are
blurred as it regards communication and economics. The manner and method in which
the other is represented within the "global risk publics," he feels, is absolutely vital for
establishing morality in the world. From his normative perspective, the representation
and presentation of the other implies not only they been seen and heard ("sound and
image") but also, meaning. That is, the alien "other" must and has the right to be
understood ; this is cosmopolitan understanding or cosmopolitan hermeneutics.483
We can see this reflected in modernity. Globalization does not negatively impact
social trust by closing us off from one another. As Giddens484 points out, in some ways,
it enhances it. Even societies with non-Western trust realities have come to adapt. For
example, societies with access to the Internet have formed alternate trust networks in
reaction to a combination of factors that can include, but are not limited to, authoritarian
regimes, access to technology, religious beliefs, tribal societies, as well as experience with
others. London: Routledge, 2004. Further, recent research has strongly suggested new
forms of social networks and civil society have emerged, particularly online that are
vibrant, personal, highly active, and sometimes politically active.485 However, this is all
dependent on having technology to re-embed trust back into the local and across global
spaces.
This sort of connection to unknown others gives us a chance to see ourselves reflected
in them and offers those suffering the recognition they seek. Further, it gives us avenues
to come to gather and act half-way around the world in a myriad of ways that include but
are not limited to, sharing information with our own networks, offering financial support
482Urlich Beck, "Living in and Coping with World Risk Society: The Cosmopolitan Turn" (Moscow),
June 2012, http://www.gorby.ru/userfiles/ulrichbeckf inalversionmoscow.pdf.
483 Ibid.
484Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 4.
485Markku Lonkila, "The Internet and Anti-military Activism in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 7
(2008): , doi:10.1080/09668130802230671.;Wim Van de Donk et al., Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens
and Social Movements (London: Routledge, 2004) 87.
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to those organizations that are in a position to help, engaging our own politicians to act
to change the conditions in which the injustice sprung. Overtime, these online spaces
have come to form a legitimate sort of civil society in which people exchange ideas with
one another about a wide variety of topics. According to Lonkila, these connections seem
to operate as "weak ties"(or generalized trust)486 connecting people and transferring
information between different social groups. There will likely never be a world in which
all governments are democracies and all states are trusted by their citizenry. However,
this process of joining together in global risk publics allows us to build weak-ties to
unknown others globally, to build trust, and seek a more democratic world in which
others are given the right to be understood and recognized, and injustices are addressed,
transforming these global uncertainties into risk, thereby fostering trust with one another.
Conclusion.
Until now, the seminal works on trust have focused on the importance of generalized
trust over particularized, claiming the later is detrimental to the growth of democracy.
Institutional trust has been seen as being vital, as well, as it feeds back into generalized
trust creating a virtuous circle of trust in which democracies can thrive and survive.
However, upon closer examination, we see that this view of trust is unidimensional. It
cannot possibly account for the true nature of trust as it resigns each of us to one sort
of truster or another. As such, it negates the trust realities of non-Western societies and
leads to the exclusion of each one as being capable of developing democracy. It does
not accurately take into account the process of how humans build and develop trust over
time. Nor does it account how technological advances can affect trust of unknown others,
nor how trust can be transformed to create new bonds of global civil society487 and allow
us to see our selves in oppressed others and work together to create change in the system.
As we can see trust is an ongoing process that begins when we are born. As we grow
486Ibid.; Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6
(1973): , doi:10.1086/225469.
487Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: an Answer to War (Oxford: Wiley, 2003).
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we learn how to evaluate trust relationships via learned experiences. We evaluate one
another in based on those experiences. We are active agents in the trust process. We are
not resigned to one level of trust or another. We are a combination of those trusts and
we interact with institutions accordingly. When faced with dilemmas, either personal or
with institutions, we draw on all of our trust networks to varying degrees to form a plan
of action moving forward. As we gain positive experiences, our trust grows in a manner
reflective of the cultures we reside. As we have negative experiences, we may retreat into
our families. Still others may become atomized away from society. It is even apparent
that a lack of trust in institutions does not drive us from one another in ways that are
always atomized. Society finds way to fill the gaps institutions are unable or unwilling
to fill by turning to one another. And in the age of globalization we see those bonds
can also help free us from oppressive regimes, support those who stand up and demand
democracy, or at the very least, allow us in a globalized age to reach out to a global civil
society for help. For those unable to do so, it is up to us to not forget how our lives
impact unknown others in the corners of the world. We have a responsibility to them,
they have the right to be understood and we have an obligation to listen, to see ourselves
in the other and act on their behalf. This process of trust invokes a constant calculus of
others in our immediate lives, of institutions, as well as those beyond our borders. It is
a reflexive process. This is the human process of trust in modernity.
The next chapter will lay the methodological foundations for this work. It will ex-
plore limitations, as well as the contributions to the study of social and public trust in
institutions.
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Chapter 5:
The Methods.
Introduction.
The examination of the relevant literature exposes 3 main questions this research will
seek to answer: Do the country-level perceptions of corruption present in institutions
have a credible impact on how society trusts one another at the individual level? Is there
any credible difference between particularized trust and generalized trust in relation to
one’s support for democracy? In thinking about atomized others, do they have a credible
negative impact on one’s attitudes towards democracy? These questions can be answered
by considering the following hypotheses: (H1) Country level corruption will not create a
credible negative effect on individual trust outcomes in light of support for democracy.
(H2) There is no credible difference between those who trust generally and those who
trust particularly in relation to feelings of democratic importance. (H3) Atomized others
have a credible negative impact on democratic importance.
Proper research must adhere to some method; according to King, Keohane, and Verba,
the best method for the evaluation of our research involves the standards of the scientific
method of inquiry.488 As such, this chapter will unfold in the following manner: First,
the research design will offer explanations of region specific study, and will justify the use
of secondary survey data. Further, the data extracted from the World Values Survey will
be specified. Next, the relevant terms to this research will be operationalized.
488Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), 8.
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Then, the method here will be explored. In particular, why the use of the mixed or
random effects hierarchical linear model (RE HLM) was employed versus the standard
ordinary least-squares (OLS), or fixed effects hierarchical model (FE HLM), which will
account for problems related to endogeneity. In addition, the choice to utilize Bayesian
inference will be explored. And finally, an examination of the Russian case will take place
employing an OLS model. In the end, this method will allow the author to account for
corruption and its possible effects on trust and importance of democracy, while allowing
the levels of trust to be measured more accurately. Then, the benefits of this research to
the general knowledge will be explored. Finally, all research has its difficulties and this
project bears no exception. As such, the limitations will be expressed.
Research Design.
Depth vs. Breadth. This project will examine the group of post-Communist countries
as a potential deviant case related to the social trust questions outlined in the prevailing
literature. As such, it will be qualitative because it is focused on a particular region or
country. The findings of qualitative studies cannot be generalizable to the larger body of
political science because of their specificity.489 The trade-off here is potential contextual
and particularized understanding in exchange for generalizability, gaining internal validity
in the place of external validity. While qualitative studies have their drawbacks, the pay-
off can be beneficial. It is possible that through a more careful look into one’s subject, one
will be able to have a deeper understanding of the theory explored,490 or one might uncover
potential causal triggers for certain phenomena,491 both of which will be of great use to
the expansion of the body of scientific knowledge Though this research is technically
qualitative, the author will be using quantitative tools. Quantitative tools allow the
researcher to "falsify, modify, or provide support for existing theory."492 Moreover, it
489Chava Frankfort. Nachmias and David Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences (New
York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 241.
490Ann C. Lin, Reform in the Making: The Implementation of Social Policy in Prison (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000), 174-175.
491Natasha Borges Sugiyama and Wendy Hunter, "Whither Clientelism? Good Governance and Brazil’s
’Bolsa Familia’ Program.," Comparative Politics 46, no. 1 (2013): , doi:10.5129/001041513807709365.
492Chava Frankfort. Nachmias and David Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences (New
York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 241.
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values the understanding of causal mechanisms via hypothesis testing. This is done
deductively through the development of hypotheses from theory and then using the data
collected for the purposed of testing their hypotheses.493 Large data surveys are a common
method employed for quantitative research in political science.494 495
Search for generalizability. The particular findings of qualitative research can lead
to further study netting generalizable results. One obstacle to such an option can lie
in a variable or set of variables that are so contextual specific, it creates a hurdle for
measurement validity in broader set of cases. When possible, the researcher should seek
to find a middle ground from the outset.496 For example, this research has constructed a
new trust variable in such a way it can next be used in a generalizable fashion to test across
all countries of the WVS to check for broader, generalizable implications. The variable
was constructed with the nature of how human beings trust in mind which is general
and universal, though easily amendable for hyper-specific cases. Further, the model
employed in this research will focus on quantitative techniques, particularly statistical
methods with large data, to evaluate the hypotheses. As such, eschewing typical limited
qualitative designs, such as focus groups or field work in one region, is favorable in the
face of ready-made large n representative samples in each country in question; this is
especially true in the quest for broader generalizability.497
Method.
The author of this paper feels, based on Khodyakov’s "Strong-Weak State" model,
one can find cases which will deviate from previous results, and will provide the right
environment to test out the new multidimensional trust variable. This requires and ex-
amination of those countries who would have existed in that sphere. A closer examination
493Ibid.
494Babbie, 2011 106; Chava Frankfort. Nachmias and David Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social
Sciences (New York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 156; Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research,
13th ed. (Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2013), 106.
495Ibid.
496Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Quali-
tative and Quantitative Research," American Political Science Review 95, no. 03 (2001): ,
doi:10.1017/s0003055401003100
497Ibid.
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of the Russian context will then be able to take place. Due to the nested nature of the
data, a hierarchical design is required. Further, in order to test the institutionalist thesis
which states it is the institutions in a given state that impact social trust at the individual
level, an appropriate statistical model will need to be employed to parse out the causal
arrow. Does democracy cause trust? Or does trust cause democracy? 498 Complicating
matters further, does institutional performance cause trust, or as Bo Rothstein aptly puts
it: does the "fish rot from the head down?"499 To this end, a Bayesian RE HLM model
with be employed in the regional context, in order to address these issues surrounding
endogeneity. Once this is established, it will be possible to employ the OLS method to
examine the specific case of Russia.
Using a Bayesian approach here is vital; this research is most interested in the inverse
probability, in other words, the probability of the model given the data. Specifically,
this project must examine the appropriateness of the model itself, which only Bayes can
capture with greater confidence.500 Through the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
implementation using the ’Gibbs sampling’ method, one can improve the approximate
distributions of the data at each step in the chain process, even for small n data as is
found here. This will ultimately allow the MCMC to ’hone in’ on the target posterior
distribution, (θ | y), revealing whether or not the model is an appropriate fit for the
data.501
This project will proceed in two parts: first, it will examine the Russian and post-
Communist case using WVS data over the two-wave period between 2005-2015, as well
as CPI data for 2008 and 2013 for country-level perceptions of corruption. A Bayesian
Hierarchical Linear Model will be employed to determine if the country-level ?corrup-
tion? might impact how trusters support democracy in a given country. Wave 5 will
first be explored examining the post-Communist states and Russia. Wave 6 will follow;
498Helmut Rainer and Thomas Siedler, "Does democracy foster trust?" Journal of Comparative Eco-
nomics 37, no. 2 (2009):.
499"Corruption and Social Trust: Why the Fish Rots From the Head Down," Social Research 80, no. 4
(Winter 2013): , doi:10.17506/ryipl.2016.17.1.3760.
500John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: General 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146.
501Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Mod-
els (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 392.
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unfortunately, not all of the same countries appear in this wave, limiting the number of
countries from six to three. In the second part, an OLS model of Russia alone will be
examined.
Choice of HLM.
The regular ordinary least squares (OLS) method assumes independent and identically
distributed int(iid) of all variables within the model. As such, all higher level variables
assumed to be the same and can be "pooled" into a single population. Random Effects
can deal with this partially by allowing the intercepts to vary across countries; in the case
of this research this is not enough when exploring multiple countries at once. Because the
variables for social trust and institutional trust can vary quite a bit between nations, one
must also take into account the importance of the slopes varying, as well. The concern
here is, according to the literature, trust in institutions is quite different from societal
trust, however they can and sometimes do play into one another;502 therefore they must
be considered separately, and for purposes of this research, at different levels.503
The HLM method will account for the inherent nested nature of the data, while al-
lowing the variables to vary appropriately with in the model, reducing Type I errors.504
Indeed, most data in the political sciences are nested: for example, individual trusters
inside countries, inside a region. Therefore, it is only appropriate to consider the data
in such a way.505 This research will be using the CPI data to represent institutional
considerations. This attitudinal country-level variable will allow one to account for "per-
ceptions" of institutions. In turn this will be used to control for "trust" and "importance
of democracy" ; both variables will be taken form the WVS. Social trust is also allowed to
vary by country. An interaction between social trust and institutional trust was created
to see if such an interaction might affect the model. Overall, previous research tends to
ignore is the potential effect of political institutions on social trust overall, while focusing
502Bo Rothstein "Corruption and Social Trust: Why the Fish Rots From the Head Down," Social
Research 80, no. 4 (Winter 2013): , doi:10.17506/ryipl.2016.17.1.3760.
503Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Mod-
els (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 251.
504Ibid.
505Ibid.
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exclusively on generalized trust. Adding the multidimensional trust variable, as well as
using mixed effects models over time, one can control for unobserved heterogeneity and
address simultaneity.506 Further, because this project is interested in differences in the
levels of trust between nations on support for democracy, holding all others constant, the
HLM method is most appropriate.507
Specifically, a mixed effect model which Gelman and Hill call "random effects" will
be utilized here. Random or "mixed" refers to "the randomness in the probability model
for the group-level coefficients."508 This allows both the slope and the intercept to vary
by groups. When used in conjunction with the HLM, this is referred to as "multi-
level" modeling.509 The random effect will be on trust. Random effects deals with the
error terms in the level two equation; another way to think of this is error terms for
the coefficient estimates. HLM is broke up into two pieces: the individual level, where
indicators, data clusters are denoted as i and the group level, where the indicators are
denoted as j. This research is concerned with i level individual level variables: the new
multidimensional social trust variable and typical controls which include: age, gender,
job satisfaction, net usage, and level of education. The institutional level variable will be
CPI which is allowed to vary with trust by country. Constructing the model via HLM and
examining it across both waves allows for the possibility of determining which direction
the causal really arrow flows, reducing concerns over endogeneity.511 It does this by
allowing the independent variable "trust" to vary across the level two variable "country."
Accounting for the various concerns related to endogeneity is also paramount. In other
words, does the arrow flow from attitudes of trust to country-level considerations or visa
versa? Measuring where these indicators fall over time and measuring the difference
506Ibid. 245; Bell and Jones 2012
507Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Mod-
els (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9
508p. 245
509 Gelman and Hill eschew the use of the term "random" because they feel it can be misleading and
might also encourage the use of a solely fixed effects approach, which they claim are counterintuitive in
social research; since random effects should "always be used" they opt for the single term,510 however
the author here will use random effects for additional clarity as it is also commonly used
511William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" Comparative Political
Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.; Natalia Letki and Geoffry Evans, "En-
dogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe," British Journal of Political Science,
2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242.
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between them can expose which direction the causal arrow points. Further, controlling
for CPI will help account for the third variable omission.512
Problem of Endogeneity: Fixed Effects.
It is en vogue today for many researchers to "eliminate" the endogeneity problem by
simply employing a Fixed Effects (FE) model.513 However, this method, while very simple
and attractive in its ease of use, leads to serious variable omission issues. This method
holds fixed the 2nd level variables at a mean of 0. In other words, it treats the higher
level variables as completely separate from the individual exogenous variables when in
fact they may not be and most likely are not. This essentially "strips out" the variables
from their appropriate nested context and will result in telling us nothing particularly
contextual or useful about the model or the data.514 Further, because it is known there is
an endogenous relationship between the DV and the IV, it is important to also control for
the relationship at the country level and allow the IV to vary appropriately. Removing
the FE will allow for endogeneity if it exists, while preserving context. To this end, it
seems advisable to employ a random effects/mixed effects/multilinear effects model (RE)
with some slight modifications to Mundlak. Before this is settled, an exploration of a
commonly used method for dealing with endogeneity in HLMs, the Hausman test, should
be addressed.515
Problem of Endogeneity: Hausman test.
One typical test for endogeneity for HLMs is the Hausman test. However, it has
recently been shown to have serious drawbacks in this regard.516 The results of the Haus-
512Chava Frankfort. Nachmias and David Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences (New
York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 208.
513Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-
Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," Political Science Research and Methods 3, no. 01 (2014): ,
doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.
514Ibid.
515Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-
Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," Political Science Research and Methods 3, no. 01 (2014): ,
doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.
516Ibid.
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man are not particularly interesting and often yield little useful information in relation
to endogeneity. Ultimately, it is very similar to the within and between effects. It is
"neither necessary nor sufficient"517 to use the Hausman test as the as the sole basis for
one’s own methodology. The issue can arise when there is a potentiality of covariance
within groups/ across individual indicators and predictors. Clearly, the FE method and
the Hausman test will not do What is required is a framework which is flexible, parsi-
monious, and one which allows for "endogeneity not simply to be fixed, but for it to be
explicitly modeled."518
Establishing and maintaining the role of context in the model, be it individuals,
neighborhoods, counties, cities, countries any parameter which denotes a "higher level",
is typically of profound importance the research question, particularly in the political
sciences, "one must model it explicitly."519 Here, one simply cannot remove the country
level effects and allow trust and corruption to be examined together at the individual
level. This "pooling" will result in additional error to the model. Another method, the
Multi-level or Random Effects (RE) model can analyze "both the within and between
components of an effect explicitly", whilst preserving explanatory power.520
Solution for Endogeneity: Multi-level or Random Effects (RE)
HLM model.
The RE HLM method not only solves the "problem" of endogeneity across levels; it is
specifically modeled and accounted for (Bell and Jones 2012). The adaptation of Muldak
(1978) as notated in Berlin et. al., 1999 is parsimonious and effective way of dealing with
endogeneity. β1 is the within effect and β4 is the between effects for Xij. The Xij − X¯
deals with the specific correlation, with the data centering around the group mean. The
process shown above of "de-meaning" the x, results in the loss of the multicollinearity
517Tom S. Clark and Drew A. Linzer, "Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?" Political Science
Research and Methods 3, no. 02 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.32.
518Ibid.
519Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-
Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," Political Science Research and Methods 3, no. 01 (2014): ,
doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.
520Ibid.
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between variables, netting a much more stable and precise estimate. In other words, it
returns an unbiased estimate of within group effects. The effect Xij is separated one at
each level into 2 different processes, "interpretable, and relevant to the researcher".521
Also, the higher level residuals are assumed to be normal which results in efficiency over
the FE model. In the FE case, higher level variables are assigned dummy indicators which
are then switched ’off,’ losing the needed context. The RE method, which functions via
partial pooling, assumes error u0j comes from a common sampling distribution and has
been selected from the same sample space, more reliable predictions are the net result.522
yij = β0 + β1(xij − x¯) + β4x¯j + β2zj + (u0j + e0ij)(1)
The above formula can be related to this research, however the model will include an
interaction with CPI to see if that relationship has an effect of the DV, while being allowed
to vary across clusters/ countries. This is justified, again, because multiple literatures
suggest there is a direct relationship between societal trust in institutions and trust in
one another in relation to democracy. If the variables still show a high level of correlation
after the HLM has been complete, it would be worth it to not only move on to other
methods to check this result, but potentially switch out the IV and DV and run a new
model.
It is also important to note here that there is also current research which provides solid
empirical evidence that neither side of the argument is completely right on its own, as is
shown in Robbins 2012 cross-national panel study of political institutions and generalized
trust over the years 1980-2009. Again, this method still focuses on the importance of
generalized trust, which I feel is incorrect for reasons outlined above. Mishler and Rose
(2012) also yielded similar results. One final, yet very important step: this research will
be conducted using Bayesian inference, rather than the typical frequentist method.
521Craig K. Enders and Davood Tofighi, "Centering predictor variables in cross-sectional multilevel
models: a new look at an old issue.," Psychology Methods 12, no. 2 (June 2007): , doi:10.1037/1082-
989X.12.2.121.
522Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-
Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," Political Science Research and Methods 3, no. 01 (2014): ,
doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.
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What is Bayes?
Bayes theorem begins with the prior probability distribution of some unknown pa-
rameters and improves or updates it via the likelihood of that data which results in the
posterior prediction (Figure 1). The prior probability is chosen as a starting point for the
posterior is what is used to make predictions and inferences.footnoteAndrew Gelman and
Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 143. The posterior distribution will become
the new prior probability distribution and the chain will begin again, and continue as
many times as required, to test all possible iterations. This is a time consuming process
in relation to the frequentist method, which is one reason why it is often not employed.
This is due to the use of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo/Metropolis.
Figure 2: Bayes Theorem
The problem of priors from the frequentist approach. The choice of priors has been
the central critique surrounding Bayes. Indeed, priors have been called an "aberration of
the intellect."523 There are two camps to the Bayesian approach on how to select priors.
In the first camp are the subjectivists in the style of De Finettie and Savage and use
"uninformed priors". The other camp, called "Objectivists," focus on the use of so-called
"informed priors."524
The subjectivists take a unique approach to prior formation. One can set any prior
they wish, based on a variety of reasons. This includes setting a proper to being flat or
uniform if one has no prior information or strong belief about the posterior distribution. It
523Goldstein 2005 http://www.stat.cmu.edu/bayesworkshop/2005/goldsteinDOTpdf
524Ibid.
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also allows one to consider the data already at hand, and include other information that is
not included in the data set, for example our ’hunches’ about the posterior distribution.525
Further, the subjectivists would not feel it is required to provide any justification or
restrictions on the belief because, in the end, they feel any justification is introducing
subjectivity into the equation. However, frequentists frown on this method. If one has
no prior belief, claim the frequentists, assuming equally likely priors is not appropriate
and "not scientific.526 Rather than a problem for Bayes, it is actually one of its strongest
points. Where frequentists would say one cannot model that which is not directly in the
data set, Bayes allows for the Inclusion of all information that can affect the distribution,
even after the initial collection of the data.527 However, the subjectivists would not feel
it is required to provide any justification or restrictions on the belief because, in the end,
they feel any justification is introducing subjectivity into the equation. Further, when one
has many observations contained within the data, the use of the so-called "uninformed
prior" is justified. In the end, given enough iterations and data, the data will converge
on the appropriate posterior distribution, regardless the prior set.528
Objectivists follow the "Principle of Insufficient Reason" which states prior distribu-
tions should be uniform unless there is some absolute reason to consider that one event
has a greater probability than the other event, however a justification for your decision is
not required.529 In short, objectivists believe there must be some initial stage of knowl-
edge. As such, one should be able to make some inferences on the data collected from
the beginning. This is done when one has a strong belief some prior information is most
525Michael Goldstein, "Subjective Bayesian Analysis: Principles and Practice," Bayesian Analysis 1,
no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1214/06-ba116.
526Ibid.; Robert E. Kass and Larry Wasserman, "The Selection of Prior Distributions by
Formal Rules," Journal of the American Statistical Association 91, no. 435 (1996): ,
doi:10.1080/01621459.1996.10477003.
527Goldstein 2005 http://www.stat.cmu.edu/bayesworkshop/2005/goldsteinDOTpdf
528John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: General 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146.; Peter Boedeker, "Maximum Likelihood,
Restricted Maximum Likelihood, and Bayesian Estimation for Mixed Models," Practical Assessment,
Research Evaluation. 22, no. 2 (April 2017): , http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=22n=2.; Michael
Goldstein, "Subjective Bayesian Analysis: Principles and Practice," Bayesian Analysis 1, no. 3 (2006):
, doi:10.1214/06-ba116.
529Robert E. Kass and Larry Wasserman, "The Selection of Prior Distributions by Formal Rules," Jour-
nal of the American Statistical Association 91, no. 435 (1996): , doi:10.1080/01621459.1996.10477003.
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likely to be more credible over some other prior belief.530 Therefore, a higher degree of
belief is weighted on the prior in said direction.
Overall, the frequentist critiques leveled at the use of priors is the accusation a prior
is just ?guess? or subjective belief. Further, it was claimed probabilities should be
measured by objective frequency of events rather than "subjective degrees of belief."531
It is important to give thought to our choice of priors in order to overcome some of these
criticisms. As such, a prior cannot be chosen on a whim; one must be prepared to justify
their prior to a scientific or critical audience. The process must be transparent in order
for it to stand up to scientific scrutiny. If one is uncertain about the data, and employs a
uniform prior reflecting that uncertainty as a result, this is justified because the data will
eventually take over or overwhelm the prior as it hones in on the target distribution.532
Choice of Bayes.
When thinking of Bayesian data analysis, we are referring to the practical ways one can
make inferences from all available data using probability models for the "stuff" we want
to learn about. What makes the Bayesian approach unique is the exact use of probability
in order to quantify uncertainty in our inferences using statistical methods.533 In other
words, we are turning our inferences into measurements of uncertainty.534 It can also be
thought of as the "reallocation across a space of candidate possibilities." 535Uncertainty
is measured via probability. Probability is a method of assigning numbers to a set of
mutually exclusive possibilities; and probability is the basis of Bayesian inference.536
One of the main features of the Bayesian approach is one can make inference with little
(small n) to no data, which is optimal here for the regional study. Frequentists require set
530Peter Boedeker, "Maximum Likelihood, Restricted Maximum Likelihood, and Bayesian Estimation
for Mixed Models," Practical Assessment, Research Evaluation. 22, no. 2 (April 2017):
531Ibid.
532John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: General 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146.
533Andrew Gelman, Bayesian Data Analysis (Baton Rouge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2003), 5.
534John K. Kruschke, Doing Bayesian Data Analysis: A Tutorial with R and BUGS. (Burlington, MA:
Elsevier, 2011), 10.
535Ibid.
536Ibid., John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146.
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data from which to measure, and do not allow for any influx of new information because
it is believed this is not scientific and will corrupt their data. Where the frequentist
paradigm would give up, or point to issues of internal validity, Bayes shines.537 Because
the examination in the post-Communist sphere contains few cases due to the way in
which the WVS conducts its own research, this project is forced to make-due with limited
country observations from which the HLM can vary. The choice of Bayes in this case is
clear: one can infer credible beliefs even in the face of few cases.538
As such, this research seeks to determine the appropriateness of the textitmodel: this
is one of the many benefits of the Bayesian approach. Bayes assumes inverse probability,
that is, the probability of the model given the data. In the multilevel context with group
level predictors, non-informed uniform priors are assigned. Each individual level of trust
is given a hyper-prior with a mean of 0 and standard distribution of .1 distributed N .539
Through the complex Monte Carlo (MCMC) process, the model will hone in on the
target distribution, sampling through the chain and discarding "unlikely" possibilities,
converging on the final parameter. The specific Bayesian formulae for the RE HLM model
can be found below:
yij = β0j + β1jParticularizedTrusterij + β2jOtherTrusterij
+β3Ageij + β4Genderij + β5Educationij + β6Incomeij
+β7Netij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01CPIj + ν0j
β1j = γ10 + γ11CPIj + ε1j
β2j = γ20 + γ21CPIj + ε2j
(2)
537Daniel Stegmueller, "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Fre-
quentist and Bayesian Approaches," American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (2013): ,
doi:10.1111/ajps.12001.;Sharon Bertsch McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die: How Bayes’ Rule
Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant from Two
Centuries of Controversy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).;John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian
Estimation Supersedes the t Test," Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142, no. 2 (2013): ,
doi: 10.1037/a0029146
538Stegmueller 2013 His work specifically deals with Bayesian HLM in the context of examining multiple
countries at the group level. His analysis finds 5 is the preferred minimum
539Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Mod-
els (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
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Where y is the dependent variable, β are related to the slopes, i are individual indicators
and j are group level indicators. The equation can be specified as below:
152
yij = (γ00 + γ01CPIj + ε0j) + (γ10 + γ11CPIj + ε1j)ParticularizedTrusterij
+(γ20 + γ21CPIj + ε2j)OtherTrusterij
+β3Ageij
+β4Genderij
+β5Educationij
+β6Incomeij
+β7Netij + ij
= γ00 + γ01CPIj + ε0j + γ10ParticularizedTrusterij
+γ11ParticularizedTrusterijPIj
+ParticularizedTrusterij1j + γ20OtherTrusterij
+γ21OtherTrusterijPIj +OtherTrusterij2j
+β3Ageij
+β4Genderij
+β5Educationij
+β6Incomeij
+β7Netij + ij
= γ00 + γ01CPIj + γ10ParticularizedTrusterij
+γ20OtherTrusterij + γ11ParticularizedTrusterijPIj
+γ21OtherTrusterijPIj
+β3Ageij
+β4Genderij
+β5Educationij
+β6Incomeij
+β7Netij + ε0j
+ParticularizedTrusterij1j
+OtherTrusterij2j + ij
(3)
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And further simplified as such:
yˆij = γ00 + γ01CPIj + γ10ParticularizedTrusterij + γ20OtherTrusterij
+γ11ParticularizedTrusterij ∗ CPIj
+γ21OtherTrusterij ∗ CPIj
+β3Ageij
+β4Genderij
+β5Educationij
+β6Incomeij
+β7Netij
(4)
This is the final equation (4) which will provide us with the predicted values. An
interaction between CPI and trust will take place at both the RE level and the lower
FE level. This will help further specify the nature of the relationship between CPI and
trust in relation to one’s feelings for the importance of democracy. In the end, if the
Bayesian results confirm the frequentist HLM results, this research can be optimistic in
the outcome and conclude, not only is the model reliable, but it accurately reflects the
data provided. In other words, one would be able to conclude this model has "less wrong"
results in comparison to other research.540
OLS model for Russia specific data.
Because this research is particularly interested in the Russian case, it is only natural
to examine this case more closely. As stated previously, the OLS method assumes all
variables within the model are independent. This means, in this case, country-level
variables assumed to be the same and can be pooled into a single population model.541
540Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Mod-
els (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
541Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-
Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," Political Science Research and Methods 3, no. 01 (2014): ,
doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.
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Because of the limited wave data on the new trust variable, a time series would not be
particularly reliable here prohibiting HLM in this context. As such, a standard OLS model
is sufficient, particularly if the RE HLM of the region demonstrates no credible effect from
the country level variable to the individual level of trust on support for democracy. This
method will provide additional contextual support to test the new trust variable. Because
the model was examined via the Bayesian RE HLM method and found to be reliable and
endogeneity accounted for, a Bayesian examination of the Russian case is not necessary.542
Data Collection.
This research will use secondary cross-national survey data available online from the
websites of the World Values Survey, as well as Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index.543 Funding and access are the primary considerations for this project;
the data required for such a study would be exceptionally costly to create from whole
cloth and employ in the region in a manner that was representative of the populations.
As a Ph.D. student, those kinds of funds are unavailable. However, both the World
Values Survey and Corruption Perceptions Index are well known in the field and use
reliable collection methods ensuring a representative sample alleviating considerations.
Specifically, the World Values Survey was chosen to model the trust question because this
survey is the only one to have a multilevel question for both generalized and particularized
trust. For example, the European Social Survey (ESS) does have a generalized trust
question ranked from 1-10, however they do not have a particularized trust question.544
The Russiabarometer 545 has both questions, however only covers Russia, not allowing for
examination in the Region. The Corruption Perceptions Index was imported to model
country-level corruption data.
The initial idea was to create a longitudinal data study over a number of waves,
542Daniel Stegmueller, "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Fre-
quentist and Bayesian Approaches," American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (2013): ,
doi:10.1111/ajps.12001.
543WVS; CPI
544 "Source Questionnaire.," European Social Survey, 2012, ,
https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round6/fieldwork/source/ESS6sourcemainquestionnaire.pdf.
545"New Russia Barometer," Takes you to the main page for this section, , accessed May 30, 2017,
http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog10.html.
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however, by the time of this project?s completion, only 2 waves were available limiting the
scope of the study. Further, only six countries were present that met the post-Communist
criterion for Wave 5 (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, and Serbia). Because
of the time it takes to conduct interviews for each nation, the WVS conducts surveys
in "waves."546 Countries not covered in one wave, may be covered in another, however
they may not. For similar reasons, in Wave 6, the field was further limited to a re-run of
only three countries: Russia, Ukraine, and Poland. The attitudinal dependent variable of
"importance of democracy" will also be taken from the WVS survey. Controls will include
gender, age, income levels, net usage, and trust in ethnicity questions, all of which are
strongly suggested by the literature.
Operationalization of Concepts and Definitions:
Dependent Variable:
"Importance of Democracy". This question has been taken from the WVS’s data.
It asks: "What do you rate the importance of democracy being"? The WVS variable
ranked 1-10 with 10 being the upmost importance and 1 being the least importance to
the respondent. It is treated here as a continuous variable. The research question and
hypothesis are best reflected by this question in the data set. This project does not try
to claim trust causes democracy in and of itself, nor is it asking what variables most
likely cause democracy. Instead, it seeks to answer the questions: how does the new trust
variable function in relation to attitudes towards democracy, and what, if any, differences
exist between the levels of trust in relation to democratic importance. If the prevailing
literature is correct, we should see a credible difference in the levels of trust from one
another against the response. However, if it is not correct, we will likely see no credible
difference.
There is an important caveat to present here. Because the variable is attitudinal
and the respondent is not provided a definition of democracy, they may evaluate that
546"Data Documentation," WVS Database, , accessed October 18, 2017,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
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term based on performance in their own country. For example, Russia has claimed to be
pursing liberal democracy, however if the respondent’s only interaction with democracy
is their own state, and they feel their state is corrupt, they may conflate both to bias
their response.547
Independent variable:
This research will focus on the definition of trust as outlined in Khodyakov’s research
understanding "trust as a process": Trust: a process of constant imaginative anticipation
of the reliability of the other party’s actions based on: (1) the reputation of the partner
and the actor. (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions
about the partners actions, (4) the belief of the honesty and morality of the other side.
548 As discussed in Chapter 4, when one makes a decision to trust they are, in an
instant, drawing on all experiences past and present at the level of both particularized
and generalized trust. Further, when one is deciding on whether to act in conjunction
with others, either to engage in civil society, or to act politically, they draw on their social
networks which include both generalized and particularized trust networks. This betrays
the need to create a trust variable that reflects this reality.
This variable was created by combining the four-level generalized trust question in the
WVS survey with their particularized trust level (Table1). The new generalized trusters
are those who always trust the people they do not know and always trust the people they
do know. This is important because it addresses Fukuyama’s concern about one’s radius of
trust and narrow trusters; specifically, in reference to the prevailing literature, those who
always trust the people they do not but also do not trust the people they do know. These
trusters will have a broader trust-radius.549 There is also now a new ’other’ category.
547 Fukuyama raises the concern, in survey research, what democracy means for each person may end
up biasing the results, if what democracy is is not made clear at the outset. He provides the example of
China where there is support for democracy but when respondents are asked what democracy is, one of
the main responses is the government provides for our needs. As such, the people aren?t in a particular
hurry for regime change. 2011.
548Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.
549"Social Capital and Civil Society - Francis Fukuyama - Prepared for delivery at the IMF Con-
ference on Second Generation Reforms," International Monetary Fund, , accessed May 30, 2017,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm.
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As discussed in the chapter 4, the lack of a specific category reflecting atomization is
problematic. How can one who does largely trust people, with some reservations, be
ranked together with those who mostly or do not trust at all? This seems an unnecessary
prejudice. Further, this gives one the opportunity to test Gellner’s (1994) assertion that
atomization is not always negative, particularly in the post-Communist sphere.
p. completely p. somewhat p. not very much p. no trust at all
g. trust completely gen part part other
g. not at all part part other other
M=5; 5
Table 1: New Trust Variable: Wave 5 and 6 World Values Survey.
This variable has been created from the WVS’ generalized trust question that asks:
"Generally speaking, would you say people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful?"
This variable is combined with the WVS’ particularized trust question: "How much would
you say you trust the people you know?" This question is a Likert scale from 1-4 with one
being "trust completely and 4 being "no trust at all." Overall, this particular variable
resolves the widely held critique of the unidimensionality of the current measurement
among prevailing cross-national surveys and depicts trust as being the process it is. As
such, one would expect the difference between particularized trust and generalized trust to
not be particularly interesting because both, if measured correctly, should matter. If there
is concern in relation to trust, it might manifest in the area of new "atomized others" level,
however it is also possible, if Gellner is correct, there is no credible difference between
atomized others and the other levels of trust in given circumstances. The construction
of the new trust variable accounts for this dynamism which has been omitted from the
prevailing research, as such, the author proposes this method will add to the content
validation of the study.550
550 Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qual-
itative and Quantitative Research," American Political Science Review 95, no. 03 (2001): ,
doi:10.1017/s0003055401003100.
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Control Variables: socio-demographics and importance of democ-
racy.
For this study, typical controls will be accounted for. These are "age", "education",
"gender", and "job satisfaction". These variables are common controls in the study of
social trust and democracy literature. An additional control will be added "net usage"
to account for recent research in Russia.
textitAge. The WVS’s age variable is continuous with a range of 16-99. This research
will maintain the continuous nature of the variable for the sake of ease rather than
breaking the variable into cohorts; this was done for expediency as it is only meant to
be examined generally in relation to the independent variable "trust" and country-level
variable "Perceptions of Corruption" (CPI) on the dependent variable "Importance of
Democracy".
When thinking abut the region, it is important to consider what might be expected
from this variable. Mishler and Rose conducted research using the Russiabarometer
data from 1998-2005 which demonstrated the younger generations tended to support
the new regime, meaning those born in the post-Communist era after 1976, are more
likely to be trusting of the new regime and less so of the old regime.distrusting of the
system because the cultural environment places them at a disadvantage over men.551 In
addition, the younger generations were far more likely to trust the President than the
older generations. This is because older generations exhibit concern the new order will
negatively impact their lives, in particular to their pensions as well as benefits for future
generations. Having grown up in Communist political order, they have come to revere the
social aspects of the old order. The younger generations have little to no experience with
the old regime, and as such, they know nothing else except the new order in which they
were socialized into distrusting of the system because the cultural environment places
them at a disadvantage over men.552 Further, those who supported the regime were more
likely to have pro-Western and pro-Democratic attitudes until 2012 at which point the
551William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" Comparative Political
Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.
552Ibid.
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inverse became correct that is distrusting of the system because the cultural environment
places them at a disadvantage over men.553 Given this contextual research, one would
expect to find the same holds true in the current research.
Education. The WVS education question is a 9-level variable ranging form "no formal
education" to "university-level, with degree.?"As before, for the sake of ease, this research
converts this variable to a continuous variable, as the specific levels are not as important
to this research. A general understanding is sufficient here.
The prevailing literature suggests the more education one has, the more likely they are
to trust others, as well as, support democracy.554 This holds true in the post-Communist
context, as well.555 Broad access to education is key. Many of the post-Communist states
have seen a rise in higher education; this is particularly true in post-Communist Russia.
Both education and democratic attitudes have risen together. Further, previous research
suggests the more education one has, the more trusting they are of others.556 This would
be expected to be the case here.
textitGender. The WVS codes gender as a dichotomous variable. This arrangement
will be kept in the current project.
The general literature on trust in relation to democracy reflects women are more trust-
ing and support democracy more than men do and tend to be more politically and civilly
engaged,557; however, other literature contradicts this. 558 Discussions around gender in
the post-Communist setting often are related to cultural socialization,559 however this
is demonstrated in other cultural settings as well.560 In post-Communist states, women
553Ibid.
554 Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tra-
ditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 108-109.; Gabriel A. Almond and
Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1966), 397.
555 Treisman 2017
556 Bo Rothstein, The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in Interna-
tional Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 163.; Bo Rothstein and Eric M.
Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," World Politics 58, no. 01 (2005): ,
doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.
557Ibid.
558Georgina Waylen et al., The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 566-570.
559Katherine Verdery, What was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996), Chapter 3.
560 Almond and Verba The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 397.
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can be more distrusting of the system because the cultural environment places them at
a disadvantage over men. This can lead to gender based distrust in the government and
institutions.561 This research expects to find women are more trusting and supportive of
democracy than men are and less trusting of the state when corruption is high.
Income level. The WVS scales incomes of the respondents on the variable ?income.?
The scale is ranked from 1-10 is an ordinal variable. The respondents are given the
following information and then asked the question : "1 indicates the ’lowest income
decile’ and 10 the ’highest income decile’ in your country. We would like to know in what
group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages,
salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in."562 For the sake of ease, this variable
is transformed to a continuous variable in this research.
Income is a common variable one must account for. The research indicates those who
are not struggling and wishing the higher wage brackets tend to be more trusting of others,
and also tend to find democratic values important.563 Thinking of the region, specifically,
this claim is also generally accepted as being true. Mishler and Rose’s (1997) examination
of Russia concurs, however they note the importance of including other sources of income
are included in the measurement. This particular variable already accounts for such
concerns. Further, Shields work in Poland shows similar results. As income gaps widen
and the amount of poor increases, this leads to a rise in nationalism.564 Countries who
have a shared post-Communist history tend to take income more personally because of
the previous regime’s "cradle to grave" assurance of income and employment. As such,
one would expect those who are doing well will more likely feel democracy is important565
561 Katherine Verdery, What was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996), Chapter 3.
562"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
563Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tra-
ditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 169.; Francis Fukuyama, Trust:
The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1996), 99.
564Shields 2007
565Elena Chebankova, "Public and Private Cycles of Socio-Political Life in Putin’s Russia," Post-
Soviet Affairs 26, no. 2 (2010): , doi:10.2747/1060-586X.26.2.121.; Ksenia Northmore-Ball, "Increasingly
unequal turnout in Eastern European new democracies: Communist and transitional legacies versus new
institutions," Electoral Studies 42 (June 2016): , doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.01.012.
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and extend trust to others566 than those who are struggling under the new regime.
Net usage. The question is asked: "People use different sources to learn what is going
on in their country and the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate
whether you used it last week or did not use it last week to obtain information (read
out and code one answer for each)." The responses are dichotomous: "used last week,"
"not used last week." This structure has also been maintained. New research offer mixed
results. One position posits the more one has access to the internet the less satisfied
they will be with the state of democracy.567 As the internet is more widely accessible,
individuals have greater access to information than ever before. They can reach out and
communicate with others and learn about the state of democracy or level of despotism
in their own country. The other claims Internet usage has increased civic activism and
involvement.568 Indeed computer usage is up in Russia,569 as well as the post-Communist
sphere. This research expects there to be less of an impact on support for democracy dur-
ing Wave 5 and an increased role in Wave 6, corresponding to the increase in percentage
of people using the Internet.
Country-level control: CPI. CPI is ranked on a yearly basis and is a continuous
variable ranging from 0-100 with a score of 0 being "highly corrupt" and a score of 100
being "very clean."570 At the time of Wave 5, the variable was continuous between 1-10,
with the same connotations.571 Each country in each wave was coded with their respective
CPI scores for the years their survey was taken in each wave.
This variable is important if Khodyakov’s (2007) "Strong-Weak State" model is to be
supported. Corruption and inefficiency are expected in this context. It is these expec-
tations this variable will capture. Other research in the post-Communist system offers
566 Khodyakov 2007
567Erik C. Nisbet, Elizabeth Stoycheff, and Katy E. Pearce, "Internet Use and Democratic Demands:
A Multinational, Multilevel Model of Internet Use and Citizen Attitudes About Democracy," Journal of
Communication 62, no. 2 (2012): , doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01627.x.
568Natalia Letki and Geoffry Evans, "Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Eu-
rope," British Journal of Political Science, 2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242.
569Levada Center (2016, 171); "Internet v Rossiya: Dinamika ?proniknoveniya Zima 2015 - 2016. ,"
FOM MEDIA, , accessed May 30, 2017, http://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/12610.
570Transparency International E.V., "How corrupt is your country?" 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index
– Results, , accessed May 30, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results.
571Transparency International E.V., "Transparency International," Research - CPI - Corruption Percep-
tions Index 2008, , accessed May 30, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi2008results.
162
some support. Alena Ledeneva’s work focuses on the importance of informal networks
in the face of an incompetent or corrupt state.572 Indeed, her works, as well as others
suggests corruption is accepted or even preferred as a method of "getting things done"
because the formal channels are inefficient and time consuming.573 However, these works
depart from Khodyakov on the emphasis they pace on generalized trust relations over
particularized. The prevailing literature presupposes the importance of both generalized
trust and institutional performance on social trust, overall. This research will be able to
parse out the causal arrow and expects to find Khodyakov’s case to be upheld with the
new, more dynamic trust variable.
Life Satisfaction In order to measure one’s happiness with their life, the WVS asks
the question: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole
these days?"574 The response in measured on a Likert scale from 1-10 with 1 being the
least satisfaction and 10 being the most satisfaction with one’s life. This arrangement
will be replicated in this research. The literature discusses life satisfaction as having an
important role in determining one’s support for democracy. It is said the happier one
is with their life, they are more likely to live in states with well functioning democratic
institutions, or at the very least, they will be more likely they are to support democracy.
In countries where institutions are not functioning , nor meeting the expectations of the
people, one would expect less life satisfaction, and less support for democracy.575 This
expectation is predicted to be upheld in this research, as well.
Departure from Previous Research.
by focusing solely on one form of trust: generalized trust. The literature claims
that particularized trust can lead to the atomization of society, which is detrimental to
572Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" Social
Research 76, no. 1 (2009): , http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146.
573Marina Zaloznaya, The Politics of Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Transitional Eastern Europe.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 66;115.
574"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
575Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Kligemann, "The theory of human develop-
ment: A cross-cultural analysis.," European Journal of Political Research. 42, no. 3 (May 2003): ,
doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00086.
163
democracy. However, atomization is the absence of trust in others. Particularized trust is
based on trust in people you know. Atomization is the mirror negative of trust. Therefore
conceptualizing a bankruptcy of trust with those who do trust does not follow, logically.
Creating a trust variable that captures the dynamic nature of trust relations is a key
departure.
This research will tackle head on the elusive nature of trust in a manner that will
allow it to be more appropriately measured to reflect as close an proximation to reality as
is possible. This includes the focus of the importance of particularized trust in relation
to a society’s attitudes towards democracy. This project also takes a new approach to
trust by removing "atomized others" and giving them their own category separate from
particularized trusters. Because this research has in mind the potential generalizability
of the trust variable, the measure was constructed carefully to ensure it can be applied
across divergent cases, as well as globally.
Since social trust is seen as the cornerstone to civil society and, in turn, liberal democ-
racy, it is important to have a true understanding of where countries stand on this im-
portant measure. If one aspect of a measure is incorrect, then the final result will be
flawed. A new measure must be created accounting for particularized trust that will be
applicable across other countries making it generalizable. If this can be accomplished,
our previous held views of countries as not being trusting will have to change, and with
it, our attitudes towards them and their prospects for democratization. This research is
an important "first step" in this process.
Challenges.
No research, particularly in the social sciences, is perfect; this project is no exception.
Because of the inherent social nature of the data, it is important to recognize the inevitable
shortcomings of one’s own research and do one’s best to mitigate and account for them.
The first difficulty lies with current and available data to demonstrate the intermediary
link, which has the effect of bridging ethnicities, found in Khodyakov’s (2007) research.
No dataset currently exists which asks the kinds of questions needed to directly measure
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the intermediary variable in informal networks, nor its effect on social trust. As such,
inference is the best one can hope for through the creation of a multidimensional trust
variable that implies a radius of trust that would likely include intermediaries. That is,
by parsing out atomized trusters, who trust no one most or all of the time, this increases
the chances the new generalized and particularized trust levels are able to account for
the potentiality of intermediaries.
Another consideration can be found in the dependent variable. A difficulty with survey
research is the inability of the interviewer to follow up with explanations that are not
already present in the questionnaire.576 This leads to instances where the respondents,
based on either a shared history or experiences, perceives a variable different from other
regions or cases. This is a consideration when thinking about democracy in the region,
particularly in post-Soviet cases, specifically. If one evaluates how they feel about a
concept such as democracy, they may base understanding of it on past experience with
"democracy," or how they were socialized to understand what that word means, both at
home or at school.577 In a perfect world, this variable would have been constructed in
such a way as to be broadly understood and applicable across cases.
This research also had difficulties regarding out-group variables; it would have been
optimal to account for broad out-group questions as previous research suggests high levels
of xenophobia in the region. The question regarding diversity, which is a broad question
capturing feelings regarding out-groups, was not asked across either wave of the WVS.
Other variables related to out-groups such as feelings for immigrants were asked but
too specific to cover such a broad topic. The question was asked "Would not like to
have as neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers."578 For example, in Russia, respondents
were twice as likely to be concerned about homosexuals and three times as likely to be
concerned with drug addicts than with immigrants.579 Because this research has in mind
576 Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qual-
itative and Quantitative Research," American Political Science Review 95, no. 03 (2001): ,
doi:10.1017/s0003055401003100.
577 Ellen Carnaghan, "The Difficulty of Measuring Support for Democracy in a Changing Society:
Evidence from Russia," Democratization 18, no. 3 (2011): , doi:10.1080/13510347.2011.563113.
578"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
579Ibid.
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generalizability, specific questions related to out-group trust had have been omitted from
the RE HLM at this time. Part two of this project examines Russia, deploying an OLS
with the immigrant question and, as we will see in the next chapter, it did not significantly
impact the model over either wave one way or the other. Because the RE HLM is mainly
looking trying to parse out endogeneity, the author felt it was safe to run the RE HLM
without the out-group variables. Moreover, the dynamism found in the new trust variable
implies out-group trust via the generalized trust question, however imperfect.
Finally, it is also important to remember that this data represents only a snapshot in
time per country: the years 2005, 2006, and 2008 captured in Wave 5 and 2011, 2012, 2014
captured in Wave 6. As the WVS includes more waves as time progresses the construct
validity of this research will increase.
Conclusion.
This research seeks to fill gaps in the previous research by creating a more dynamic
trust variable. Though this project is qualitative in nature, because it is seeking to test
the measure in one region, followed by one country, the author sought the middle ground
and took careful consideration in the construction of the variable so it can potentially
be generalizable across divergent cases or globally. This project will overcome issues of
endogeneity by employing a multilevel (RE HLM) model to examine cases in the post-
Communist sphere. Once this is established, the author will look at both waves using an
OLS model to examine the case of Russia more closely. Both models will utilize Bayesian
inference preferable using small n data (as is the case when using the RE HLM), as well
as ensuring the validity of the model, rather than the data. Each of the variables were
given careful consideration and justified appropriately for use in the model.
Further, this chapter discussed how the research will improve on previous understand-
ings of trust because it does a better job capturing the nature of how human beings trust.
It resolves issues surrounding the radius of trust, particularly "narrow trusters," miss-
ing from the prevailing literature with its hyper-focus on generalized trust. While this
research expects similar findings at the generalized trust level, treating particularized
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trusters as they matter for democracy will do much to improve on our understandings of
how it can be used to foster democratic support. It also establishes a separate variable for
atomized trusters to examine the thesis "atomized trusters do not cultivate democratic
attitudes" that exists in the prevailing literature. Finally, issues surrounding the short-
comings of this work have been addressed here. While the challenges are not insignificant,
the author has done as much as possible to mitigate the concerns surrounding insufficient
data, context-specific understandings of democracy, variable omission, and time analysis.
In the end, the research will be
In the next chapter, model results will be presented against the three hypotheses.
First, at the level of the region, the data will demonstrate there is no difference be-
tween generalized and particularized trust. Further, the claim atomized trust is bad for
democratic attitudes is also called into question. Further, the data will also demonstrate
support for the "Strong-Weak State" model proposed by Khodyakov (2007). In other
words, country-level perceptions of corruption have no effect on in the levels of trust in
relation to feelings that democracy is important. The same results will appear on closer
examination of the Russian case, as well.
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Chapter 6:
The Results.
Introduction.
This research has been primarily concerned with the creation of a new trust variable
that is more accurately able to capture the nature of how human beings trust. Further,
because the author is concerned about potential generalizability, this was done with
careful consideration to theory and practice. The result is a multidimensional variable
existing at 3 levels: generalized, particularized, and a new atomized level. This variable
overcomes the critique of the standard and flat hyper focus on generalized trust, and
answers the call of attention to particularized trust put forth by Khodyakov580. The
model to test this variable was also carefully considered. Due to the existing debate in
the literature between culturalists and institutionalists, as well as concerns surrounding
endogeneity this debate elicits, it was determined the use of a Bayesian RE HLM model
would be most appropriate to resolve these concerns 581. Though the factor of time
was not sufficient enough to completely flesh out endogeneity in this project, the model
was created with this in mind as additional research will be needed. Nonetheless, this
project and its results have raised the question of the legitimacy of the insituttionalist
approach as it relates to societal trust, and supports Khodyakov’s (2007) research on the
"Strong-Weak" state and the process of trust.
580Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.
581Daniel Stegmueller, "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Fre-
quentist and Bayesian Approaches," American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (2013): ,
doi:10.1111/ajps.12001.; Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects
Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," Political Science Research and Methods 3,
no. 01 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.;Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A
Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," American Political Science Review 95, no.
03 (2001): , doi:10.1017/s0003055401003100.
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Research Questions.
The examination of the relevant literature exposes 3 main questions this research will
seek to answer: Do the country-level perceptions of corruption present in institutions
have a credible impact on how society trusts one another at the individual level? Is there
any credible difference between particularized trust and generalized trust in relation to
one’s support for democracy? In thinking about atomized others, do they have a credible
negative impact on one’s attitudes towards democracy? Or will Gellner’s suggestion that
atomization can, in some cases, lead to changes towards democracy be upheld?
Hypotheses.
These questions can be answered by considering the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4 Country level corruption will not create a credible negative effect on in-
dividual trust outcomes in light of support for liberal democratic values.
Hypothesis 5 There is no credible difference between those who trust generally and those
who trust particularly in relation to support liberal democracy.
Hypothesis 6 Atomized others have a credible negative impact on democratic attitudes.
The rest of the chapter will proceed as follows: First, a brief description of how the
Bayesian RE HLM was specified for post-Communist states; then the results for Wave
5 will be examined against the hypotheses, followed by Wave 6. Second, an Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) model will be specified for Waves 5 and 6 isolating Russia. These
results will also be discussed in light of the hypotheses. Lastly, the author will provide
concluding thoughts.
The Models.
There were two main types of models designed for the purpose of this research: First,
a Bayesian Random Effects Hierarchical Linear Model (RE HLM)582 was employed to
582The models were estimated using R version 3.4.0 and JAGS version 4.6 on a Mac with OSX version
10.12.5.
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explore the relationship between country-level corruption and trust on respondents’ atti-
tudes towards democracy across Wave 5 & Wave 6 of the WVS. Second, for closer inspec-
tion the data, Russia was isolated; a standard OLS was utilized for both waves for a more
contextual look at the data. 583 The Bayesian RE HLM models were estimated, employ-
ing the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) with random walk Metropolis-Hastings,
assuming normality using uniform priors set to µ 0 and the σ set to .1 as is typical for
such models584. The burnin was set at 100,000 iterations. This means the first 100,000
estimations of the MCMC were tossed out in favor of more reliable estimations during the
sample run. The models were given a sample of 100,000.585 Both models converged and
passed the Gelman and Rubin test, as well as the Geweke test, showing the chains ulti-
mately converged towards a standard distribution.586 In addition, the visual trace plot or
’fuzzy caterpillar’ confirmed proper mixing of the chains and convergence. Heteroskedac-
ity was also checked, as well as the model density plot showing the chains overlapped
appropriately and were indeed properly fitted for both models, and the posterior param-
eters were normally distributed (see diagnostic plots in appendix).
The OLS models were fit assuming normality of the data and the distribution of error
would be random. Diagnostics were performed. The model was check for heteroskedacity
and passed all tests. Further, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests were run to confirm
the results of each run and ANOVA model comparisons were also run as final confirmation
of the results.
583The Bayesian RE HLM models return Fixed Effects and Radom Effects for each country. The results
for Russia return estimates that would be similar to a standard OLS, particularly for the information
gained from the RE/ FE examining trust and corruption on democratic support. These results were
examined and compared to the standard frequentist OLS results and were found to be reliably similar
justifying this approach.
584Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Mod-
els (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 143; 430.
585The models were also tested using a longer burnin and more samples, however this did not improve
the model.
586The result of the Gelman and Rubin test was a rating of ’1’ on all parameters, indicating the models
did not need to be run for additional iterations.
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Bayesian RE HLM examination across post-Communist states. Waves
5 and 6 of the WVS. Effect of group-level variance on individual
feelings of ’Importance of Democracy.’
The results for Waves 5 and 6 can be found in tables 1 and 2. It is important to keep in
mind a few caveats whilst examining these results. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the WVS does not survey the same countries in every wave. This means the sample
space is likely to vary; this is what happened in this research. Wave 5 had Georgia,
Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. 587 Wave 6 saw a repeat of Russia, Poland,
and Ukraine; the countries of Belarus and Slovakia were added to increase the group-
level sample space. Because there is a difference in the sample countries used for each
wave, and to include the passage of time, one would expect the results to perhaps look
different. This also means one must limit possible explanatory language to the countries
covered, though one can make inferences to the region, generally, though again with
caution. 588 Further, because this research is examining two waves only, the author will
caution against making conclusive causal arguments. Further, complicating this matter
is the space of time between waves. There is an average of four to five years between
each country’s new survey. While the ultimate desire of this design is generalizability,
because there are only two waves with years apart between them, this prevented the
author from placing a third level of "time" on the HLM, as this would have further
reduced the space for variation degrading the model. This means it will be difficult to
587Wave 5 also included Serbia and Montenegro, however there were multiple technical issues with this
data. The author contacted the WVS on 3 occasions regarding this and did not hear back. So this data
was not employed here.
588Daniel Stegmueller’s (2013) comprehensive exploration on reliable sample space for HLMs, specifi-
cally, the number of countries required for confidence must be noted here. Stegmueller specifically com-
pared Bayesian vs. frequentist methods in the comparative political science context; his research shows,
while neither method is perfect when the sample space is 5 countries, the Bayesian results will produce
less bias and more reliable credible intervals, while the Maximum Likelihood Estimation approach of the
frequentist method results in "over confidence" and comparatively wider confidence bounds. Another
important note: when an interaction term is introduced, as is the case here, explanatory language must
be qualified still further. Stegmueller also shows that the fixed effects results are reliable -regardless
of group level sample space- because the prior will be overwhelmed by the number of individual data.
While Stegmueller recommends an inverse Wishart prior for low country numbers at the group level,
there is some debate around this topic. As a result, the author chose to utilize uniform priors for the
final results. The author chose to test the robustness of model by adjusting the priors slightly in each
direction as recommended by Gelman (2007, 355), however the results were not substantively changed
by doing so.
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use the WVS for this research moving forward because it will be challenging to track
patterns effectively over time. Optimally, this research might perhaps encourage other
surveys such as the Eurobarometer, who surveys the same countries every year, to begin
asking the particularized trust question. For now, each wave was examined on its own at
the "region" or "country" level.
Bayesian RE HLM Wave 5 World Values Survey results.
Hypothesis 1.
First, examining the 2nd-level variable CPI across the region, we note it has been al-
lowed to vary across countries with trust independently and between levels, as well as to
interact with trust. Allowing "CPI" and "Trust" to interact, one can see there is no signif-
icant impact between the levels of trust and CPI. We can take this to mean corruption has
no credible impact on how people trust in relation to their support for democracy. This
is in direct conflict with the prevailing "top-down" or institutionalists such as Mishler
and Rose 589 or Rothstein and Uslaner 590 which have postulated country-level-corruption
has a credible negative impact on social trust as a whole. Instead, this result does sup-
port Khodyakov’s (2007) "Strong/Weak" state model, as well as Inglehart’sMichael Hout
and Ronald Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and
Political Change in Forty-three Societies," Contemporary Sociology 27, no. 2 (1998): ,
doi:10.2307/2654810. claim that societal trust is not dependent on political trust. As
such, the first hypothesis of this research, which states country-level perceptions of cor-
ruption will have no credible affect on how society trusts one another in relation to their
feelings towards democracy, has been supported. The data above clearly shows that feel-
ings government corruption and feelings of societal trust overall are largely independent
effects. In this wave, all three levels of trust can operate exclusively from CPI. A person
can feel deeply their country is corrupt but still have faith in one another.
589William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" Comparative Political
Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.
590Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," World
Politics 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.
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Table 2: Model 1: Wave 5 of the WVS. Bayesian RE HLM.
Posterior Mean HPDI, Lower HPDI, Higher
(Intercept) 2.32905 -2.781 7.408
Particularized Trusters 2.63002 -5.357 4.955
Other Trusters -0.51286 -5.657 4.599
Perceptions of Corruption 1.59379 0.054 3.120 ∗
Particularized:CPI -0.04556 -1.603 1.518
Other:CPI -0.03126 -1.564 1.510
PRE .19 heightM = 5
∗ credible parameters in which 95% of the data is on the same side of zero.
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
One can see "Perceptions of Corruption" on its own does not have the Highest Pos-
terior Density Interval (HPDI) values. This is similar to the frequentist "Confidence
Interval." However the HPDI is a collection of the most reliable values of given parame-
ters; that is, values that fall outside of the HPDI are given less credence. Specifically, the
HPDI is the space which includes 95% of the posterior density. 591 that span zero. This
means CPI does have an effect on how people perceive the importance of democracy;
given there is 0.98% of the data above the mean, this suggests CPI is important to the
model and has a credible impact on the y-axis. More specifically, a one unit increase in
CPI increases the average level of feelings about democracy in the country by ∼ 1.59
points with trust held constant. 592 In short, the less corrupt a state is perceived to be,
the more the respondents feel democracy matters.
Hypothesis 2.
Examining the group-level variable "Trust", one notes HPDI spans a space which
covers 0 form ∼ −5.275 to ∼ 4.854; this means the levels of trust are not credibly dif-
ferent from one another across the region. When "Perceptions of Corruption" (CPI) is
set to zero, particularized trusters show an average deflection away generalized trusters
591John K. Kruschke, "Doing Bayesian Data Analysis," Why to use highest den-
sity intervals instead of equal tailed intervals, April 16, 2012, accessed June 20, 2017,
http://doingbayesiandataanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/04/why-to-use-highest-density-intervals.html.
592Recall, CPI is measured on a scale of 1-100 with 1 being the most corrupt and 100 being the least
corrupt (or "very clean"). The results are scaled 1:10 so the variable ranges 1-10 with 10 being the least
corrupt. (Transparency International 2017)
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of ∼ 0.08 in their feelings of the importance of democracy, however because the HPDI
spans values of zero from ∼ −5.357 to ∼ 4.955, we cannot confirm the decrease is reliable
across the region. We also see a similar increase of ∼ 0.09 between other trusters and
particularized trusters, however this increase is also not reliable. In other words, at the
group level, while trust remains important, the kinds of trust are not. These findings sup-
port the second hypothesis; there is no reliable difference between particularized trusters
and generalized trusters and how they feel about democracy. Hypothesis 2 is upheld for
Wave 5 in the region.
Hypothesis 3.
The results for other trusters return values that span zero. As such, the third hy-
pothesis is not upheld. Other trusters are not reliably different overall in the region, nor
do they have a credible negative impact, on average, on how one feels about democracy
across the region. Both of these findings differ from the accepted view from Granovet-
ter (1973), Putnam (1995, 1998, 2001, etc.), Fukuyama (1995, 2000, etc.) and others,
that particularized trusters, as well as atomized trusters, are detrimental to democracy,
because they will be less supportive of democratic institutions or attitudes.
Bayesian RE HLM Wave 6 World Values survey results.
Hypothesis 1.
Again, the country level variable CPI was chosen to see if adding the additional
second level would erode individual level of societal trust across the region. Just as
before, the credible intervals for trust and the interaction with CPI indicates there are
no reliable intervals which do not cover zero. As such, we can again note there is no
credible difference between the levels of trust in relation to support for democracy when
controlling for perceptions of corruption at the country level. The finding in Wave 6, as
in Wave 5, supports H1, contradicting the institutionalist approach claiming the reverse.
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Table 3: Model 2: Wave6 of the WVS. Bayesian RE HLM.
Posterior Mean HPDI, Lower HPDI, Higher
(Intercept) 3.04487 -3.184 7.248
Particularized Trusters 0.11979 -5.360 5.177
Other Trusters 0.09133 -5.227 5.322
Perceptions of Corruption 1.12430 0.065 3.155 ∗
Particularized:CPI -0.05255 -1.636 1.445
Other:CPI -0.04620 -1.688 1.419
PRE .21 M = 5
∗ credible parameters in which 95% of the data is on the same side of zero.
CPI
More specifically, a one unit increase in CPI increases the average level of feelings
about democracy in the country by ∼ 1.59 points with trust held constant. 593 In short,
the less corrupt a state is perceived to be, the more the respondents feel democracy mat-
ters. This model clearly mirrors the outcomes of Model 1 Wave 5. The Bayesian results
for Wave 6 reflects there is a reliable effect of Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) on respondents feelings about democracy when trust was set
to zero. One could expect an average of ∼ 1.124 increase on the y-axis for every one
unit increase on CPI. This means there is an inverse relationship between "CPI" and
"Importance of Democracy". The less corrupt a country is perceived to be, the more
important one feels democracy is across the region for Wave 6. This result was a given.
Hypothesis 2.
Looking at the variable "Trust" at the group level, one notes there is no credible
difference between the levels of trust on average across the region when controlled for
at the country level via "CPI" set to zero. There is an average ∼ 0.12 increase over
the reference category "generalized trusters "on the y-axis "importance of democracy"
however this was not reliable given the HPDI spans values of zero ranging from ∼ −5.360
to ∼ 5.177. This finding again supports the author’s second hypothesis which states
593Recall, CPI is measured on a scale of 1-100 with 1 being the most corrupt and 100 being the least
corrupt (or "very clean"). The results are scaled 1:10 so the variable ranges 1-10 with 10 being the least
corrupt. (Transparency International 2017)
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there is no credible difference between generalized trusters and particularized trusters in
relation to their support for democracy.
Hypothesis 3.
The same occurs with "other trusters"; there is a ∼ 0.091 increase over the reference
category, however this result also covers zero with an HPDI of ∼ 5.227 to ∼ 5.322. This
indicated there is no support for the third hypothesis for Wave 6, as well. This means
that, on the whole, while trust matters to the model, the levels between them do not
matter across the region.
Bayesian Model Summaries.
The Proportional Reduction of Error (PRE) was estimated to capture the variation
the model represents over the null. In particular for categorical models, this measure
informs the researcher how much this model improves our knowledge of some phenomena
over knowing nothing. The PRE has an upper bound of 1, however its lower bound;
values could come in below zero indicating the model is actually worse than knowing
nothing at all. In short, this measure is very similar to a typical R2. For Wave 5, one
notes the PRE is .19 meaning the model seems to capture a possible 19% of variance. For
Wave 6, we see the PRE is .21, again, meaning the model has potentially captured 21%
of the variance present. We also note that all 3 Hypotheses were upheld at the region
level.
Pooled OLS Model: Russia Waves 5 and 6.
As stated before, by the nature of how the Bayesian RE HLM is constructed, not only
does the model return the group level variance, it also returns the individual country fixed
effects. In other words, the lower level fixed effects (FE) reports for trust and corruption
are effectively OLS models for each country holding all other variables at a pooled group
constant. Examining all of the effects for trust and corruption in each country is beyond
the scope of this particular work. However, the effective Bayesian FE results for Russia
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are checked against the frequentist results, because uniform priors were deployed, and
found to be reliably similar. Now we can examine the OLS for Russia to gain a more
contextualized understanding of how the new trust level will operate in for Wave 5 with
the appropriate controls. Here, the author has chosen Russia to test the "Strong Weak
State" model and because of its ranking as a historically low-trusting society. Further,
because of its history of dominance in the region under the USSR and as the source of
Soviet socialization, the effects may still linger strongest there. Just as before, Wave 5 will
be examined, followed by Wave 6. Further, at this level, CPI was lost and replaced with
"trust in government", which is generally seen as similar to perceptions of corruption.594
OLS examination Model 1 WVS Wave 5 Results for Russia 2005.
Before examining the Russian case, the author constructed a table to determine the
number of ’trusters’ in each category for Russia; this was compared to the prevailing
measure of trust: the WVS’s generalized trust question. They were as follows for Wave
5:
Table 4: Russia 2005. Number of Trusters with new Trust Variable.
Particularized 1064
Generalized 104
Other 190
n=1358
Table 5: Russia, 2005. Generalized Trusters. Standard WVS measures.
Trust completely. Can’t be too careful.
Generalized 352 1006
n=1358
Examining the WVS standard measure (Table 4), one sees 35% of the respondents
who answered this question affirmed they "trust completely" the people they do not know,
while the remainder 63.5% claimed one "can’t be too careful". The new trust measure
594Luigi Manzetti and Carole J. Wilson, "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?"
Corruption and Democracy in Latin America, August 2007, , doi:10.2307/j.ctt9qh6n2.7.
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shows ∼ 0.08% of the respondents were placed in the new generalized trust category,
∼ 79% are in the particularized trust category, while ∼ 14% are in the newly created
"other" category. The reduction of generalized trusters is expected here; this is because
of the higher criteria placed on generalized trusters in the new variable. "Generalized
trusters" now include not only those who ’trust completely’ the people they do not know,
but also ’trust completely’ the people they do know. This construction resolves the ’radius
of trust’ concerns discussed by Fukuyama (2005). Further, the multidimensionality of the
trust variable overall will more accurately reflect how people trust in any given nation.
Now, we can investigate the Fixed Effects pooled model for Russia.
Table 6: OLS WVS Wave 5 Russia 2005. Effects of Trust and Government Trust on
Democracy.
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 7.396731 0.893201 8.281 < 2e− 16∗
Particular Trust -1.402886 0.629863 -2.227 0.0261∗
Other Trust 0.901628 0.785842 -1.147 0.2514
Government Trust 0.357400 0.234072 -1.527 0.1270
Life Satisfaction 0.162540 0.030286 5.367 9.38e-08 ∗
Age -0.007917 0.004703 -1.683 0.0925.
Females 0.265323 0.144723 1.833 0.06697
Education 0.082369 0.041884 1.967 0.04943.
Income 0.003307 0.032898 0.101 0.91995
Internet 0.050870 0.195012 0.261 0.79424
Immigrants 0.050870 0.195012 0.261 0.79424
Particular Trust:Gov 0.347850 0.247663 1.405 0.16038
Other Trust:Gov 0.060336 0.294000 0.205 0.83743
N 1385
adj. R2 0.03772
Mult. R2 0.04594
p-value 2.023e-09
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Hypothesis 1.
In order to address H1 in the Russian context, the author fitted a standard Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) model for Russia and did a partial comparison to the Bayesian RE
HLM’s random effects with Russia(Table 5). The results were the same, as expected.
Examining first the interaction the coefficients were estimates of β unit increases or
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decreases of the interaction of "Trust" and "Government Trust", in relation to attitudes
towards democracy while all others held constant. The Intercept relates to the position of
"Generalized Trust" on "Importance of Democracy". While the results show and increase
of ∼ 0.34 over the reference interaction of government confidence and generalized trust,
it was not found to be significant. The same holds true for the interaction of government
trust and other trusters when compared to the reference category. Overall, there is no
significant interplay between the levels of social trust and government level corruption on
individual level feelings of trust and importance of democracy in either the OLS here, nor
at the group level or between states. In short, both parameters have independent effects
on how one supports democracy. This finding contradicts the literature, particularly from
the instrumentalists who find negative feelings about the state will lead to a degradation
of trust at the individual level, especially generalized trust (Rothstein 2011, Mishler
and Rose 2001). It could be the multidimensionality of the new trust variable provides
enough context to account for this difference since atomized trusters were extracted from
the particularized trusters. 595
Trust in Government: In Nation’s Capital.
"Trust in Government", recall, is a variable taken from the WVS survey. It is a 4 level
categorical variable where a score of 1 means "trust completely" and a score of 4 means
"no trust at all". In order to put this variable in context and to compare results across
waves, the author felt it would be appropriate to include the descriptive statistics for this
variable. We notice 46% or Russians indicate they completely trust or somewhat trust
the government, while 54% say they have little to no trust at all in the government. So
it seems Russian society is fairly split on their feelings of trust for those in the Kremlin.
In Table 5 with the interaction, the variable is not significant with an α 0.127. How-
ever, when the interaction is removed, this changes. Referring to Table 6, how one trusts
595An Analysis of Variance (anova() in R) was run on the frequentist models confirming the interaction
was not significant. Another model was fitted without the interaction and there was no substantive
difference on the outcome of the variables between the model with the interaction and the model with
out. The R package ’sjPlot’ was used for visual confirmation, as well. These diagnostics can be found in
the appendix
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Table 7: Russia, 2005. Trust in Government: In the Nation’s Capital. WVS Wave 5
Trust completely. Trust Somewhat. Distrust Somewhat. No Trust At All.
0.05% 0.41% 0.36% 0.18%
n=1385
their government shows to be a significant factor in this model, however this is an inde-
pendent effect when holding all others constant. For every single β increase in feelings
of government distrust, one can expect an average decrease of ∼ 0.13 in individual atti-
tudes towards democratic importance. In other words, the more trustworthy the Russian
government is perceived to be, the less important individuals feel democracy is.
Table 8: Simplified Model Wave 5 Without Interaction, Russia 2005
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 7.963098 0.708239 11.244 < 2e− 16 ∗
Particular Trust -0.902604 0.267855 -3.370 0.000773*
Other Trust -1.130256 0.319491 -3.538 0.000417 ∗
Life Satisfaction 0.164645 0.030266 5.440 6.29e-08 ∗
Government Trust -0.132688 0.066375 -1.999 0.04580 ∗
Age -0.007779 0.004703 -1.654 0.09834
Female 0.228869 0.143784 1.592 0.11167
Education 0.087610 0.041577 2.107 0.03528 ∗
Income -0.031138 0.033265 -0.936 0.34940
Immigrants 0.033695 0.152399 0.221 0.82505
Internet 0.074351 0.193529 0.384 0.70090
N 1385
adj. R2 0.03715
Mult. R2 0.04401
p-value 1.01e-09
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Model Summaries.
This multivariate linear regression with interaction for Russia in the year 2006 pro-
vided similar results as the Bayesian RE HLM which was largely expected. The interac-
tion model only accounts for ∼ 0.038 of the variance, and the reduced model accounts
for ∼ 0.037 of that model’s variance however this was expected. The aim of this research
was not to solve what accounts for democracy but to test hypotheses related to trust
and democratic support, which required an attitudinal variable related to democracy be
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the model response. An Analysis of Variance (anova() in R) was run on this model to
determine which variables were important to this model. The anova confirmed the in-
teraction was not significant. A model was fitted without the interaction and there was
no substantive difference on the outcome of the variables between the model with the
interaction and the model with out. The model with the interaction showed an adjusted
R2 0.038 and the model without showed an adjusted R2 0.037. Another anova was run
comparing both models together and found there was no substantive difference between
the model with the interaction and the model without the interaction. As such, the
simplified model was chosen.The OLS models were also checked for heteroskedacity and
passed. The results of these tests can be found in the Appendix.
Hypothesis 2.
Now examining the simplified model (Table 7), one notes generalized trusters feel
democracy is important at an 7.96 on a scale of 1-10, holding all other variables at their
constant value. There is a -0.73 decrease between particularized trusters and general-
ized trusters and their feelings that democracy is important; this difference is shown to
be significant. Further, examining the effects plot visualizing social trust on democratic
attitudes, we see that particularized trusters are effectively closer to other trusters, con-
firming this result. This means there is a credible difference between the two levels and
the difference is negative. Therefore, this result does not support H2 for Russia in 2006.
Hypothesis 3.
The third level of trust known as ’other trusters’, correlates to ’atomized’ in the lit-
erature (Putnam 1995, Fukuyama 1995). This group has a significant ∼ −0.92 negative
deflection from generalized trust on the dependent variable. This is an expected effect.
Therefore, H3 is upheld showing atomized others have a credible negative impact on
how one feels about democracy in Russia for the year 2006. Plotting the results yields
additional insight. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the drop between generalized and partic-
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ularized trusters becomes more clear, as do the similarities between the particularized
trusters and other trusters.
The effects plot for trust shows particularized trusters support democracy with a
ranking of ∼ 7.45 and generalized trusters feelings of the importance of democracy with
a ranking of ∼ 8.3. However, there is no substantive difference between the two. We also
see the atomized ’other’ category comes in at a rank around ∼ 7.25 Overall, the author
discovered it does not matter which type of truster you are (generalized or particularized),
your impact on support for democracy is statistically the same. This is in direct conflict
with the predominate theories of trust.
Substantive Effects: Controls.
Life Satisfaction The results show for every β unit increase in feelings of satisfaction
with one’s life, we can expect a ∼ 0.16 increase in feelings democracy is important.
This results was expected and conforms with the literature.596 Education For every β
increase in educational attainment, one’s feelings towards democracy also improved by
0.088. The more education one has the more likely they are to support democracy. This
was an expected effect.597
Other Controls.
Age Age also seems to significantly influence one’s feelings about democracy. There
is an approximate drop of ∼ 0.002 in how one feels about democracy in Russia for
every β increase of age with all others held at their constant. This means as Russians
gain another year, their feelings about democracy decrease. This was expected and is
supported by the current literature, particularly Mishler and Rose (2001) who found the
same results. However, it was not significant in this research. Gender We notice females
are approximately 0.23 more likely to support democracy with a ranking of 7.45 than
596William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democ-
racy in Post-Communist Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28, no. 4 (1996): ,
doi:10.1177/0010414096028004003.
597Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tra-
ditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 113-114.
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Figure 3: Effects Plot: Social Trust on Democratic Attitudes, Russia 2006.
males in the year 2005. Given the general literature on gender which is mixed, this is an
interesting finding. Income. Relating to income, the effects across income was found not
to be significant. There is very little difference between those who are the least happy with
their income levels over those who are happiest with their income; the effects is nearly
flat. In other words, income has nothing to do with how one feels about democracy
in Russia, a finding which contradicts the literature.598 Immigrants. The author was
unable to include variables related to xenophobia the the region level because they were
not uniformly asked in each wave. However since the question was asked for Russia, it
was decided to run a model to include the immigrant question. One finds those who are
accepting having immigrants as neighbors see an expected ∼ 0.03 increase in support for
democracy folding all other variables at their constant, however this was surprisingly not
significant.This seems to also contradict literature which suggests xenophobia negatively
impacts both trust and support for democracy in Russia 599 Internet Internet usage was
598William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" Comparative Political
Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.
599Sten Berglund, Challenges to Democracy: Eastern Europe Ten Years After the Collapse of
Communism (Cheltenham, GB: Edward Elgar, 2002).; Donna Bahry et al., "Ethnicity and Trust:
Evidence from Russia," The American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (November 2005): ,
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/30038962.). In order to verify this somewhat surpris-
ing find, the author ran another model which included the interaction of trust and immigrant attitudes
and found the relationship was also not significant. An anova was run to confirm these results, and the
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also not found to be particularly interesting. Though this was not entirely unexpected
given the year; Russians overall did not gain most of their information from the Internet
in 2005. One might expect these results to look a little different in 2011 during Wave
6, however not significantly. The more interesting effects might not be seen until waves
covering 2016 and beyond given the recent increases in Internet usage as a tool for news
consumption. 600
OLS Model 2 WVS 2011 Wave 6 Results for Russia.
As before the trust variable was looked at in more detail for the Russia OLS mode
for Wave 6. This table will give us and idea of the number of ’trusters’ in each category
and comparing these results to the prevailing measure of trust: the WVS’s generalized
trust question. They were as follows for Wave 6:
Table 9: Russia, WVS 2011 Wave 6. Types of Trusters: New trust Variable.
Particularized 682
Generalized 76
Other 109
n=867
Table 10: Russia, 2011. Generalized Trusters. Standard WVS measures.
Trust completely. Can’t be too careful.
Generalized 266 601
n=867
As before there is an expected drop in those who now meet the criterion for generalized
trusters, since it now also includes the subset of those who also trust those they do not
know all the time. For the standard WVS measure (Table 8), we see∼ 31% of respondents
who answered this question were labeled as generalized trusters; the remainder would be
labeled as particularized trusters with the potentiality to be atomizing. With the new
measure (Table 7), of those who answered the trust questions, only ∼ 9% were considered
to be generalized trusters, ∼ 77% are now considered particularized trusters, while ∼ 13%
finding was upheld, as well.
600Levada Center 2016, 171
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now fall in the newly created "other" category. Others are those who have little to no
trust in anyone whether they know them or not. These percentages are essentially the
same as found in Wave 5.
Table 11: OLS WVS Wave 6 Russia 2011. Effects of Trust and Government Trust on
Democracy.
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 7.333267 1.036416 7.076 3.11e-12 ∗
Particular Trust -1.286484 0.818906 -1.571 0.1166
Other Trust -1.494040 1.083571 -1.379 0.1683
Government Corruption -0.522857 0.311167 -1.680 0.0933∗
Life Satisfaction 0.100327 0.043078 2.329 0.0201 ∗
Age 0.008267 0.006373 1.297 0.1949
Females 0.304832 0.161199 1.891 0.0590.
Education 0.078341 0.044720 1.752 0.0802 .
Income -0.033856 0.050277 -0.673 0.5009
Immigrants -0.123097 0.168384 -0.731 0.4649
Internet 0.034326 0.183378 0.187 0.8516
Particular Trust:Gov 0.480527 0.327620 1.467 0.1428
Other Trust:Gov 0.283372 0.403685 0.702 0.4829
N 867
adj. R2 0.02184
Mult. R2 0.03545
p-value 0.002067
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Hypothesis 1.
Just as before the interaction (Table 9) was looked at in order to assess H1. Again,
as in Wave 5, we note there is no significant relationship between trust and government
perceived corruption in Russia during Wave 6 interviews. This seems to suggest, as in
the more complex model examining the region, how one feels about their government, no
matter how negative, this will not impact individual levels of trust, overall.
Model Summaries
This multivariate linear regression with interaction for Russia in the year 2011 pro-
vided similar results as the Bayesian RE HLM which was largely expected. The interac-
tion model only accounts for ∼ 0.022 of the variance, and the reduced model accounts
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for ∼ 0.021 of that model’s variance however this was expected. The aim of this research
was not to solve what accounts for democracy but to test hypotheses related to trust
and democratic support, which required an attitudinal variable related to democracy be
the model response. An Analysis of Variance (anova() in R) was run on this model to
determine which variables were important to this model. The anova confirmed the in-
teraction was not significant. A model was fitted without the interaction and there was
no substantive difference on the outcome of the variables between the model with the
interaction and the model with out. The model with the interaction showed an adjusted
R2 0.022 and the model without showed an adjusted R2 0.021. Another anova was run
comparing both models together indicating the interaction was not. The OLS models
were also checked for heteroskedacity and passed. The results of these tests can be found
in the Appendix.
Trust in Government: In the Nation’s Capital.
Examining the descriptive statistics, one notes a slight change in feelings of govern-
mental trust. Comparing these results to Wave 5, one notes a slight 1% increase in those
who indicate they have complete trust in the government while there is also a slight
3%increase in those who claim they have no trust at all. Substantively, these numbers
have changed very little.
Table 12: Russia, 2011. Trust in Government: In the Nation’s Capital. WVS Wave 6
Trust completely. Trust Somewhat Distrust Somewhat. No Trust At All.
0.06% 0.41% 0.33% 0.20%
n=867
Looking at government perception of corruption (Table 12), one sees for every β
increase of government trust, which indicates reduced trust, we see a decrease of −0.12 in
feelings democracy is important. In other words, the less one can trust their government,
the less support they have for democracy. However, this effect is no longer significant
to the model in Russia for the year 2011. We also see no other control parameters
significantly effect the model, as well.
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Table 13: Simplified Model Wave 6 Without Interaction, Russia 2011
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 6.386285 0.785931 8.126 < 1.56e− 15 ∗
Particular Trust 0.164866 0.284362 -0.580 0.5622
Other Trust -0.912582 0.355294 -2.569 0.0104∗
Government Trust -0.110388 0.093931 -1.175 0.2402
Life Satisfaction 0.098890 0.043078 2.296 0.0219 ∗
Age 0.008269 0.006374 1.297 0.1949
Female 0.301827 0.161149 1.873 0.0614 .
Education 0.079470 0.044699 1.778 0.0758 .
Income -0.033072 0.050260 -0.658 0.5107
Internet 0.044213 0.183326 0.241 0.8095
Immigrants -0.122537 0.168421 -0.728 0.4671
N 867
adj. R2 0.02133
Mult. R2 0.03268
p-value 0.001532
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Hypothesis 2.
Next we will look at the simplified OLS model for Wave 6 (Table 10). One will note
immediately particularized trusters are now no longer significantly different from gen-
eralized trusters on the y-axis. While there is a -0.16 deflection away from generalized
trusters, they are considered statistically the same in Russia this wave. This supports H2
which states there is no significant difference between generalized trusters and particu-
larized trusters when considering how important they feel democracy is. This contradicts
the literature on particularized trusters. (Putnam 1995, 2000; Fukuyama 1995). This
research finds there is no significant difference between those who trust generally and
those who trust particularly for Russia in 2011.
Hypothesis 3.
Other trusters preformed as expected for this wave. For every β increase on related
to government trust, which a greater mistrust, we see a decrease of −0.91 in feelings
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democracy is important. This supports the third hypothesis and supports, generally, the
understanding of atomized trusters int he literature.601Being and atomized truster has a
credibly negative impact on who one supports democracy. We also see no other control
parameters significantly effect the model, as well. Examining the effects plot (Figure 4)
highlights this difference.
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Figure 4: Effects Plot: Social Trust on Democratic Attitudes, Russia 2011
Substantive Effects: Controls.
Life Satisfaction The repeat of life satisfaction playing a significant role in this model
was expected. For every β increase of satisfaction, one should expect an increase of
democratic feelings of ∼ 0.09. This result conforms with the literature.602
Other Controls.
Age the results show for every β increase in age, one might expect an increase of
∼ 0.006 in positive feelings about democracy while holding all others at their mean or
0, however this was not a significant effect for this wave. Gender While a person’s sex
seems to have some impact, females supporting democracy at a ∼ 0.29 increase over men,
601Putnam; Fukuyama; Uslaner; Mishler and Rose
602Putnam; Fukuyama; Mishler
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it was not found to meet the α of 0.05% threshold. This is not entirely unexpected as
the literature can be mixed on this issue. 603 Income There is little evidence income
levels drive support for democracy itself, particularly in the region. So this outcome was
expected. 604 Internet As discussed with the last model, Internet usage was not expected
to have a significant impact at this stage and was largely included as a possible "rising
star" of indicators to be on the lookout for, given the rise of Internet usage as a source
of information in recent years in Russia. This will be covered in more detail in the next
chapter. Immigrants Again, not wanting to have immigrants as neighbors was not found
to be a significant factor for how one supports democracy while holding all other variables
at their constant. This result matches the last wave in this regard. And is still somewhat
surprising given Russia’s reputation as being a xenophobic country.605
Conclusion.
The purpose of this chapter was to test the hypotheses against the prevailing literature.H1
postulated there would be no credible impact of institutional level perception of govern-
ment corruption on individual level trust and how important one feels democracy is. At
the 2nd level of analysis is it clear: concerns around institutional corruption have no
impact on how society trusts one another when individuals examine the importance of
democracy in their lives. This was repeated when we looked at Russia, specifically. In
each Wave the interaction bore not fruit, supporting H1. Instead, the data demonstrate,
at both the region level, as well as in Russia when isolated, how one feels about their
governments and how they trust act wholly independent of one another on the y-axis.
Further, while CPI and government trust do have a credible impact on how respondents
felt about democracy, the effects were different when looking ta the region overall vs
Russia isolated. We noticed in the region the less corrupt a country was perceived to be,
on average one would expect and increase in the feelings of democracy on each country.
603Georgina Waylen et al., The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 566-570.
604Daron Acemoglu et al., "From Education to Democracy?" AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 95,
no. 2 (May 2005): , doi:10.1257/000282805774669916.
605Donna Bahry et al., "Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia," The American Political Science
Review 99, no. 4 (November 2005): , http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/30038962.
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In Russia the same results held were discovered however, this effect was only significant
in Wave 5. Looking at H2, we noticed in the region, this was largely supported; there
was no credible difference between the particularized trusters and generalized trusters on
average for each country in each of the two WVS waves. H2 was supported at the region
level. However, we noted for Wave 5 in Russia, particularized trusters were significantly
different in Wave 5, in contradiction with H2. This was not repeated in Wave 6, however
and H2 was supported in Russia for 2011. Looking at the region, for both Waves 5 and
6, other trusters were seen to have no credible difference from generalized trusters in
contradiction to the literature, as well as H3. However wen looking at Russia isolated
from the group, other trusters had a negative impact indirectly in Wave 5 and a direct
negative impact in Wave 6, supporting H3 which sats other trusters will have a credible
negative impact on how respondents feel about democracy.
Because of the unique challenges presented here, the author cautions from making
any generalizable or causal claims. The WVS measure countries every four to five years
meaning there is a significant space of time not accounted for. This makes difficult the
measurement of differences between waves. It would have been preferable to have a survey
which asks the particularized question every year, however no such survey exists. It is
the hope of this work to encourage survey outfits to include this question every year. For
now, the author can only report two snapshots on time for waves 5 and 6 in the region
and in Russia, specifically.
The next chapter will be a discussion of the results found here. The author will explore
possible explanations for these results, as well as their implications. Also, suggestions for
future research will be examined.
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Chapter 7:
Discussion and Conclusion.
Introduction.
The purpose of this research was to create a new multidimensional trust variable that
would more adequately reflect how human beings trust. Prevailing research has proven
inadequate in this arena due to its reliance on aggregate data that offers little to no
individual context 606 on a unidimensional variable (generalized trust only). As such, it
fails to capture the true way in which human beings trust. 607 The author chose the
case of the former USSR in order to test the "Strong-Weak State" model as proposed by
Khodyakov’s (2007) research. Khodyakov’s asserts the shared history of Communist rule
has left a mark on how individuals trust one another due to experiences with ineffective
institutions. For the region, a Bayesian RE HLM was administered for both waves to
address issues around endogeneity. Next, the case of Russia was isolated for both waves in
order to look at a single case in more detail. The results in both cases yielded interesting
results that seem to favor the "Strong-Weak" state model and the potential value of
particularized trust, however additional research will be required.
606Natalia Letki and Geoffry Evans, "Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Eu-
rope," British Journal of Political Science, 2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242.;
Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," World Politics
58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.;James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and
the Prospects for Consolidating Russias Democratic Transition," American Journal of Political Science
45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.
607Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.;James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for
Consolidating Russias Democratic Transition," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001):
, doi:10.2307/2669359.
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This chapter continue as follows: First, the author will discuss the implications of this
research first in the region, followed by Russia specifically. Next, the overall importance
of the findings will be examined. This will be followed by an exploration of likely next
steps for this particular research, as well as suggestions for how this variable might be
utilized in the future. Finally, the author will close with a summation of this project and
concluding thoughts.
Discussion.
This section will offer context for the results themselves. First, the region results
will be examined in light of the literature and political realities for both waves. Table 1
helps to provide context to the scores and results. Then, we will take a closer look at
the findings in the Russian case for 2005 and 2011. This section as a whole will help us
gain an overall understanding why this research is important, as well as provide clues for
future research. These were the hypothesis tested for this research.
Hypothesis 7 H1 Country level corruption will not create a credible negative effect on
individual trust outcomes in light of support for liberal democratic values.
Hypothesis 8 H2 There is no credible difference between those who trust generally and
those who trust particularly in relation to support liberal democracy.
Hypothesis 9 H3 Atomized others have a credible negative impact on democratic atti-
tudes.
Region Discussion.
Hypothesis 1.
H1 is upheld for both waves calling into question the findings of the instrumentalists
608 who believe perceptions of corruption negatively impact interpersonal trust by degrad-
ing generalized trust and strengthening particularized trust, which they believe atomizing
608William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" Comparative Political
Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002. ; Mishler and Rose 2001
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and having negative impacts on democratic support. Removing atomized trusters and
providing them their own category may have had an effect on the results for the region.
The results for both waves returned non-credible results for the interaction of CPI and
all levels of trust, supporting Khodyakov’s (2007) findings and the "Strong-Weak State
Model". This theory asserted that, under Communist or Soviet control, individuals saw
the state as both strong and weak at the same time. The state was seen as strong because
it reliably provided some political goods to the people. For example, education was free
at all levels and seen as highly effective. Indeed, Soviet k-12 education was believed to
be one of the best in the world. Another example would be the state’s ability to provide
universal healthcare. While the Soviet healthcare system was far form perfect, it was
accessible to everyone. Yet still further, the state was believed to be strong from the
vantage point of international relations. The geopolitical importance of the USSR was
unquestioned, globally as it was seen as 1/2 of the two global super powers.609 Conversely,
the state was also seen as weak, for its inability to consistently provide needed political
goods, such as food, nor were they able to consistently increase the standard of living.
This state of affairs was accepted as a given forcing those in society, not to turn on one
another as the prevailing literature might suggest but instead, to turn to one another in
order to obtain necessities to survive, obtain ’luxury’ items, or simply to just ’get things
done’.610 The system was seen as binary: it was we the people and they the bureau-
cracy. And there was no way we could act as a check against them. 611 Thus, informal
institutions of blat’ and krugovaya poruka were deployed; these relied on a vast social
network of friends and family, and relied heavily on intermediaries acting as key links to
other networks including those from out-groups. 612 Attitudes, overall, in the region are
609Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285
610Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" Social
Research 76, no. 1 (2009): , http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146. ;Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a
Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285;
611Barbara Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies: the Search for the Bases of Social Order (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1996), 251.
612Onoshchenko and Williams 2016, 2013; Huseyn Aliyev, "Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat
in the South Caucasus," Demokratizatsiya 21, no. 1 (2013):.; Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat":
Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" Social Research 76, no. 1 (2009): ; Dmitry Khodyakov,
"Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285
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resistant to government institutions related to high levels of perceived corruption. This
holds true even in states where democracy is objectively present and thriving such as
Poland, accounted for in both waves of this research, suggesting perhaps cultural, social,
or other latent factors are at play (see Table 1, particularly ’06 results).613
After the fall of the USSR, the lingering distrust of the system was temporarily sus-
pended with the hope of change to a more effective and less corrupt form of governance:
democracy. This is especially true in the Visegrad countries of Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Visegrad states shed themselves of all vestiges of
Communism as quickly as possible after the fall 614, swiftly adopting more liberal eco-
nomic and political reforms, and were accepted into the EU rather directly615. Russia,
Belarus, and Ukraine, all former Soviet Republics, are part of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. (CIS); 616 Russia and Belarus have not faired as well towards democratic
development after the fall, with Russia consistently sliding backwards, and Ukraine has
been met with mixed results.617 Nonetheless, the process of trust resulted in the soci-
eties in these states assimilating what had been learned while interacting with their new
respective regimes; as such this hope turned to apathy as expectations in each individual
society were not met.618
613Mishler and Rose 1997. The authors suggest there could be more than post-Communist legacies
at play and include the possibility of country-specific influences, as well. Though their research finds
cultural considerations play a minor role, institutional performance has the largest impact –citizens
evaluate institutional performance by overall economic considerations.
614M. Steven Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-communist World.," East
European Politics and Societies. 12, no. 1 (December 1997): , doi:10.1177/0888325498012001002.
615 Wilhelmus Antonius Arts and Loek Halman, Loek Halman and Arts, "(Post-)modernization, Indi-
vidualization And Individualism: Value Changes In Central And Eastern Europe In The First Decade
After The Fall Of The Iron Curtain Advanced Search button for Search (Post-)modernization, Individu-
alization And Individualism: Value Changes In Central And Eastern Europe In The First Decade After
The Fall Of The Iron Curtain," in Mapping Value Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe (Brill,
2010).. (Leiden: Brill, 2004).
616Ukraine is an associate state since 1993
617EIU Digital Solutions, "Democracy Index 2016," Democracy Index 2016 - The Economist Intel-
ligence Unit, accessed June 31, 2017, https://www.eiu.com/public/topicalreport.aspx?campaignid =
DemocracyIndex2016.; ”NationsinTransit2016, ”|FreedomHouse, January04, 2017, accessedJuly19, 2017, https :
//freedomhouse.org/report/nations − transit/nations − transit −
2016.; ”TwelveMythsaboutChangeinUkraine, ”StopFake.org, July18, 2017, accessedJuly31, 2017, https :
//www.stopfake.org/en/twelve−myths− about− change− in− ukraine/.
618"Twelve Myths about Change in Ukraine," StopFake.org, July 18, 2017, , accessed July 31, 2017,
https://www.stopfake.org/en/twelve-myths-about-change-in-ukraine/.; Loek Halman and Arts, "(Post-
)modernization, Individualization And Individualism: Value Changes In Central And Eastern Europe
In The First Decade After The Fall Of The Iron Curtain Advanced Search button for Search (Post-
)modernization, Individualization And Individualism: Value Changes In Central And Eastern Europe In
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Generally, individuals in the region for both waves lacked trust in their political in-
stitutions, even if the rate and success of democratization differs within the region. The
average feelings of government corruption across the region or Wave 5, for example, show
a µ = 3.41, Poland reported the comparatively ’least’ corruption with a 5.3 on a 1:10
scale. Alternatively, trust levels in government institutions across Wave 5 show an av-
erage of 31% respondents who replied they either ’trust completely’ or ’trust somewhat’
government. Looking at the individual results, Poland trusted their government the least
with only 17%, though they have faired the best in the democratization project according
to Freedom House with a ranking of "Free" for 2005 and 2012.619 However, perceptions
are important because they spur either action or in action. For the first hypotheses we see
negative perceptions do not, at least, cause individuals to mistrust one another. However
there are other implications for this variable when looked at independent of social trust.
Table 14: Perceptions vs. Democracy Score By WVS Country and Year.
WVS Year CPI∗ FH Score∗ FH Staus∗
Georgia ’08 3.9 4.0 "Partly Free"
Moldova ’06 3.2 3.5 "Partly Free"
Poland ’06 3.7 1.0 "Free"
Russia ’06 2.5 5.5 "Not Free"
Ukraine ’06 2.8 2.5 "Free"
Belarus ’11 2.4 6.5 "Not Free"
Poland ’12 5.5 1.0 "Free"
Russia ’11 2.4 5.5 "Not Free"
Slovenia ’11 5.9 1.0 "Free"
Ukraine ’11 2.3 3.5 " Partly Free"
*CPI is scored from 1-10 where 10 is the least corrupt or "Very Clean". Freedom House scores democracy on a scale of
1-7 with1 being "Free" and 7 rating as "Not Free" The numbers come from the year after the WVS interviews. This is
because FH reports are for the year previous. For example Ukraine’s 2006 results are in the FH 2007 report. 621
The First Decade After The Fall Of The Iron Curtain," in Mapping Value Orientations in Central and
Eastern Europe (Brill, 2010),110.
619Freedom House "Freedom in the World" reports 2007. Other research has shown, on average, per-
ceptions of corruption (CPI) can be associated with trust in government institutions, particularly the
WVS question on this topic.620 Given these results, the author created a model for Poland where the
WVS’s "trust in government" question was replaced by CPI to see if the effects would change; "trust in
government" is ranked on a 1-4 scale where 1 is "trust completely and 4 is "no trust at all". The results
did not change. An anova was run to confirm these findings. For the sake of thoroughness, the author
repeated the OLS, as well as anovas, for each in each of the countries for each wave and was met with
the same result: neither CPI nor trust in government had any interaction effect with trust, though it
was sometimes found to be credible/significant on its own mirroring the CPI results at the country level
for each wave.
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Perceptions of Corruption (CPI)
The results for both waves showed perceived levels of government corruption had an
independent and credible impact on how the people in the region felt about democracy.
The less corrupt the state was perceived to be, the more people felt democracy was im-
portant. These findings were theoretically expected and support current understandings
of corruption an its effects on democratic support, though are interesting in the context
of the region. Given the perceived levels of corruption one might have expected beliefs
in high levels of corruption influence a greater belief in the importance of democracy.622
The exact answer to this question is beyond the scope of this research, however it is still
an important consideration to note. Widespread belief in the corruption of the state, ac-
cording to the literature, makes a society more likely to accept and support authoritarian
political behaviors.623 Anderson and Tverdova find in countries where corruption is high,
supporters of the regime do not share the notion their government is corrupt– when in
fact empirical evidence supports it is.624 The reverse may also be true. Perceptions drive
reality for better or worse. However, they can also be drivers of change as was seen in
the fall of the USSR.625 A look at Table 1 allows one to see this in ’action’. Poland is
ranked as "Free" with a Freedom score of 1 for Wave 5 and 6, however, Poles perceived
their government as very corrupt for Wave 5, and corrupt for Wave 6. Could this be a
result of cultural attitudes towards government and institutions? Or could it be more
than that? If we are to believe trust is a process, it will take time and experience for
society to have reliable interactions with a more credible government for attitudes and
perceptions to change. Inglehart’s (2006) research shows as positive experiences increase,
so will improved perceptions. Looking again at Table 1, we can see this reflected with a
higher CPI score for Wave 6, indicating a somewhat reduced belief in corruption among
622Luigi Manzetti and Carole J. Wilson, "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?"
Corruption and Democracy in Latin America, August 2007, , doi:10.2307/j.ctt9qh6n2.7.
623Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Under-
standing Post-Communist Societies (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998),
224.
624Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova, "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes
toward Government in Contemporary Democracies," American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 1
(2003): , doi:10.2307/3186095.
625Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (New York: Penguin Books, 1996),
133.
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Poles. However, when one places the Bayesian RE HLM CPI results in the context of
democratic support in the region overall, it is somewhat concerning.
Support for democracy in the region across both waves experienced a drop from 73%
in Wave 5 to an average of about 63% in Wave 6.626 This represents a full 10 point drop
between waves. It is difficult to know if this drop is related to the loss Moldova and
Georgia in Wave 6 in favor of Slovakia and Belarus. Given Slovakia’s high democracy
rating and relatively more robust civil society, and Belarus’ poor ratings, according to
Freedom House this likely does not explain the full drop.627 In other words, the model
results should not be taken on their face as good news for the region over all.
The current research on the region suggests poor institutions may to blame for the
drop in democratic support.628 Corruption is so embedded into the system of most of
these states, it is impossible to avoid entirely. Indeed, in some instances it is ultimately
’preferred’ to the official mode of dealing with the state and the ineffective and/ or
corrupt bureaucracy. The sistema, as discussed in Chapter 3, is so entrenched across
much of the region, bribes or favors are short hand for simply "getting things done" such
as filing for travel visas, dealing with the courts, tax organizations, or even hospitals
and schools.629 Unlike blat’ and krugovaya poruka, sistema corruption seeks to enrich
individuals in the bureaucracy at the expense of the people. It is this perceived "moral"
difference that creates resentment between citizens and institutions630 , and potentially
decreased satisfaction with democracy.631 Though it is sometimes preferred or accepted
626 Meaning, those who offered a rating on the importance of democracy as being 8 or greater.
627"Freedom in the World 2017," Freedom House, September 25, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.
628Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" So-
cial Research 76, no. 1 (2009): , http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146. ; Luigi Manzetti and Car-
ole J. Wilson, "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?" Corruption and Democracy
in Latin America, August 2007, doi:10.2307/j.ctt9qh6n2.7.; Ivana MarkovTrust and democratic transi-
tion in post-communist Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).; Bo Rothstein and Eric M.
Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," World Politics 58, no. 01 (2005): ,
doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.
629 Zaloznaya 2017 pp 66, 115; Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks
Help Modernize Russia?" Social Research 76, no. 1 (2009): , http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146.
630 Marina Zaloznaya, The Politics of Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Transitional Eastern Europe.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 40.; Anderson and Tverdova 2003
631Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its alternatives: Under-
standing post-Communist Societies (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999),
102.
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this does not mean it is free from critique: this creates and environment where citizens
feel it is ok to steal from the government or circumvent formal rules because the state
is unable or, in reality, wholly unwilling to change sistema to benefit the people. It is
this conflict between the governed and the state that likely accounts for the results found
here.
However, the author of this research in no way wishes to leave the reader with the
impression this result is fixed, predetermined, or immutable, regardless of the carry over
of these behaviors from the Communist period. As discussed above with Poland, this
situation has the ability to change overtime given the understanding trust is a process.
As society has improved direct positive experiences with institutions, individuals may
change their disposition towards greater trust in their governments. What this requires
is both simple and at the same time, monumental: leaders with the political will to expose
the system for what it is, and change course to a more transparent and efficient system.
632 While this research shows corruption is an independent effect from all levels or trust,
in relation to democratic support, it is the belief of this author improved institutions can
foster institutional trust where it is lacking.
Hypothesis 2
H2 Is supported at the region level for both waves. These findings uphold the notion
trust is a process existing on different levels, often times multiple levels at the same time
as discussed in Chapter 4. Trust matters to both models in both waves however the levels
between them do not, on average, across the region. Making connections and creating and
maintaining trust was important in these networks they remain largely intact across the
region. 633 Further, the over all feeling of avoidance of interaction with authorities and
apathy towards institutions remains and is understandable where institutions have failed.
The very nature of blat’ networks and krugovaya poruka is grounded in family, blood-ties,
632Bo Rothstein, The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International
Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 164-192.; Ledeneva
633Huseyn Aliyev, "Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus," Demokrati-
zatsiya 21, no. 1 (2013):.; Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help
Modernize Russia?" Social Research 76, no. 1 (2009): , http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146.; Dmitry
Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.
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community, and social relationships which operate outside of government institutions,
not for the personal profit of the participant but, for the general welfare of those in the
network. Human beings are not unidimensional -existing at one level of trust at a time-
but rather multidimensional; this means people often draw on all levels of their trust
networks, to varying degrees, when help is needed. Studies have shown these networks
can include intermediaries from out-groups, to include people of other ethnicities, and
are not always exclusionary.634; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and
the Prospects for Consolidating Russias Democratic Transition," American Journal of
Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.. This is especially true when
society generally has greater opportunity to interact with people outside of their own
ethnicity because of higher concentrations of ethnic others in their communities.635
Hypothesis 3.
H3 is not supported for both waves, however the findings potentially support Gell-
ner’s understanding of atomization not being solely positive or negative in orientation
to democratic values. This means, on average, atomized trusters do not have a credible
difference between generalized trusters and their feelings of democratic importance. In
other words, being atomized, at the aggregate region level, is not always going to have a
negative impact on how one feels about democracy.
Russian Discussion.
Hypothesis 1.
H1 is upheld across both waves. As expected, the findings in Russia mirror that
of the region in both waves. How individuals feel about government corruption has no
credible impact on how society feels for one another in relation to their support for
democracy for the years 2005 nor for 2012. This contradicts the accepted literature on
634Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.
635Donna Bahry et al., "Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia," The American Political Science
Review 99, no. 4 (November 2005): , http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/30038962.
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the region from the instrumentalists 636 yet supports Khodyakov’s (2007) "Strong Weak"
state model. The system of informal networks is steeped in Russian society from top to
bottom. Unable, or in some instances –unwilling–, to interact with a state that is seen
to be corrupt at worst or disinterested at best, Russians often prefer to turn to their
trust networks in order to ’get things done’. 637 This common Russian perception that
"politicians have one life and our lives do not cross" is perhaps explicitly modeled here.638
Russian society has come to believe much more strongly in one in another, in so much
as what is happening at the governmental or institutional level does not directly impact
how they trust.
Trust in Government: In the Nation’s Capital.
Trust in government in Russia for Waves 5 and 6 returned conflicting results. For Wave
5 we saw a mirror image of what the region displayed overall. In other words, the less one
felt they could trust the government, the less they were likely to support democracy. In
Wave 6, the same result was returned, however the effect was not significant for 2011 which
is difficult to explain, and goes against expected expectations in the literature. While a
full discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this research, some considerations
are in order. Thinking of Wave 5, which mirrors the literature on this topic, placing this
wave in context of time, one should recall 2006 the second year of Putin’s second term as
President. While the economy was on the rise due to increasing oil prices world-wide639
corruption was still seen as a pervasive problem. Sistema was in full swing, as President
Putin was replacing oligarchs for new ones in the form of siloviki, his friends from his
days in the KGB, who he had given considerable power. While the rule of law had been
636Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust,"
World Politics 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.; William Mishler and Richard Rose,
"What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): ,
doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.
637Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" Social
Research 76, no. 1 (2009): , http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146.; Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a
Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285
638"Public Opinion 2012," Levada Center, 2012, http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/2012eng.pdf.
639The World Bank, "Russian Economic Report," Russian economic re-
port (Russian) | The World Bank, March 24, 2006, accessed July 01, 2017,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/826961468295838920/Russian-economic-report.
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addressed to some extent as it regards to average Russian citizens, such as neighborly
disputes or violent crime, political crimes, however, were clearly still adjudicated from
Moscow 640. As such, Russian society was still aware of the depth of political corruption
still present in the government, leading to distrust.
However, as time passed between Wave 5 (2006) and Wave 6 (2001) much had tran-
spired. Russia was coming to the end of Medvedev’s first term as Russian President.
It was widely speculated Putin would try to reassert power in some way increasing a
mixture of apathy and anger in society: would Putin run again? 641 This discontent
might account for the slight decrease in government trust between Waves 5 and 6 (see
Chapter 6, Tables 6 and 11). What impacts institutional or government trust is their
performance.642 Indeed, it was announced in September 2011 Medvedev would step aside
to be Prime Minister for Putin in the 2012 election. It could be society had written off
their lack of trust in government as an absolute given in such a way it no longer had an
overall significant impact how they felt about democracy that year. Anger was stirred,
however, leading to numerous protests at the end of 2011 and well into 2012 amidst
government crackdowns. There could also be other latent variables not accounted for
here which explain why trust in government is no longer significant. For example, the
growing tide of the extreme right authoritarianism and nationalism that was spreading
across Europe at this time643 had also affected Russia as well. It is no secret Putin’s au-
thoritarian presidency and control over the media already spurred this from within and
even encouraged the extreme right in Europe during this time.644. This could account for
the 3% drop, from 60% to 57%, in overall feelings that democracy is important between
Waves 5 and 6. In order to parse out the results of this wave, further research needs to
640Amnesty International; Carnegie
641RFE/RL, "Twelve Days That Shook The Kremlin," RadioFreeEu-
rope/RadioLiberty, October 05, 2011; "Public Opinion 2012," Levada Center, 2012,
http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/2012eng.pdf.
642Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," Sociology 41, no. 1 (2007): ,
doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.; William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of
Political Trust?" Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.
643Michael Allen Hansen, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explana-
tion for Vote Choice," PhD diss., University Wisconsin- Milwaukee, 2016, abstract, 2016, ,
http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148.
644Ibid.
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be considered.
Hypothesis 2.
H2 is not supported for Wave 5 but is for Wave 6. Particularized trusters were
credibly different from generalized trusters in their reduced support for democracy for
the year 2006. A closer look at the data illuminates the differences. In 2006, ∼ 79% of
generalized trusters rated democracy’s importance at 8 or higher, particularized trusters
came in at ∼ 50%, and other trusters at ∼ 57%. One notes particularized trusters are
more similar than generalized trusters, however it is important to note even other trusters
came in at over 50% which is somewhat surprising. For 2011, generalized trusters rated
the importance of democracy as being an 8 or higher at a rate of ∼ 61% a drops of
18%, particularized trusters remained stable at ∼ 60%, and other trusters saw a large
drop to ∼ 33% (see table in appendix). In the absence of longitudinal data it will be
difficult to explain these results, however one possibility is what Chebankova (2013) found
in her study of trust in the Russian context. Using longitudinal data, she was able to
uncover cyclical patterns based on socio-economic conditions.645 She termed these public
and private phases. In short, from 2000-2006, Russia had entered what she called a
"private phase" in which society was largely interested on focusing on self interests after
the relative poverty and chaos of the 1990s. The initial excitement and hope with the
coming of democratization ended by 2000, leaving the people exhausted and disillusioned.
Russians did not seem to be disappointed with the change of regimes, per se, but rather
how it was being implemented or governed in Russia. In short, Russian society was in a
period of disillusionment with the ’debacle’ of the Yeltsin years. Feeling they could do
nothing to change the state of affairs brought a return to the us versus them positioning;
society’s focus became improving one’s own personal position and retreating from the
public sphere. The economy was on the rise in 2006 due to surging oil prices, which
may explain why income was not significant during this wave, however, Chebankova’s
(2013) research finds this private phase had not peaked until 2006. However, the shift,
645Elena Chebankova, "Public and Private Cycles of Socio-Political Life in Putin’s Russia," Post-Soviet
Affairs 26, no. 2 (2010): , doi:10.2747/1060-586X.26.2.121.
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she asserts began to appear in 2005.
This can be seen most acutely in a decision made the previous year to replace some
government benefits with flat monetary compensation. This was a source of consternation
among Russian society, and seemed to imbue citizens with a heightened sense of the binary
nature of their relations with the state being an "us versus them scenario." Indeed, 22%
of the people who responded to a Levada Center poll in March of 2005 felt Putin was
responsible for creating societal tensions surrounding the benefits issue, 37% felt it was
the government more generally. 646. Similarly, the same year, the WVS also asked a
question regarding what Russians expect of a democracy in their state. The survey
participants were asked to respond on a scale of 1-10 importance, with 1, being the least
and 10 being the most important, to the following question: "Governments tax the rich
and subsidize the poor." 63% of the respondents answered 8 or higher, with 71% of those
responding with a rating of 10. Taken together with the results of the interaction model,
which showed there was no direct impact from government trust impacting how society
trusted one another in relation to support for democracy, we can say improved economic
conditions began to awaken a sort of renewed moral compass. In other words, government
mistrust was not the impetus for society’s shift in focus, but rather economic antecedent
considerations.
As Chapter 6 showed, there was not a significant change in the percentage of trusters
in each category. However, during 2011 there was an increase of ∼ 3% in particularized
trusters feeling democracy was important and a decrease from generalized trusters of
∼ 10%. If we examine the notion of trust as a process, one sees it is capable of change, in
either direction based on circumstances, and is not immutable. The data seems to sug-
gests particularized trusters may have been spurred to relatively stronger feelings towards
democracy by some possible event or anticipation while generalized trusters became dra-
matically more disillusioned; this is where longitudinal data would be especially helpful
in order to see "shocks in the system".647 Though we do not have the benefit of continu-
646"Sotsialno politicheskaya situatsiya v Rossii v fevrale g po oprosam obshhestvennogo mneniya.,"
Levada Center, March 17, 2005, accessed July 01, 2017, https://www.levada.ru/2005/03/17/sotsialno-
politicheskaya-situatsiya-v-rossii-v-fevrale-2005-g-po-oprosam-obshhestvennogo-mneniya/
647Natalia Letki and Geoffry Evans, "Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Eu-
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ous year-by-year data in this research, one can still look to events happening during this
time for possible clues and compare this to other research. The results seem to confirm
Chebakova’s (2013) findings. Russia was beginning the ascent out of the private-phase as
the economy continued to strengthen. This resulted in a sort of post-materialist mindset
where improved economic conditions allowed society become more active and concerned
over democratic issues and increased public participation, rather than be focused mainly
on their economic survival.
One possible explanation centers around concerns over Putin’s return and general
anger over the upcoming Duma elections, both of which were anticipate to be rigged or
a forgone conclusion all year,648 were acute enough to to spur large protest movements
the end of 2011 and well into 2012, as discussed in Chapter 3. It is likely people who
might otherwise not engage in protest, saw a danger to their own perceptions of how
Russian society should be governed, the people banned together when their political
values were threatened. In short, when faced with corruption and a lack of governmental
trust, particularized trusters saw an increase in the importance of democracy over the
Wave 5 results and were more closely aligned with the position of generalized trusters.
Finally, one must also consider it is possible Wave 5 was an outlier year, or perhaps it is
really 2011 that is the outlier year in relation to the differences between particularized and
generalized trusters. This is why the author cautions against too strong of interpretation
into the conclusions reached here. It will be up to future research to attempt to falsify
these findings.
Hypothesis 3.
H3 is upheld for both waves. Overall, these findings conform with the general and
specific literature, indicating atomization leads to a reduction in democratic support. This
is especially noticed when comparing other trusters in 2006, who were still on average
supportive of democracy, to other trusters in 2011. The percentages of other trusters
rope," British Journal of Political Science, 2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242.
648Ellen Barry and Michael Schwirtz, "Observers Detail Fraud in Russian Election
Won by Putin," The New York Times, March 05, 2012, accessed July 01, 2017,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/observers-detail-flaws-in-russian-election.html.
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only dropped slightly from ∼ 13% to ∼ 12% between waves. As noted in the last section,
other trusters saw a large drop in finding democracy to be important by ∼ 24% from
Wave 5 to 6. This may present a concerning trend where other trusters may pose more
of a threat to democracy than in Wave 5. These results may be explained when placed in
context of the larger concern over the rise of extreme right attitudes across Europe and
Russia.649
Control Variables.
Life Satisfaction Life Satisfaction was the only control variable that was significant
in both waves. What is interesting is in the descriptive statistics. between Waves 5 and
6, there was an increase in the percentage of Russians who were satisfied with their lives,
which is ranked on a scale of 1-10, with 10 being the most satisfaction. For Wave 5,
∼ 32% ranked their satisfaction an 8 or higher, and ∼ 45% ranked it between a score
of 5 to 7. For Wave 6, we see those who ranked satisfaction 8 or higher rose to ∼ 37%
and 5 to 7 rose, as well, to ∼ 49%. At the same time we see a raw drop in support for
democracy between Waves5 and 6. Life Satisfaction is linked to market performance and
incomes. Given Russia’s economic performance was newly booming in 2005 and peaking
in 2011, the raw results of satisfaction align with expectations. However when compared
against support for democracy, the results are more interesting. As shown in Chapter 6,
Wave 5 saw an increase of 0.16 on feelings of democratic importance for every β unit step
in life satisfaction. Though Russians report to be happier in Wave 6, there is a drop in
the effect this happiness has on democratic attitudes by and average of 0.07 points per
increase in life satisfaction. While these results do not seem to go together, Inglehart’s
(2006) research shows this is a typical pattern in Russia; rises in happiness are related
to economic conditions rather than political realities.650 It will be interesting to compare
these findings to a new regression analysis with Wave 7 results due out in 2019. In a
recent report, the European Bank finds Russians have some of the lowest life satisfaction
649Michael Allen Hansen, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explana-
tion for Vote Choice," PhD diss., University Wisconsin- Milwaukee, 2016, abstract, 2016, ,
http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148.
650https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1d0f/1c409f46040281bde732256586faf68e00d2.pdf.
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ratings today among the states categorized as ’in transition’.651
Gender and Education. Females were shown to have more support for democracy.
The literature on this is mixed, as discussed in Chapter 5. However gender was not found
to be significant in either wave. Further, the more education one had the more likely
they were to support democracy, though this was only significant for Wave 5. Both of
these results suggest there are other factors which transcended both gender and education
which were more important.
Age. The results for age were mixed; for Wave 5 Age was found to be significant and
showed as one aged, their support for democracy would decrease. By contrast, Wave 6
found the reverse: as one aged, one was more likely to support democracy than younger
people. Mishler and Rose (2001) longitudinal research found, initially, older people were
less likely to support democracy due to considerations regarding pensions and social
safety net expectations that were part and parcel of the old regime (meaning before
Gorbachev). However, the researchers’ conclusions were, as time passed between the old
regime and the new and more political knowledge was increased, these positive feelings
would be transferred to the new regime. The findings of this research suggest that may
have happened here.
Income there was a very slight reversal this wave from last showing the more income
one had the less they supported democracy, however this was still not a significant effect.
This could be, as before, a result in the increase in the overall attitudes one had towards
their income in as the economy was on the rise due to increased oil prices. Wether
real or imagined, Russians perceived their economic standing had improved. Immigrants
This wave saw an interesting drop in those who did not feel having immigrants as their
neighbors should be a cause for concern over those who did: the previous were 0.12 less
likely to support democracy than those who did not want immigrants as their neighbor,
however, again, this effect was not significant. Internet The rate of internet usage was
not found to be a significant factor, though this was largely expected for this wave. As
discussed before, the more interesting aspect of this variable may not appear until the
651"EBRD Transition Report 2016-17," EBRD, , accessed July 01, 2017,
http://www.ebrd.com/transition-report.
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next wave and may interact with age. These effects which are commonly used as controls
when considering attitudinal variables have a flat and/ or non significant effect across
this wave therefore other considerations must account for this phenomena.
Importance of the Findings.
Previous literature has been unable or unwilling to grapple with the true nature of
trust by focusing solely on one form of trust: generalized trust. The literature claims
particularized trust can lead to the atomization of society, which is detrimental to democ-
racy. However, atomization is the absence of trust in others. Particularized trust is based
on trust in people you know. Atomization is the mirror negative of any form of trust.
Therefore, conceptualizing a bankruptcy of trust with those who do trust does not follow
logically. Creating a trust variable that captures the dynamic nature of trust relations is
a key departure.
This research has tackled head on the elusive nature of trust in a manner that has
allowed it to be more appropriately measured, reflecting as close an proximation to reality
as is possible. This included the focus on the importance of particularized trust in relation
to a society’s attitudes towards democracy. This project also has taken a new approach
to trust by removing ’atomized others’ and giving them their own category separate from
particularized trusters. Because this research has in mind the potential generalizability
of the trust variable, the measure was constructed carefully to ensure it can be applied
across divergent cases, as well as globally.
Since social trust is seen as the cornerstone to civil society and, in turn, liberal democ-
racy, it is vital to have a true understanding of where countries stand on this important
measure. If one aspect of a measure is incorrect, then the final result will be flawed. The
new measure needed to be both more accurate to trust int he region, but also created in
such a way it would be applicable in a more generalizable fashion. The author believes
this has been accomplished here. As such, our previous held views of countries as not
being trusting will have to change, and with it, our attitudes towards their prospects for
democratization. This research is an important ’first step’ in this process.
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Implications for Future Research.
Of course, there is still much work to be done. Therefore, there are many avenues
of further research one might consider in light of the findings here. Encourage other
surveys to add the particularized trust question. First and foremost, this research hopes
to encourage other surveys to include the particularized trust question. Adding the
multidimensional variable, not only better accounts for the nature of trust, it also allows
one to see patterns much more readily between the different levels of trust. This will
allow for more accurate prediction of potential social problems, as seen here in the other
category in Russia between waves, or track more detailed changes that might indicate
more social openness in relation to democratic attitudes.
Trust as the dependent variable. The promise of this research would likely follow
with trying to understand what affects changes in trust more directly. This is possible
through examining trust through a Bayesian multinomial logistic regression. Having a
multidimensional trust variable may permit a more contextual understanding of what
changes in the economic, political, or social sphere may cause trust to rise or fall in each
level. Having this ability will also help researchers who study trust in the comparative
political context to make policy recommendations on how to improve social relations
within a given country to foster greater levels of trust and discourage the potential harmful
effects of atomized trusters.
Trust by geography. The author would also like to test this variable in relation to
geography. How are those who are in more urban areas trust in relation to those in
more rural? This will also help further identify more specific patterns that may occur by
region within a given state, across different cities, or even when in closer proximity to
other states or continents.
Examine Trust in relation to authoritarian attitudes. As Mishler, et al have pointed
out, a reduction in trust can lead to acceptance of authoritarian attitudes. Given what
has been seen in this case, it would be interesting to see how this applies here, as well as
across Europe. Given the ground swelling of extreme right attitudes across Europe and
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into Russia,652 this is a logical choice for further inquiry.
Testing for generalizability. Another logical step would be to test this measure in
other specific contexts, or more broadly to test for generalizability. Can this measure be
utilized not only, say in the African context, but also in South America? Can we draw
out patterns globally?
Wave 7 in 2019. Significant social and political changes in the region have taken place
since Wave 6. As mentioned previously, we have seen the rise of extreme right parties
in Europe buttressed, in part, by Vladimir Putin.653 We have also seen the grassroots
support for Alexey Navalny in Russia grow, particularly from the Russian youth. As
discussed in Chapter 3, his ability to connect to the people has been unprecedented. His
use of Internet tools, such as LiveJournal, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, VK, has been
unique. He has a team of dedicated workers who helped him to launch well-produced
live news streams and videos on YouTube and pushes them to all platforms. His reach
has spread across Russia, to include organizing Navalny HQ offices as far East as Vladi-
vostok.654 Despite his numerous arrests, he is seen as the only opposition to Vladimir
Vladimirovich, though it is not likely he will be successful in the 2018 election. To what,
if any, extent will these events effect trust and democratic support in Russia? Will any
age group be more effected? Will there be regional or city versus urban changes?
Conclusion.
The main goal of this research was to create a new measure that would more accurately
reflect the nature of how human being trust. Chapter 2 reviewed the the background
to the relationship between citizens and the state, as well as a review of the general
652Michael Allen Hansen, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explana-
tion for Vote Choice," PhD diss., University Wisconsin- Milwaukee, 2016, abstract, 2016, ,
http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148.
653Fredrik Wesslau, "Putin," ECFR, October 19, 1970, , accessed July 01, 2017,
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentaryputinsfriendsineurope7153.;MikeLofgren, ”Trump, Putin, andtheAlt−
RightInternational, ”TheAtlantic,October31, 2016, https : //www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/trump−
putin−alt−right−comintern/506015/.;https : //imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2500−putinism−
and− the− european− far − right
654"Navalny’s campaign headquarters opens in Khabarovsk," Navalny’s campaign head-
quarters opens in Khabarovsk - Interfax, May 13, 2107, , accessed July 01, 2017,
http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=753761.
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literature. This helped expose the hyper-focus on Western notions of institutional and
social formation with little cultural context. Chapter 3 provided the reader with an
extensive background into the post-Communist, and in particular, the Russian case given
it’s dominance over policy and institutions over most of the past century. The region
and Russia specific literature still emphasized a focus on generalized trust and eschewing
particularized trusters as atomizing. However, Chapter 4 provided us with the theoretical
framework for the construction of a new trust variable that could better capture the
nature of trust itself. We were reminded we are not one sort of truster or another, but
rather more complex being who rely on an array of trust occurring at all levels to some
degree or another, all simultaneously. Chapter 5 offered the reader an the explanation
of the methodology employed here. It was noted, for the region, the RE HLM method
would best potentially capture concerns around endogeneity, especially when combined
with Bayesian inference with small M concerns. The ordinary least squares linear model
was utilized in the Russian case. And, in Chapter 6, we found the results of this work,
with a discussion, here in this Chapter.
There are three main points of interest the author would like taken away from this
research. First, this project has focused on the creation of a new trust measure that
would more accurately reflect on how human beings trust. The author believes, at the
very least, this has been accomplished through the creation of a multidimensional that
has a separate category for atomized trusters. This will allow researchers the ability to
see changes to the different levels of social trust at a glance to better predict potential
conflicts in social and political issues. Because trust is seen as an important indicator
to democracy, getting this measure right matters. As discussed previously, perceptions
drive action, and form reality. For example, if those in a position of global power, such
as the IMF, or World Bank have the wrong perception of a social situation in a nation,
this could have a direct impact on how a developing country is, not only monetarily
supported, but also directed to make reforms.
Second, the author has shown support for Khodyakov’s (2007) "Strong’ Weak" state
model. It has held true for both the region and in the specific Russian case. While how
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one feels about their government and institutions has a direct impact on how they feel for
democracy overall, it does not directly impact trust at the individual levels when thinking
about democratic support. These are independent events. As such, the Institutionalist
position may have to be reevaluated given the limitations of this project and additional
research. This also leads into the notion that particularized trust is not especially atom-
izing, or even necessarily exclusionary. In both waves, the inclusion of immigrants had no
impact on the models what so ever, suggesting other post-materialist considerations for
particularized trusters, or the possible influence of the extreme right on atomized trusters
may be at play.
Finally, while cultural considerations related to the legacy of Communist rule may
have some lingering effect on how society deals with perceived ineffective or corrupt
institutions, this is in no way a fixed condition. The author agrees with Mishler and
Rose (2001) that political knowledge and increased time and experience with effective
institutions will have a beneficial impact on how society perceives democracy overall.
The case of Poland, as discussed earlier, may be an example of this. However, given the
current state of political flux in Poland towards the extreme right655, more research will
need to be done in this regard.
655Michael Allen Hansen, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explana-
tion for Vote Choice," PhD diss., University Wisconsin- Milwaukee, 2016, abstract, 2016,
http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148.
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Figure 5: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects:Intercept. Wave 5.
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Figure 6: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: CPI. Wave 5.
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Figure 7: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized Trust. Wave 5.
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Figure 8: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized TrustxCPI. Wave 5.
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Figure 9: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Other TrustxCPI. Wave 5.
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Figure 10: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Other Trust. Wave 5.
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Figure 11: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects:Intercept. Wave 6.
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Figure 12: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: CPI. Wave 6.
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Figure 13: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized Trust. Wave 6.
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Figure 14: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized TrustxCPI. Wave 6.
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Figure 15: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized TrustxCPI. Wave 6.
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Figure 16: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Other Trust. Wave 6.
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